Chennai Court August 1917 Judgments
Browse smarter
Open an 18-section brief on any judgment
Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.
- AI Brief & Ask
- Semantic AI Search
- Devil's Bench
Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.
Bodduluru Nagayya Vs. Bachu Chenchuramayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-14-1917
Reported in: (1917)33MLJ674
1. The appellant is the owner of a certain land through which the water of a tank belonging to another person flows in a defined channel on to the respondents' land. The case of the appellant is that since the water that is turned into this artificial channel is what overflows the surplus weir of the tank in question, therefore no right of easement can be acquired with respect to that water. It must be noted that the owner of the tank has not raised the question, but objection was raised only by the owner of the intermediate land through which water flows before reaching the respondents' land. We think there can be no doubt that a person can acquire a right of easement with respect to water which is discharged over the surplus weir of a tank if he has been using and enjoying the water for a sufficient length of time and as a matter of right, as laid down in the Indian Easements Act.2. The learned Vakil for the appellant relied very strongly on Arkwright v. Gell (1839) 5 M. & W. 203 and...
Sankaramahalingam Chetti and anr. Vs. Muthulakshmi and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-14-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad39; 43Ind.Cas.860; (1917)33MLJ740
Spencer, J.1. The plaintiff sued her brother and brother's sons in this suit for the recovery of certain immoveable property to which she claimed title under deeds of sale and gift from her father. Questions were raised at the trial whether these deeds represented real or sham transactions and whether the defendants had a good title by adverse possession for over the statutory period. The suit has been decreed in the plaintiff's favour, both the lower courts holding that the defendants are debarred from raising these defences by the decision in a prior suit O.S. No. 232 of 1910 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Koilpatti which makes these matters res judicata.2. O.S. No. 232 of 1910 was a suit brought by the assignee of a mortgage to enforce a sale of the suit properties upon a bond executed by Muthulakshmi, who was 1st defendant in that suit and is the plaintiff in this suit. That suit was dismissed on the finding that the mortgage was a sham transaction devoid of con...
Thacharath Parkum Etathatta Kannan Raman Kurup (Dead) and ors. Vs. Tha ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-14-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad86; 43Ind.Cas.50; (1917)33MLJ753
Spencer, J.1. Exhibit A having been found by both the lower courts to be not genuine, this suit has resolved itself into a suit to redeem a mortgage or kanom of the year 1798, corresponding to the Malabar year 974.2. The District Munsif found the suit to be barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge reversed his finding on this point. I am of opinion that he was wrong and the District Munsif was right.3. Under Section 1clause 15 of the Limitation Act XIV of 1859 the mortgagors had 60 years from the date of mortgage to bring a suit for the recovery of their immoveable property. Those 60 years expired in 1858. The clause however provides that, if in the meantime an acknowledgment of the mortgagor's title or of his right of redemption shall have been given in writing signed by the mortgagee, the 60 years will be reckoned from the date of such acknowledgment. In this case it has been found that there was such an acknowledgment in 1861. (Malabar year 1037). The Subordinate Judge thought th...
P. Thiruvarangiah Vs. D. K. Pania and Co.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-14-1917
Reported in: 43Ind.Cas.673
Coutts Trotter, J.1. This is an action for damages for breach of three contracts between the parties dated the 24sh April, 27th April and 30th April 1914, under which the plaintiff agrees to purchase a certain number of cases of Belgium window glass. Those goods were shipped--we do not know the exact date, but as the invoices were nude oat on the 23rd July 1914 and the bills of exchange were dated the 29th July, the probability is that they were shipped between those dates, and it is conceded for the purpose of this case that they were shipped before the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany on the 3rd August. The contracts were c.i.f., c.i., Madras, and they were shipped on board a German ship the 'Spitzfels' at Antwerp. While she was on her voyage, war broke out; I am told that she was ultimately captured, and was brought to Colombo where the ship was condemned as a prize, but she was allowed to proceed to such ports in the British Empire as she had cargo consigned for an...
Papla Chakrapani Chettiar Vs. Ramaswamt thenkondan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-14-1917
Reported in: 42Ind.Cas.230
1. The plaintiff obtained a preliminary' decree in a redemption suit, which followed the form prescribed by Order XXXIV, rule 7 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and directed that upon payment into Court of the amount declared to be due on or before the appointed day, the defendants should put the plaintiff in possession of specified properties. The plaintiff paid the amount into Court before the appointed day hut the defendants retained possession of the properties, and the passing of a final decree in the suit was delayed for a considerable period owing to unsuccessful appeals by the defendants. The question now argued relates to the claim of the plaintiff that the defendants should account for the profits received by them from the date when they should have delivered possession and that the amount found due should be included in the final decree in the suit.2. Rule 8 (1) of the above-mentioned order prescribes the form of the decree to be passed when payment has been made by the p...
V. Ranga Rao Vs. Kithori Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-14-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad458; 42Ind.Cas.265
Spencer, J1. As I understand Exhibit 1, I feel no doubt that it is in terms an absolute gift deed of immoveable property, the denee's possession of which is postponed till the happening of a certain future event, namely, the death of the donor,2. When the clause reserving1 to the donor a power of revocation at her mere will, which, if it had remained, would, under Section 126 of the Transfer Of Property Act, have invalidated the gift, was struck out from the draft deed by consent of the parties, all that conditional character which the draft possessed was taken away from the deed as finally executed.3. The learned Judge was in error in thinking that because there is some ambiguity about the expression 'whereas the donee has served the donor faithfully for the period of ten years and upwards and wishes to continue his services to her', oral evidence could be let in to prove that future service was an essential condition of the contract. As in Madhavrao Moreshvar v. Kashibai Dattubhai 5 ...
Shenbagamuthu Pillai Vs. Vaduganathan Chetty and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-13-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad672; 42Ind.Cas.552
1. There was a sale of certain immoveable property in execution of a decree and the 2nd respondent who was not a party to the suit bought that property. He deposited the purchase money within the time allowed by Rule 85 of Order XXI. But it appears that the sale was set aside at the instance of the judgment-debtor. Then an appeal was filed against that order by the decree-holder. He succeeded in the appeal and the result was that the order setting aside the sale was set aside and the sale stood confirmed. After the Order of the first Court setting aside the sale, the purchaser applied for refund of the money and obtained an order for refund and we gather that notice of this application was given to the judgment-debtor and decree-holder, but they made no objection. Four months after the order of the Appellate Court upholding the sale, the respondent purchaser made an application for confirmation of the sale and for permission to pay into Court the Amount of the purchase money which he h...
M.R.M.A. Subramanian Chettiar Vs. Hon.P. Rajarajeswara Sethupathi Alia ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-10-1917
Reported in: (1918)ILR41Mad327
John Wallis, Kt., C.J.1. The question raised in the appeal, which is of some importance is, when immoveable property has been given by the judgment-debtor as security for the due performance of a decree pursuant to an order made under Order XLI, Rule 5(3)(c), Civil Procedure Code, whether that property can be realized by the decree-holder in execution or can only be realized in a separate suit. We have been referred to a decision in Tokhan Singh v. Girwar Singh I.L.R. (1905) Calc. 494 that a separate suit is necessary. But the learned Judges who decided that case proceeded upon the prohibition in Section 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it then was, against bringing mortgaged property to sale except by means of a suit under Section 67 of that Act. That section has been repealed and the prohibition has been limited in Order XXXIV, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code, and that decision is therefore inapplicable to the present case and affords no reason for refusing to follow the earlier ...
M.R.M.A. Subramania Chettiar Vs. the Hon'ble B. Raja Rajeswara Sethupa ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-10-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad442; 43Ind.Cas.187
1. The question raised in the appeal which is of some importance is when immoveable property has been given by the judgment-debtor as security for the due performance of a decree pursuant to an order made under Order XLI, Rule 5(d)(c), Civil Procedure Code, whether that property can be realised by the decree-holder in execution or can only be realised in a separate suit. We have been referred to a decision in Tokhan Singh v. Girwar Singh 9 C.W.N 372 that a separate suit is necessary. But the learned Judges who decided that case proceeded upon the prohibition in Section 93 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it then was, against bringing mortgaged property, to sale except by means of a suit, under Section 67 of that Act. That section has been repealed and the prohibition has been limited in Order XXXIV, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code, and that decision is, therefore, inapplicable to the present case and affords no reason for refusing to follow the earlier decision of the same Court in Sh...
Vadlamany Venkatesam (Deceased); and anr. Vs. Mangipudi Viswanadham an ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-10-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad512; 42Ind.Cas.897
1. The appellant had a decree against the 2nd respondent for money and the 1st respondent had also a decree against the 2nd respondent for money as legal representative of his father, and the amount payable under the decree was out of the assets of the 2nd respondent's deceased father in the hands of the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent attached the property in 1913 and the appellant attached it in 1914. The property was sold in execution of the appellant's decree in 1914 and the money was brought into Court. Then both of them applied for payment of the money in satisfaction of their decrees. There can be no doubt that Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to this case, as the 1st respondent's application for execution had been made before the assets were received by the Court. The learned Vakil for the 1st respondent supporting the order of the lower Court contends that his client is entitled to priority in respect of the amount of his decree, inasmuch as his decree was ...
- ‹ Prev
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 5
- 6
- Next ›
- Last »