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Chennai Court September 1919 Judgments

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Sep 04 1919

Alagiasundaram Pillay and ors. Vs. the Midnapore Zemindary Co., Ltd., ...

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-04-1919

Reported in: 54Ind.Cas.816

Bakewell, J 1. Under Section 15 of the Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, Madras Act II of 1894, the newly created office in this ease is hereditary. Section 9 gives the power of appointment to the new office to the proprietor and the manner in which he shall proceed is declared by Section 15; he has to ascertain the members of the family of the last holder, and then to select from among them the person whom he may consider best qualified.2. In making the appointment to a new office which is not hereditary, the choice of the proprietor is limited by Section 15(1) to the family of the last holder, but within that limit he may select the person whom the considers to be best qualified under the rules set out in Section 103. In the case of a vacancy in an hereditary office, under Section 9 the proprietor also makes an appointment, but under Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 10, he is bound to have regard to the rule of primogeniture and his choice is, therefore, limited to a partic...


Sep 03 1919

Angamuthu Chetti Vs. Varatharajulu Chetti

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-03-1919

Reported in: (1919)37MLJ384

Abdur Rahim, C.J.1. The answer to the question referred depends mainly upon the interpretation of the scope and effect of a recent ruling of the Judicial Committee in Rangasami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan I.L.R. (1918) M. 523 where the law on the subject of surrender and alienation by a Hindu widow has been authoritatively considered. They begin by pointing-out that these two classes of transactions are different in their nature and legal incidents. Surrender is described as 'an effacement of the widow--an effacement which in other circumstances is effected by actual death or by civil death--which opens the estate of the deceased husband to his next heirs at that date '. In another place it is stated to be a withdrawal of the widow's life estate so that the whole estate should get vested at once in the grantee thus approving of the proposition as stated in Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gayawal I.L.R. (1891) Cal. 236 by Lord Morris that ' according to Hindu law the widow can accelerate ...


Sep 03 1919

The Municipal Chairman, Virudupatti Vs. Saravana Pillai

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-03-1919

Reported in: 54Ind.Cas.454

Krishnan, J.1. It seems to me to be clear that the District Munsif was wrong in holding that Section 262 of the District Municipalities Act, IV of 1884, was not a bar to the suit. Clause (2) of that section expressly prohibits a suit in any Court to recover money collected under the authority of the Act, provided that the provisions of the Act have been in substance and effect complied with. There is no case made here that, in assessing plaintiff, any of the relevant provisions of the Act was not complied with, nor is this a suit falling within the proviso to Section 262.2. Section 54 gives the power to the Chairman to decide the class in which a person has to be placed for professional tax and, in doing so, he has to satisfy himself as to the man's income. The action of the Chairman is subject only to an appeal to the Council under Section 97, and Section 101 provides that his assessment is final when there is no appeal to the Council, as was the case here. It would thus not be open t...


Sep 03 1919

Venkata Perumalla Pillai and ors. Vs. Marapudi Venkataswami Naidu

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-03-1919

Reported in: 54Ind.Cas.506

1. Vakil for appellants admits that the appeal is incompetent since it is based on a matter not before the lower Appellate Court. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.Memorandum of Objections.2. Upon the appeal being called on for hearing, the appellants' Vakil stated that the appeal did not lie because the matter to which it relates was not the subject of appeal to the lower Appellate Court, and he has argued that the respondent cannot proceed with his memorandum of objections because the appeal has not been withdrawn or dismissed for default within the meaning of Order XLI, Rule 22(4), Civil procedure Code. Rule 22 is contained in the rules grouped under the subheading 'procedure on hearing,' and sub-rule (1) applies to the hearing before the Court, as is shown by the expressions 'any respondent may not only support the decree...but take any cross-objections to the decree.' The latter privilege depends upon his having adopted a certain procedure before the case comes on for hear...


Sep 02 1919

Ramanathan Pillai Vs. M. Doraiswami Ayyangar and ors.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-02-1919

Reported in: (1920)38MLJ65

1. In execution of the decree in C.S. 34 of 1912 in the High Court, one Sayyed Mahomed Rowther was arrested. On 29th September 1914 the judgment-debtor and the present appellant as surety on behalf of the judgment-debtor executed a security bond for Rs. 4,443-2-0 in favour of the District Court of Ramnad in which Court the execution proceedings were pending, and the judgment-debtor was released. The bond provides for the payment of the amount either jointly or severally by the executants. There is also a further provision that in case of default in payment, the money should be recovered from the surety personally, and from the properties hypothecated under the security bond and from the other properties of the surety. The properties hypothecated are, it appears, situate in the Madura District. On the 8th February 1915 the appellant filed a suit (Original Suit No, 19 of 1915) in the Subordinate Judge's Court of Madura against the plaintiffs in C.S. No. 34 of 1912 and their judgment-debt...


Sep 02 1919

Ramanathan Pillai Vs. Doraiswami Aiyangar and Nine ors.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-02-1919

Reported in: (1920)ILR43Mad325

Moore, J.1. In execution of the decree in C.S. No. 34 of 1912 in the High Court, one Sayyed Muhammad Rowther was arrested. On 29th September 1914, the judgment-debtor and the present appellant as surety on behalf of the judgment-debtor, executed a security bond for Rs. 4,443-20 in favour of the District Court of Ramnad, in which Court the execution proceedings were pending, and the judgment-debtor was released.2. The bond provides for the payment of the amount either jointly or severally by the executants. There is also a further provision, that in case of default in payment, the money should be recovered from the surety personally, and from the properties hypothecated under the security bond and from the other properties of the surety. The properties hypothecated are, it appears, situate in the Madura district. On 8th February 1915, the appellant filed a suit (Original Suit No. 19 of 1915), in the Subordinate Judge's Court of Madura, against the plaintiffs in C.S. No. 34 of 1912 and t...


Sep 01 1919

Muthusami Asari Vs. Angayakannu Asari

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-01-1919

Reported in: 54Ind.Cas.807

Krishnan, J.1. The money in question was paid by the respondent (2nd defendant-petitioner) when execution was taken out against the family properties in his hands. The warrant of attachment is no doubt not very clear about what property was to be attached, but I think the meaning was to attach properties in his possession which were family properties. That being so, respondent can obtain a refund of the money paid by him only if he shows that certain properties belonging to him exclusively as his self-acquisition were threatened to be attached and to prevent such attachment he made the payment in question and that he had no family properties in his hands at all at the time of attachment. I am unable to accept the Subordinate Judge's disposal of the case on affidavits as satisfactory. The question should be properly tried on evidence. It is only if the respondent proves that his payment was an involuntary one occasioned by the decree being attempted to be executed against his own proper...


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