Chennai Court February 1918 Judgments
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Raghuvalu Naicker Vs. Singaram and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-14-1918
Reported in: 45Ind.Cas.517
Abdur Rahim, J.1. A complaint was made under Sections 352 and 504, Indian Penal Code, before the 2nd Presidency Magistrate. On the date fixed for the else the complainant was absent and the Magistrate discharged the accused. Then a fresh bom-plaint was lodged with reference to the same transaction before the 3rd Presidency Magistrate and he held that so far as the offence under Section 352, Indian Penal Code, was concerned, the order of the 2nd Presidency Magistrate operated as an acquittal and that the case should be proceeded with only with reference to the offence under Section 504, Indian Penal Code. We are asked to consider whether the order of the 3rd Presidency Magistrate that there has been an acquittal within the meaning of the law with respect to the charge under Section 352 by reason of the previous order of the 2nd Presidency Magistrate, is right.2. The case relating to an offence under Section 352 is a summing case, inasmuch as the punishment for such an offence is not mor...
Thatha Pillai and ors. Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-14-1918
Reported in: 45Ind.Cas.504
ORDER1. The convictions in these cases are under Section 26 of the Madras Forest Act and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. The land with reference to which this section has been applied admittedly belonged to the Devastanam and is Inam land. The Zemindar of Kadavur is the manager of the Devastanam. His estate and also the management of the Devastanam 'have been taken charge of by the Court of Wards under the Madras Court of Wards Act. Then an application was made for the use of the pasturage and of the natural produce of this land being regulated under Chapter III of the Forest Act. This chapter deals with the protection of land at the disposal of Government not included in reserved forests and says: 'subject to all rights now legally vested in individuals and communities the Governor in Council may, for any district or portion of a district, make rules to regulate the use of the pasturage or of the natural produce of land at the disposal of Government and not included in a ...
Muthuvelu Mudaliar Vs. Vythilinga Mudaliar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-13-1918
Reported in: 50Ind.Cas.205; (1919)36MLJ385
John Wallis, C.J.1. It is in my opinion not open to us to answer the question referred to us in the affirmative consistently with the decisions of the Privy Council in Pattabhiramier v. Venkatarow Naicken (1871) 13 M.I.A 560, Thumbusawmy Moodaly v. Hossain Rowthen I.L.R. (1875) Mad, Sithal Pershad v. Luchmi Pershad I.L.R. (1883) Cal. 30, Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din I.L.R. (1890) All. 387, Balkishen Das v. W.F. Legge I.L.R. (1899) All. 149 and Jhanda Singh Wahiduddin I.L.R. (1916) All. 570. All these decisions lay down that in cases in India not governed by Bengal Regulation XVI of 1806 instruments of this kind are to take effect according to their tenor, unless it appears from the terms of the instrument or the surrounding circumstances, excluding oral evidence of intention as inadmissible, that the intention was to effect a mortgage. In Thumbuswamy Moodaly v. Hossain Rowthen I.L.R. (1875) Mad. 1 the Privy Council refused to disturb a decision of this Court which took a different view...
Murajalli Munia Goundan Vs. Ramasami Chetti and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1918
Reported in: AIR1918Mad19; 45Ind.Cas.867; (1918)34MLJ528
Oldfield, J.1. The facts admitted or found are that 1st defendant and his father Gopal Row, mortgaged their property to 2nd defendant with possession under Exhibit I. Gopal Row afterwards sold the equity of redemption, as though the property were his self acquisition, to 3rd defendant by Exhibit II. The lower appellate court has found and we accept its findings, that the property belonged to the family and the sale does not bind 1st defendant. After Gopal Row's death, 1st defendant sold to plaintiff by Exhibit A and plaintiff now sues for possession of 1st defendant's share on payment of the appropriate proportion of the mortgage amount, which 3rd defendant has paid. The question is whether the suit, filed on 26th August 1912, is in time. It will be if the Article of Schedule I, Limitation Act, applicable is No. 148. It may be, if the Article is No. 144 and 3rd defendant's possession, which, it is not disputed, began in 1898, was not adverse to 1st defendant and plaintiff. It will not ...
Vathiar Venkatachariar Vs. P. Ponappa Ayyengar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1918
Reported in: 45Ind.Cas.959
Krishnan, J.1. This is an appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin, in Original Suit No. 11 of 1913, dismissing the plaintiff's suit on the ground that his claim was not of a civil nature under Section 9, Civil Procedure Code. The 1st plaintiff having died, the 2nd plaintiff alone has appealed to us against that decree and his learned Vakil has strongly urged that the finding of the lower Court is wrong.2. The plaintiffs' case, as stated in the plaint, is that in the Adniada Alwar temple in Alwar Tirnnagari in the Tinnevelly District there is an office called 'Teertham or Teerthakar's' office of which they and others, in all 29 in number, are the office holders, that the duty of the said office holders is to recite the Prabandam or Tiruvoimoli and the Vedas in the temple and in places where the idol is taken in procession when the Goshti or group of Teerthakars is formed, that special places are allotted to each of them in the temple for this purpose and that attach...
Kizhekke Manjambrath Avulla Vs. C.K.P. Kanna Kurup and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1918
Reported in: 47Ind.Cas.595
Bakewell, J.1. The question argued before us is, whether the plaintiff is debarred from bringing his suit by reason of the omission of some of the co-owners of the property in his previous suit for redemption in contra-vention of the provisions of Order XXXIV, Rule 1.2. The plaint states expressly that the previous suit was against the 1st defendant in his personal capacity and this also appears from the order dismissing the 4th defendant from that suit; there is, accordingly, no question of the members of the 1st defendant's Tarwad other than the 4th defendant being bound by the previous decree.3. The plaint does not allege that the plaintiff was ignorant of the claims of those persons to the Kanom right, and I think that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that he had notice of that claim when he brought the previous suit.4. It is obvious that if a mortgagor were at liberty to bring separate suits for redemption against several co-mor...
Bobba Padmanabhudu and anr. Vs. Bobba Buchamma
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-05-1918
Reported in: 47Ind.Cas.702; (1918)35MLJ144
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.1. Plaintiffs sue for a declaration that a will said to have been made by their brother, the deceased husband of the defendant, authorising her to adept a boy was never executed. The defendant pleaded in limine that such a suit is incompetent. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit; the only question in appeal is whether this decision is right. 2. The diversity of judicial opinion on the construction of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is so great that I have resolved upon confining my citations to the cases decided in Madras and to the decisions of the Privy Council. If I may say so with respect the consideration of this question has been rendered difficult by mixing up two distinct issues. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, while indicating the character of the right which may be declared by a court of law, leaves it to the discretion of such court to grant or refuse the relief claimed. In arguments addressed to courts and not infrequently in decisions a...
R. Rajachari Vs. Tirumugoor Devastanam Represented by Its Manager Veng ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-05-1918
Reported in: (1918)34MLJ419
Oldfield, J.1. The only question argued is whether the learned Judge was right in holding that the Civil Court had Jurisdiction.2. The facts, as now argued on, differ from those stated by the learned Judge. For they are that plaintiff, one of the fractional share-holders of the melwaram right in an inam village, that is one of the inamdars, acquired by gift the kudivaram right in the whole village, not in a portion of it, and that in 1897 he leased 50 cents of the whole to defendant, the appellant before us. The suit is on that lease for rent. Ordinarily Section 8(2) of the Estates Land Act would apply, the defendant would be deemed an occupancy ryot and the suit would lie in a Revenue Court. But it is admitted that the land is comprised in an estate falling under Section 3(2)(d) and argued that the exception to Section 8 is applicable and the land has ceased to be part, of an estate. In effect therefore the question is whether the exception governs the Sub-section (2) or only Sub-sect...
R. Rajachari Vs. Thirumugoor Devastanam
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-05-1918
Reported in: 45Ind.Cas.71
Oldfield, J.1. The only question argued is whether the learned Judge was right in holding that the Civil Court had jurisdiction.2. The facts, as now agreed on, differ from those stated by the learned Judge. For they are that plaintiff, one of the fractional share-holders of the Melvaram right in an Inam village, that is one of the Inamdars, acquired by gift the Kudivaram right in the whole village, not in a portion of it, and that in 1897 he leased 50 cents of the whole to the defendant, the appellant before us. The suit is on that lease for rent. Ordinarily Section 8 (2) of the Estates Land Act would apply, the defendant would be deemed an occupancy ryot and the suit would lie in a Revenue Court. But it is admitted that the land is comprised in an estate falling under Section 3 (2)(d) and argued that the exception to sectioti 8 is applicable and the land has ceased to be part of an estate. In effect, therefore, the question is whether the exception governs Sub-section (2) or only Sub-...
S.R.M.M.C.T. Muthiah Chetty and ors. Vs. A.L.V.R. Alagappa Chetty and ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-05-1918
Reported in: 47Ind.Cas.296
1. The payment into Court of assets realised and the application for rateable distribution were made on the same day, and the officer distributing the assets should have ascertained which act was prior in point of time. He distributed the assets on the footing that the application was prior.2. The plaintiffs who now challenge his action must show that it was wrongful, since there can be no presumption as to the order of events. The second point argued was that owing to an irregularity in the proceedings the application for execution made by the 1st defendant was not legally subsisting at the date of distribution.3. A valid application within Section 73 had been made and was on the file of the Court at the date of distribution, and we think that the requirements of the Section had been fulfilled.4. The third point is whether the decrees were against the same judgment debtor. The appellants obtained a decree for money against 3rd and 4th defendants personally and respondents obtained a s...
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