Chennai Court July 1917 Judgments
Browse smarter
Open an 18-section brief on any judgment
Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.
- AI Brief & Ask
- Semantic AI Search
- Devil's Bench
Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.
Suri Markandeya Sastri Vs. Gottumukkala Subhanadhra Charyulu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-24-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad530; 42Ind.Cas.288
1. We cannot agree with the Subordinate Judge in his opinion that the mortgage deed in this case contains no personal covenant to pay. The words 'we shall discharge the debt' make this a stronger case than that of Abbakke Heggadthi v. Kinhiamma Shetty 29 M. 491. where it was held that the personal liability of the mortgagor would ordinarily exist in the absence of a specific contract to the contrary.2. The Subordinate Judge would have been on safer ground if he had based his refusal on the second ground mentioned in his judgment, namely, that the decree-holder was entitled to proceed against the person of the defendants under Order XXXIV, rule 6, only after the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property proved to be insufficient to pay the amount due (Order XXXIV, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code).3. But the District Munsif's decree did not conform to the form for mortgage decrees printed in Appendix D, inasmuch as it did not expressly reserve this right, and the Subordinate Judge, hav...
Machi Raju Venkataratnam Vs. Sri Rajah Vadrevu Ranganayakamma Zamindar ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-23-1917
Reported in: (1918)35MLJ335
John Wallis, C.J.1. The general policy of these provisions of the Code, as explained by the Judicial Committee in Sardhari Lal v. Ambika Pershad is to secure the speedy settlement of questions of title raised at execution sales. Section 283 of the Codes of 1877 and 1882 only gave a right of suit to the party against whom an order had been passed under Sections 280, 281 or 282, and did not provide for the case where the Court under Section 278 refused to investigate the claim on the ground that it had been designedly or unnecessarily delayed. In such cases, Section 283 failed to provide for the speedy settlement of the questions of title raised by the claim. The legislature would appear to have intended to supply this omission when in Rule 63 of Order XXI of the present Code it conferred the right of suit in general terms ' where a claim or an objection is preferred ' upon ' the party against whom an order is made,' instead of limiting it, as in Section 283, to cases in which an order h...
Subroya Goundan and ors. Vs. Perumal Chettiar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-23-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad377; 43Ind.Cas.956
1. The case, apparently, was not argued fully before the Courts below. The points arising for decision have now been discussed in all their aspects; and our conclusion is that the decision of the Court below is right.2. The first point for consideration is whether the decree obtained by the plaintiff was for a debt which was in existence when the release deed was executed by the 1st defendant to the 4th defendant in 1901. To enable us to decide this question, we gave time to the Vakils appearing on either side to produce the judgment obtained against the 1st defendant by the plaintiff; we now admit it under Order XLI, Rule 27, of the Code of Civil Procedure as Exhibit B. The document is necessary to enable us to pronounce judgment and as the learned Vakils took time to produce the document before us, we think we have power under Order XLI, Rule 27, read with Order XLI, to admit the new document in evidence, and we accordingly do so From this document it is clear that the plaintiff was ...
L.A.L. Alagappa Chettiar Vs. Naganatha Mudaliar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-21-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad497; (1917)33MLJ612
1. Petitioner is a creditor of 3rd respondent, an insolvent. First respondent in C.R.P. No. 798 of 1916 is a son of the insolvent and claims the properties in dispute under a will of his grandfather, between whom and the insolvent there was a partition in 1908. First respondent in C.B.P. No. 797 of 1916 (called hereafter 1st respondent) is an alienee from the minor. The properties left by will to the minor were sought to be sold by the creditors and at the request of the petitioner, the Official receiver on 10th April 1915 ordered the sale of half the properties. First respondent in C.B.P. No. 797 of 1916 then put in a petition asking that the properties should not be sold as they did not belong to the insolvent. On 21st April 1915 the Official receiver passed the following order:I have no jurisdiction to decide whether the insolvent has a saleable interest. That is a matter which should be decided by a Court having jurisdiction in a regular suit between the future purchaser and the ap...
Unnamalai Ammal Vs. Mathan Alias Arunachalam and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-20-1917
Reported in: 42Ind.Cas.530; (1917)33MLJ413
1. The question in the appeal is whether Article 182 or 181 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to this application which was an application for restitution of certain property in consequence of the reversal of the original decree. There is no direct decision on this point under the new Civil Procedure Code. The learned pleader for the respondent argues that though it is conceded that the application in question is an application in execution it cannot be said to be an application for execution of the decree and he says that there is authority for the distinction in a case reported in Sultan ' Sahib Marakayar v. Chidambaram Chettiar (1909) I.L.R. 32 M. 138. But what was decided in that case was that a decree having been already executed and the application being for delivery of possession, there was no question of the execution of the decree. This is a totally different case. It is conceded by the learned pleader that Section 47, C.P. Code does govern an application for restitution un...
Aiya Ramalinga Mudali and anr. Vs. Arumuga Mudali, Minor by Guardian, ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-19-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad495; 42Ind.Cas.512; (1917)33MLJ471
1. The question for decision before us in this appeal is whether the withdrawal of a suit instituted by the nearest reversioner a daughter without obtaining permission to institute another suit is binding on the succeeding reversioner the daughter's son so as to deprive him of the right to challenge the alienation by another suit. The learned pleader who appeared for the appellants has entirely relied on certain general language used by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal I.L.R. (1915) M. 406 and also Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar I.L.R. (1916) M. 634. In the first case, their Lordships had to consider the question whether when the nearest reversioner who instituted the suit died, that suit could be continued by the next reversioner and they held that it could be. In giving their reasons for the decision, they treated the next reversioner as legal representative for the purpose of reviving the action, It is contended that it logically follo...
Katta Tholasingam Chetty Vs. Vedachella Aiyah and Four ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-19-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad624; (1918)ILR41Mad319
John Wallis, Kt., C.J.1. In this case a trustee was ordered to be removed by Mr. Justice Bakewell and an account was directed to be taken against him. That decision was confirmed on appeal and the case went to the learned Official Referee. But the learned Official Referee was of opinion that certain questions of fact involved should be decided by the Court itself, and the case, therefore, came before Mr. Justice Coutts Trotter sitting on the Original Side and we have now to deal with an appeal from his decision.2. The question argued before us on appeal relates to item 11, certain house property to which the trust became entitled in the time of the former trustee, some ten years before the accession to the office of trustee of the defendant in this suit so that the defendant had two years in which he could have taken step for recovery of the property. It is stated by the learned Judge, and the case proceeds upon that basis, that neither the present defendant nor his predecessor did any...
Muthia Naick and Two ors. Vs. the King-emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-19-1917
Reported in: (1918)ILR41Mad323
ORDER1. Petitioners' vakil contends that the composition of an offence under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with one of several accused persons has the effect of an acquittal of all the accused persons. We can find nothing in the section to support this interpretation and if this is really the meaning of the learned Judges in Chandra Kumar Das v. The Emperor 7 C.W.N. 176, we must respectfully dissent. No other authority is quoted by petitioner.2. The petition is dismissed....
Muthia Naik and ors. Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-19-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad413; 43Ind.Cas.592
ORDER1. Petitioner's Vakil contends that the composition of an offence under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with one of several accused persons has the effect of an acquittal of all the accused persons. We can find nothing in the section to support this interpretation and if this is really the meaning of the learned Judges in Chandra Kumar Das v. Emperor 7. C.W.N. 176, we must respectfully dissent. No other authority is quoted by petitioner.2. The petition is dismissed....
Gantasala Kuppiah Chetty Vs. N. Gunavathiamma and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-19-1917
Reported in: 44Ind.Cas.995
John Wallis, C.J.(After discussing the facts) *****1. There only remains one other question. The learned Judge, in view of the conduct of the 1st defendant of which he takes a very unfavourable view, granted plaintiffs' costs on the higher scale. Rule 40 of the High Court Fees Rules provides 'on special grounds the Court may...order that the fees set forth in the column headed higher scale, shall be allowed.' This rule is adopted from Order LXV, Rule 9, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, which sets forth that fees on the higher scale may be allowed 'if on special grounds arising out of the nature and importance, or the difficulty or urgency of the case the Court or a Judge shall...so order.' Some difficulty was experienced by the Courts in England in interpreting the words which I have read as to what was meant by 'nature and importance or the difficulty or urgency of the case.' Standing by themselves it might have seemed at first sight that they were wide enough to authorise the Court...
- ‹ Prev
- 1
- 3
- 4
- Next ›
- Last »