Chennai Court April 1917 Judgments
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Mulla Vittil Seeti Kutti and ors. Vs. K.M.K. Kunhi Pathumma and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-23-1917
Reported in: 43Ind.Cas.31; (1917)33MLJ320
Wallis, C.J.1. Our rules only provide for a reference to a Full Bench where both the learned Judges constituting the Bench agree that the question of law to be referred is involved in the determination of the case. There are weighty and obvious reasons for this limitation, and it is therefore desirable that we should confine ourselves to the questions which actually arise in the present case. The suit is to redeem a mortgage of the year 1862 and is within time as against the mortgagees, having been brought within sixty years from the date of the mortgage, Article 148. The question is whether it is also within time as against transferees from the mortgagees, or is barred under Article 134 as having been brought more than twelve years from the date of the transfer. The plaintiff's mortgagees acting as full owners executed several usufructuary mortgages of items 2 and 3 under which they have been out of possession of these items since 1862 and 1894 respectively. The most recent mortgages ...
Ponnaloori Ellamandayya Vs. Chelakapathi Lakshmayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-20-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad455(2); (1917)33MLJ295
1. This is a suit by a person alleging himself to be a reversioner for possession. The widow of the last male owner died in 1909. The suit was instituted in 1912. The defendants among other pleas stated that one Guruviah alias Gurunadham, a nearer reversioner was alive when the widow died and that the plaintiff was excluded by him. In answer to this averment the plaintiff stated that Guruviah was not heard of for thirty years and that the presumption therefore was that he was dead in 1909.2. The Courts below, in our opinion, rightly held that although Guruviah was not heard of for thirty years before suit, there was no presumption that he was dead in 1909. Mr. Rajagopalachariar who has argued this case with great insistence contested this proposition. He argued that the presumption must be raised with reference to the event which is the basis of the action and not with reference to the date of the suit. The language of Section 108 of the Evidence Act, in our opinion, does not support t...
Kanniammal Alias Janakiammal, Minor, by Next Friend G. Sundara Iyer Vs ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-20-1917
Reported in: 43Ind.Cas.25
John Wallis, C.J.1. This is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Bake well, dismissing a suit brought by the minor plaintiff for a declaration that the mortgage decree passed against her father-in-law, brother in law and herself, as representatives of her deceased husband, is not binding on her, on the ground that she was sued and the decree obtained against her as a major. The plaintiff also asked for an injunction restraining the defendant from executing the decree against her interest in the mortgaged property. The learned Judge has dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff is debarred from bringing this suit for a declaratory decree by the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act that 'No Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.' The learned Judge observes that the plaintiff is now entitled to redeem the mortgaged property and holds, therefore, that she is, ...
Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu, the Receiver of Nidadavole and Med ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-20-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad786; 42Ind.Cas.483
1. A suit was originally instituted in the ordinary Civil Court for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent, on the allegation that a certain lanka land was the private land of the landholder. Beyond the fact that it was lanka land or lanka formation, there was nothing else to show that it was the private land of the zemindar as defined in the Estates Land Act.2. The District Court of Kistna in which the suit was originally filed came to the conclusion that in the absence of any evidence to show that it was private land, the mere fact of its being lanka land did not take it out of the category of ryoti land. Having come to that conclusion he directed the return of the plaint to be presented to the Court which had jurisdiction to entertain it, which obviously means a Revenue Court, under the Estates Land Act. There was an appeal against that decision to the High Court and the decision of the District Judge was confirmed. The objection to the jurisdiction of the first Court was, I ...
Ponnaloori Ellamandayya Vs. Chilakapathi Lakshmayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-20-1917
Reported in: 42Ind.Cas.241
1. This is a suit by a person alleging himself to be a reversioner for possession. The widow of the last male owner died in 1909. The suit was instituted in 1912. The defendants among other pleas stated that one Guruviah alias Gurunadban, a nearer reversioner, was alive when the widow died and that the plaintiff was excluded by him. In answer to this averment the plaintiff stated that Guruviah was not heard of for thirty years and that the presumption, therefore, was that he was dead in 1909.2. The Courts below, in our opinion, rightly held that although Guruviah was not heard of for thirty years before suit, there was no presumption that he was dead in 1909,Mr. Rajagopalachariar, who has argued this case with great insistence, contested this proposition. He argued that the presumption must be raised with reference to the event which is the basis of the action, and not with reference to the date of the suit. The language of Section 108 of the Evidence Act, in our opinion, does 'not sup...
Obla Venkatachalapathi Aiyar and anr. Vs. Thirugnana Sambanda Pandara ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-19-1917
Reported in: 42Ind.Cas.273; (1917)33MLJ297
1. During the minority of the plaintiff, the court purporting to act under Section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act appointed one Vaidyalinga Thambiran as the guardian of his person and property. As there were debts contracted by the predecessors of the Matadhipati, sanction was obtained under Section 29 of the Act to sell some of the properties of the mutt. The present appellants are the successors in interest of those who purchased the properties in pursuance of the order of the District Judge.2. The minor Pandarasannadhi has attained age and now sues to set aside the sales. The Lower Appellate Court gave a decree to the plaintiff. In this Second Appeal, Mr. KV. Krishnaswami Aiyar contended that the properties of the mutt are not trust properties and that it was competent to the District Court to have appointed Vaidyalinga Thambiran as guardian under the Act. It may become necessary to consider on some future occasion whether the decision of the Judicial Commitee in Ram Parkash Das v...
Eyuni Raghavacharyulu and Four ors. Vs. Epuri Govindasari
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-18-1917
Reported in: (1918)ILR41Mad1068
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.1. The suit is by a few sharers of samudayam or common lands for ejectment against the defendant who has obtained a lease of it from the other sharers. The lessee is himself a co-sharer and the karnam of the village. The lease is a permanent one. The extent mentioned is 60 acres, but it has been found by both the lower Courts that it comprises nearly 240 acres. There is a clause in the lease to the effect that the property should be regarded as comprising only 60 acres although the actual measurement may be more or less. The District Munsif held that the lease was not binding and decreed joint possession to the plaintiffs with the defendant. On appeal the Subordinate Judge rightly held that the decree for joint possession was wrong. His view was that, as the lease was given by a majority of the shareholders, it is binding on the plaintiffs.2. The principal question argued in second appeal is whether a majority of co-sharers can validly grant a perpetual lease of comm...
Peela Yarakayya and anr. Vs. Kanumuri Venkata Krishnam-raju and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-18-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad693(1); 41Ind.Cas.684
1. The question is exactly covered by the decision in Bailur Krishna Rau v. Lakshmana Shaubhogue 1 Ind, Dec. 1046. Here the defendant's claim to the property was disallowed, it being found by the Court which enquired into his petition of claim that he had no title to the property. He never sought to set aside the order. On the other hand he trespassed upon the property after possession had been given by the Court to the plaintiff. Then the plaintiff brought a suit and the suit happened to have been filed within one year of the order passed on the claim petition of the defendant. The defendant filed a written statement claiming, the property as his own. The learned District Judge has held, following the case which we have cited, Bailur Krishna Rau v. Lakshmana Shanbhogue 1 Ind Dec. 1046. that the order on the claim of the defendant was 'conclusive' as stated in Order XXI, Rule 63 : and the mere fact that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff to recover possession of the property from...
W. Kalmatappa and ors. Vs. Joish Narayana Bhat and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-18-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad448; 42Ind.Cas.337
1. We think this second appeal can be disposed of on a simple ground. The suit was based on an order of the Magistrate passed under Section 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That order confines itself to stating that the procession claimed by the plaintiffs should not be permitted as there was danger of a breach of the public peace. Such an order was within the competence of the Magistrate and was perfectly legal. We fail to see how this order can furnish a cause of action for the suit, although it may be the occasion for instituting the suit. The order of the Magistrate leaves the Civil rights of the parties unaffected. Consequently, if the plaintiffs sue to vindicate their rights, they must allege and prove facts which, apart from the pronouncement of the Magistrate, would enable them to obtain a decree. If the right sought to be established is a public right, then special damage must be alleged and proved; if it is an individual right, such a damage need not be proved.2. Mr. Ra...
Raja Rajeswara Muthuramalinga Sethupathi Vs. Mahalinga Raju and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-17-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad411(2); 42Ind.Cas.502; (1917)33MLJ379
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.1. The case is one of first impression, but as the arguments have been addressed to me fully on the points arising for decision, I do not think that any useful purpose will be served by reserving my decision in this case. The suit was brought by a landholder to recover the road cess, paid by him for two faslis. A decree was passed for half of the road cess paid in fasli 1322. As regards the other half the Lower Court held that the landholder himself was bound to pay it. As regards fasli 1321, the District Munsif held that the claim for half of the cess payable to the landholder was barred by limitation. In this Court, Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar does not claim that the whole of the road cess was payable by the tenant, but confined the claim to half of the cess paid by his client. The only question for decision is whether the Lower Court is right in the view that the payment made in 1321 by the landlord cannot be recovered as it is barred by limitation. Before proceeding...
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