Chennai Court March 1917 Judgments
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Sethurama Aiyangar Vs. Subbiah Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1917
Reported in: 42Ind.Cas.951; (1917)33MLJ599
1. The question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether a Revenue Court exercising jurisdiction under the Estates Land Act is entitled to decide objections, (other than those specified in Section 26 of the Act), to the validity of a contract under which a ryot claims to hold the holding at a rent less than the ordinary or the lawful rent payable on the land. The landlord is an office-holder in a temple and the lands or rather the revenue constitutes the manyam attached to the office. A predecessor of his received Rs. 200 from the ryot and agreed to allow him, remission of five-eighths of the assessment in perpetuity. The present office-holder claims the full rent, declines to be bound by the agreement and contends that his predecessor who owned the Manyam as an office-holder cannot bind his successor by such an agreement. The question arises in a suit brought by the tenant contesting the landlord's right of sale under Section 112 of the Act. The learned District Judge in ap...
Sethurama Ayyangar Vs. Suppiah Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1917
Reported in: (1918)ILR41Mad121
1. The question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether a Revenue Court exercising jurisdiction under the Estates Land Act is entitled to decide objections (other than those specified in Section 26 of the Act), to the validity of a contract under which a ryot claims to hold the holding on a rent less than the ordinary or the lawful rent payable on the land. The landlord is an office holder in a temple and the lands or rather the revenue constitute the manyam attached to the office. A predecessor of his received Rs. 200 from the ryot and agreed to allow him remission of five-eighths of the assessment in perpetuity. The present office holder claims the full rent, declines to be bound by the agreement and contends that his predecessor who owned the manyam as ap office holder cannot bind his successor by such an agreement. The question arises in a suit brought by the tenant contesting the landlord's right of sale under Section 112 of the Act. The learned District Judge in appea...
Sunnasi Kudumban Vs. Sivasubramania Kone and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad538; 39Ind.Cas.980
ORDERAylino, J.1. The main point involved in this petition is whether Section 344, Criminal Procedure Code, authorises a Magistrate to grant an adjournment conditionally on the payment of costs. The power, if it exists, is certainly one very rarely exercised; on the other hand, the words of the Section ('on such terms as it thinks fit') seem vide enough to cover an order making the payment of costs by one party to another a condition of granting an adjournment. This is the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor, and the only cases to which our attention has been directed [Mathura Prasad v. Basant Lal 2 A.L.J. 831 ; (1905) A.W.N. 256 and Sew Prosad Poddar v. Corporation of Calcutta 9 C.W.N. 18, and a recent decision of a single Judge of this Court in Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 485 and 486 of 19163 are all in his avour. It is pointed out that the Code contains no provision for the recovery of costs ordered to be paid under this section; but this is not conclusive, for Sections 433...
V. Krishnayyah Vs. C. Gajendra Naidu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1917
Reported in: (1917)33MLJ533
1. This appeal raises an interesting point as to which Mr. Venkatasubba Row has candidly put the authorities, before us. The question is whether Mr. Justice Bakewell was right in holding that an order of revivor of a decree on the Original Side made against the first defendant under Section 248 of the old Code was inoperative as against the 2nd' defendant to whom no notice went. The word 'revivor' in the third column of Article 183 as is well known, refers to the common law practice which prevailed in Supreme Courts in India under which, if a writ of execution was not sued out within a year and a day, it was necessary to revive the decree by a process known as scire facias or more fully scire facias guare executionem not habeat that is to say by calling on the judgment-debtor to show cause why the plaintiff should not have execution against him. When the Code of Civil Procedure came to be enacted, the rule was embodied in what was Section 248 of the old Code and now Order XXI, E. 22 un...
thema and anr. Vs. Kunhi Pathuma and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1917
Reported in: (1918)34MLJ128
1. The Subordinate Judge is wrong on both the points decided by him. There can be no question of adverse possession in favour of the defendant, because under the customary law of Malabar, the Kuzhikanom lessee is entitled to remain in possession until he is paid the value of the improvements.2. In this respect, the law is the same in South Canara : Daramma v. Mariamma (1898) 24 M.L.J. 397. It is true that Section 5 of the Malabar Compensation for Improvements Act does not in terms apply to South Canara but as was pointed out in Kummatha Vittil Kutti Kuthali v. Rev. Antoni Goveas (1918) M.W.N. 339 that section only embodies the customary law of Malabar and South Canara. Consequently on the expiry of the period fixed, the tenant does not become a trespasser. The decision in Subraveti Ramiah v. Gundala Ramanna I.L.R. (1909) M. 260 quoted by the Subordinate Judge has no application to Malabar Kuzhikanom tenants. We must therefore hold that the defendant has not acquired a title by prescrip...
R.S. Rama Shenoi and anr. Vs. M.A. Hallagna and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad274; 45Ind.Cas.703; (1918)34MLJ295
1. A decree was obtained against the elder brother of the plaintiff in the Cochin Court. In the cause title, he was described as the manager of the joint family. Apparently the plaint alleged that the family property was liable for the claim as the debt was contracted for family purposes. The defendant in the Cochin Court pleaded that no decree should be passed against him as manager. Therefore issue 7 was framed. The Cochin Judge held that the burden of proving that the defendant was not the manager and that the debt was not binding on the family lay upon him, and passed a decree against him personally and against the family properties. The decree was executed against the Cochin properties and then transferred to the British Court under Section 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our Court, a claim was preferred by the plaintiff against the attached properties on two grounds:--(a) that the defendant in the Cochin suit had become divided from the plaintiff before suit and (b) that th...
thema and anr. Vs. Kunhi Pathumma and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1917
Reported in: (1918)ILR41Mad118
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.1. The Subordinate Judge is wrong on both the points decided by him. There can be no question of adverse possession in favour of the defendant, because under the customary law of Malabar, the kuzhikanam lessee is entitled to remain in possession until he is paid the value of the improvements.2. In this respect, the law is the same in South Kanara: Srinivasa Pillai v. Venkatammal : (1913)24MLJ296 . It is true that Section 5 of the Malabar Compensation Act does not in terms apply to South Kanara but as was pointed out in Kummatha Vittil Kunhi Kuthalai Haji v. Reverend Antoni Goveus (1913) M.W.N. 339 that section only embodies the customary law of Malabar and South Kanara Consequently on the expiry of the period fixed, the tenant does not become a trespasser. The decision in Subbraveti Ramiah v. Gundala Ramanna I.L.R. (1910) Mad. 260 quoted by the Subordinate Judge has no application to Malabar kuzhikanam tenants. We must therefore hold that the defendant has not acquir...
V. Krishnaiyah Vs. C. Gajendra Naidu and Two ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad513; (1917)ILR40Mad1127
1. This appeal raises an interesting point as to which Mr. Venkatasubba Rao has candidly put the authorities before us. The question is whether Mr. Justice Bakewell was right in holding that an order of revivor of a decree on the Original Side made against the first defendant under Section 248 of the old Code was inoperative as against the second defendant to whom no notice went. The term 'revivor' in the third column of Article 183, as is well known, refers to the common law practice which prevailed in the Supreme Courts in India under which, if a writ of execution was not sued out within a year and a day, it was necessary to revive the decree by a process known as scire facias or more fully scire facias quare executionem non habeas, that is to say by calling on the judgment-debtor to show cause why the plaintiff should not have execution against him. When the Code of Civil Procedure came to be enacted, the rule was embodied in what was Section 248 of the old Code and now Order XXI, R...
Cherlo Subba Reddi Vs. Amparayani Venkataseshiah and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1917
Reported in: 43Ind.Cas.502
John Wallis, C.J.1. This case raises the question whether an alienee of immoveable property pendente lite from the defendantin the suit is entitled to object to a decree being passed in terms of a compromise arrived at between the plaintiff and the defendant after the date of the alienation in question and before the date when the alienee was made a party to the suit. It was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Annamalai Chettiar v. Malayandi Appaya Naik 1 M.L.T. 145 that an alienation made pendente lite was subject to the decree subsequently made in the suit, even though the decree was based on a compromise. In that case the alienee was not made a party, whereas here he has been made a party after the compromise and objects to the passing of the decree.2. As I understand the cases, the rule pendente lite nihil innovetur which is embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was introduced for the protection of the other party to the suit, and that the latter is entitled to d...
theman and anr. Vs. Kunhi Pathumma and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad84; 43Ind.Cas.757
1. The Subordinate Judge is wrong on both the points decided by him. There can be no question of adverse possession in favour of the defendant because under the Customary Law of Malabar, the kushi kanam lessee is entitled to remain in possession until he is paid the value of the improvements. In this respect, the law is the same in South Canara. Sriniwasa Pillai v. Venkatmmal 19 Ind. Cas. 410. It is true that Section 5 of the Malabar Compensation Act does not in terms apply to South Canara, bat as was pointed out in Kummatha Vittil Kunhi Kuthalai Haji v. Antoni Goveas 19 Ind. Cas. 63 that section only embodies the Customary Law of Malabarand South Canara Consequently on the expiry of the period fixed, the tenant does not become a trespasser. The decision in Subraveti Ramiah v. Gundola Ramanni 4 Ind. Cas. 1080(1910) M.W.N. 146 quoted by the Subordinate Judge has no application to Malabar kushikanon tenants. We must, therefore, hold that the defendants had not acquired a title by prescri...
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