Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1918Mad710; 42Ind.Cas.513
1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., in a suit brought by the plaintiff against the Madras Corporation for wrongful dismissal.2. The learned Judge held that the suit will not lie and we think he was right Section 58 of the Madras City Municipal Act III of 1904 empowers the President to appoint such subordinate officers and servants as the Corporation, subject to the control of the Local Government, consider necessary for the purposes of this Act,' and Sub-section 3 provides that the President may, subject to such control as may be prescribed by the Local Government, fins, suspend, reduce or dismiss any of the said of the said officers and servants. Now it appears to be well settled that when an officer in the position of the President of the Madras Corporation is empowered' by Statute to appoint and dismiss subordinate officers and servants, those officers and servants hold their office at pleasure. This was decided in the case of Smyth v. Latham. (1833 9 Bin...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1918Mad515; (1918)ILR41Mad225
1. This is a suit for breach of contract between the plaintiffs who are merchants at Ambur and the defendants who were importers of German dyes to Madras and Tuticorin, entered into on the 25th August 1914 after the outbreak of the war, by which the defendants undertook to deliver certain casks of dye from the lot to arrive per S.S. Steinturm and certain other casks from what is described as the 'Bombay lot' meaning the lot imported by the defendants at Bombay. The contract went on to stipulate for three deliveries of two casks each of the weight and description mentioned:to be delivered on arrival of other steamers, one lot of two casks to be delivered each time at the abovementioned rate, i.e., Rs. 501-4-0 for each cask. We are not responsible for the supply of goods if steamers do not come to Madras or Madura.2. The evidence shows that the defendants had arranged for consignments by successive steamers, and having regard to this we have no doubt that what the defendants undertook to...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 41Ind.Cas.527
Napier, J.1. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the plaintiff on a mortgage, dated 15th July 1878, executed by the 1st defendant in favour of one Ramasami Gounden. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of the 1st defendant, and the 5th, 6tb, 7th and 8th defendants are members of the plaintiff's family. They were made parties on the allegation in the 6th paragraph of the plaint that there was a partition between the plaintiff and those defendants of their family properties, in which partition the plaint mortgage fell to the share of the plaintiff. The 15th defendant is a purchaser from the 1st defendant. Defendants Nos. 9 to 14 mada no claim to any share in the property, admitting that it had fallen to the share of the plaintiff. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and 15 set up a case of discharge. The sole issues raised were whether the bond was true and whether there had been a full discharge. The issues were settled on the 17th of March 1911. The case went to trial and on the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 41Ind.Cas.937; (1917)33MLJ499
Spencer, J.1. The question that has been argued in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether it is competent to a Court of inferior jurisdiction to entertain a suit to declare a compromise decree obtained in a Court of superior jurisdiction to be not binding on the plaintiff as having been obtained by fraud. The plaintiff asked in his plaint not only for a declaration that the decree in O.S. No. 20 of 1914 on the file of the District Court of Coimbatore was not binding on him but also that it should be set aside and that the said suit should be retried and decided on the evidence. The District Munsif to whom the plaint was presented held that he had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the former decree was obtained by fraud and that only an Appellate Court or a court transferring a suit from one court to another would have the power to direct a retrial. The District Judge, who heard an appeal from the District Munsif's decision, was of opinion that a court of inferior jurisdict...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1918Mad393; 42Ind.Cas.948; (1917)33MLJ596
Wallis, C.J.1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Coutts Trotter in an action for specific performance, dismissing the plaintiff's suit without calling on the defendant. Mr C.V. Ananthakrishna Aiyar has argued that the evidence for the plaintiff made out a prima facie case. On the other hand Mr. V.V. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the 2nd respondent has contended that the learned Judge was wrong in admitting as evidence Exhibit A which he contended is an unregistered agreement for a lease and inadmissible for want of registration. He also argued that, as in it the terms of the contract between the parties have been reduced to writing, no other evidence can be given of the contract under Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act. We are of opinion that these contentions must be upheld.2. As regards the question whether Exhibit A amounts to an agreement for a lease, we think that the substance rather than the form of the document must be regarded.3. It is not at all uncommon in this co...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1918)ILR41Mad211
1. That in the Shafi Law which governs the parties to this case the wife is entitled to recover arrears of maintenance, though not due under a decree of Court or a mutual agreement, contrary to the Hanafi Law, admits of no doubt. For according to the theory of the former system, maintenance is a debt and not in the nature of a gratuity as is the doctrine of Hanafi lawyers. In the Hedaya (Hamilton, Volume I, page 398), it is expressly laid down as the rule of Hanafi Law that:if a length of time should elapse during which the wife has not received any maintenance from her husband she is not entitled to demand any for that time except when the Kajee had before determined or decreed it to her.2. Then the learned author after giving the reasons in support of the Hanafi view and in connection with the further deduction that 'arrears of decreed maintenance drop in the case of the death of either party' states, that Shafi says that the maintenance is in all circumstances to be considered as a ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1918Mad711; (1918)ILR41Mad213
Spencer, J.1. The question that has been argued in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether it is competent to a Court of inferior jurisdiction to entertain a suit to declare a compromise decree obtained in a Court of superior jurisdiction to be not binding on the plaintiff as having been obtained by fraud. The plaintiff asked in his plaint not only for a declaration that the decree in Original Suit No. 20 of 1914 on the file of the District Court of Coimbatore was not binding on him but also that it should be set aside and that the said suit should be re-tried and decided on the evidence. The District Munsif to whom the plaint was presented held that he had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the former decree was obtained by fraud and that only an appellate Court or a Court transferring a suit from one Court to another would have the power to direct a re-trial. The District Judge, who heard an appeal from the District Munsif's decision, was of opinion that a Court of inferio...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 42Ind.Cas.517
1. That in Shafi Law, which governs the parties to this case, the wife is entitled to recover arrears of maintenance, though not due under a decree of Court or a mutual agreement, contrary to the Hanafi Law, admits of no doubt. For according to the theory of the former system, maintenance is a debt and is not in the nature of a gratuity as is the doctrine of Hanafi lawyers. In the Hedaya (Hamilton, Volume I, page 398) it is expressly laid down as the rule of Hanafi Law, if a length of time should elapse during which the wife has not received any maintenance from her husband she is not entitled to demand any for that time except when the Kazee had before determined or decreed it to her'. Then the learned author, after giving the reasons in support of the Hanafi view and in connection with the further deduction that arrears of a decreed maintenance drop in the case of the death of either party, states that Shafi says that the maintenance is in all circumstances to be considered as a debt...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1918Mad396; 42Ind.Cas.953; 43Ind.Cas.537; (1917)33MLJ382
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.1. In order to appreciate the contention raised by the learned vakils in this case, it is necessary to state that a suit was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly by the second mortgagees against the mortgagor, the 1st defendant, and the first mortgagees, the second and third defendants. On appeal to the High Court from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge a decree was passed by which the puisne mortgagees as well as the first mortgagees were declared entitled to apply for the sale of the mortgaged properties. An order absolute was passed by the Subordinate Judge; after that, as the major portion of the properties mortgaged was in the Madura District, the decree was transferred for execution to that District. The present application was made by the transferee of the rights of the first mortgagees for a personal decree. The District Judge passed an order in his favour. In appeal Mr. Rangachariar has taken three objections to the order. In the fi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 45Ind.Cas.95; (1917)33MLJ577
Spencer, J.1. Upon an application to sue in forma pauperis the District Munsif decided that the claim, which was one for return of the balance of the sum deposited by the applicant upon a contract with the Kumbakonum Municipality for the collection of rents of stalls in the vegetable market, was time barred. Upon this ground alone he dismissed the application without hearing evidence and deciding the question of fact whether the applicant was or was not possessed of sufficient means to pay the court-fees on his suit. Two questions have been raised.1. Whether the District Munsif acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the application on this ground.2. Whether he was wrong in treating the claim as out of time, Order 33, Rule 5(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure declares that a court shall reject an application for permission to sue as pauper where the applicant's allegations do not show a cause of action, (in the Code of 1882 it was a right to sue in such court) and Rule 7(2) authorises ...
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