Chennai Court November 1917 Judgments
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Penumetsa Thirumalraju and ors. Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-15-1917
Reported in: 44Ind.Cas.40
ORDERKumaraswami Sastri, J.1. The evidence shows that the Bodi was irrigating the lands of 1st accused and that at least from 1901 the lands of the opposite party were not irrigated by it. The Sessions Judge finds that the spout was only capable of irrigating two acres, which is the extent of field No. 418 belonging to 1st accused. The Deputy Magistrate in the counter-case finds that the Kapua went to the field of the accused in the present case with a spear and sticks to enforce their right and repair the Bodi and ready to repel by force any obstruction to their interfering with the Bodi.2. I have little doubt that the accused had the right to prevent the Kapus from entering upon their fields and interfering with the Bodi on it. It is difficult to see how they lost the right of private defence because they did not send word to the Police Station six miles off. By the time a person could have gone there and returned with Police help, the Kapus would have trespassed on the land of the 1...
Keekangote Narayana Tantri Vs. Nagappa and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad126; (1918)34MLJ515; MANU/TN/0171/1917
1. In the original vernacluar petition it is quite clear that what the petitioner asked for was liberty to withdraw with permission to bring a fresh suit.2. In these circumstances following Golam Muhammad v. Shibendra Pada Banerjee I.L.R (1908) C. 990 we think that the order 'plaintiff is permitted to withdraw from the suit' must be read with the petition and construed as granting it. On the other construction the order is most misleading to the petitioner and not an order contemplated by the Code.3. We allow the Letters Patent Appeal with costs, and set aside the decree of the District Judge and remand the appeal to the District Judge for disposal according to law, other costs will abide the result....
Tittu Gopalachariar and ors. Vs. Maiyappa Chetty and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad317; 45Ind.Cas.22
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.1. The suit has been disposed of by the lower Courts on the pleadings and on the construction of the note annexed to the plaint. The learned District Judge says that as 'it is a physical impossibility for it (the note) to have been paid on the day it was drawn,' it was not a promissory note. The learned Vakil for the respondents said that he would not rest his case on this view of the District Judge. If I understand the learned Judge rightly, unless the payee and the drawer are face to face with each other, no promissory note can be made payable on demand. Whether it takes seven days to go to Penang or 24 hours from the place of execution to the place of payment, cannot matter if the view of the District Judge is correct that an 'on demand' is payable co instant and should be paid the moment payment is claimed. No authority is cited by the learned Judge for this proposition and neither I nor the learned Vakils are able to find any.2. The real question is, what is the...
In Re: N. Krishnaswami Aiyangar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1917
Reported in: 47Ind.Cas.981; (1918)35MLJ368
Abdur Rahim, J.1. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment which has been just delivered by my learned brother, and I agree that the petition ought to be dismissed, though not on the ground on which he has proceeded.2. I am of opinion that we have jurisdiction to direct the expunging of irrelevant and scandalous matters in the judgment of the Subordinate Court under Section 107 of the Government of India Act of 1915 The powers of superintendence vested in the High Court are of extremely wide character, and it seems to me that if we find a case in which a Subordinate Court has gone out of its way to introduce matters in its judgment which are absolutely irrelevant and scandalous in their nature, we can remove those passages from the judgment, so that they may not be circulated and published to the prejudice of persons who are or are not concerned in the suit either as a party or as a witness. It is quite true that, as pointed out, there is no precedent for such action except in ...
Muthammal Vs. Razu Pillai Alias Subbaraya Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad103; 44Ind.Cas.753
1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the decree of the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Ramnad, dated 21st September 1914, in a suit to enforce a mortgage. The question is what amount is due to the 4th defendant on two prior mortgages which, it is agreed, should be deemed to be still outstanding against the plaintiff. On March 29, 1899, defendants Nos. 1 to 3, the owners of certain houses in the town of Madura, mortgaged them to the Hindu Permanent Fund of that town to secure the repayment of the sum of Rs. 1,500 and interest. On the 26th September of the same year they again mortgaged the same houses and certain lands of theirs to Sevugan Chetty, the 4th defendant to secure the repayment of Rs. 1,000 and interest. On February 9, 1901, they again mortgaged the houses alone to the plaintiff's husband (deceased) to secure the repayment of Rs. 500 and interest. Sevugan Chetty sued on his mortgage in the Madura Munsif's Court, obtained a decree for Rs. 1,265-10 0 and further interest t...
Venkateswara Aiyar and ors. Vs. A.P.Ri. Executor, A.R.A.R. Somasundram ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad76; 44Ind.Cas.551
Phillips, J.1. Plaintiff obtained a decree against 1st defendant and attached his property, but the attachment was released on the application of 1st defendant's alienees, the 1st defendant having alienated the property to 2nd defendant just over 6 years before the present suit was filed. The suit now is for a declaration that the alienations are not binding on plaintiff, and that he can proceed against the property in execution of the decree against 1st defendant. Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 9, alienees from 2nd defend- ant, are appellants here.2. The first contention raised is that plaintiff cannot bring this suit on his own behalf, but must sue on behalf of all the creditors for a declaration that the alienation is invalid as against all of them.3. This plea was not taken in either of the lower Courts and is one which might have been met, if necessary, in the first Court by an amendment of the plaint.4. Whether the plea can be supported is doubtful Smith v. Hurst (1852) 10 Hare 30: 20 ...
Keelangoti Narayana Tantri Vs. Nagappa and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1917
Reported in: 44Ind.Cas.889
1. In the original vernacular petition it is quite clear that what the petitioner asked for was the liberty to withdraw with permission to bring a fresh suit.2. In these circumstances, following Golam Mahomed v. Shibendro Pada Banerjee 12 C.W.N. 893 we think that the order 'plaintiff is permitted to withdraw from the suit' must be read with the petition and construed as granting it. On the other construction the order was most misleading to the petitioner and not an order contemplated by the Code.3. We allow the Letters Patent Appeal with costs, set aside the decree of the District Judge and remand the appeal to the District Judge for disposal according to law. Other costs will abide the result....
S. Vullappa and ors. Vs. S. Bheema Row
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-09-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad36(2); 43Ind.Cas.578; (1917)33MLJ729
Wallis, C.J.1. The question in this case is, what is the. meaning of 'with intent to annoy' in Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code. In his History of the Criminal Law, Vol. II, p. 100 Sir James Stephen gives the following definition of intention: 'The direction of conduct towards the object chosen is called the intention or aim (for the metaphor involved in the word is obviously taken from aiming with a bow and arrow).' and he distinguishes the aim or intention of an act from the motive or reason which actuated the person doing it. At the same time he admits (page 110) that intention is frequently used and understood as being synonymous with motive, and speaks of ' two common fallacies, namely, the confusion between motive and intention, and the tendency to deny an immediate intention because of the existence real or supposed of some ulterior intention. For instance, it will often be argued that a person ought to be acquitted of wounding a police man with intent to do him grievous bod...
G.S. Ramaswami Ayyar Vs. the King-emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-09-1917
Reported in: (1918)ILR41Mad589
Oldfield, J.1. The accused has been convicted of an offence punishable under Sections 467 and 474 of the Indian Penal Code in the alternative, the forgery being alleged as consisting in certain alterations in Exhibit B made after its execution by second prosecution witness and accused, the result being the making of a false document, purporting to be a valuable security. Both learned Judges, before whom the appeal originally came, held that the alterations were so made by accused; and nothing now advanced leads me to dissent from this conclusion. The questions, to which the argument has been mainly directed before me, are: (1) whether the alterations were made dishonestly or fraudulently, (2) whether they could amount to forgery either of a document or a valuable security, if, as is alleged, they were made before the completion of the document and (3) whether the sentence is excessive.2. One contention on the first of these questions, that accused made the alterations, intending to get...
G.S. Ramasami Iyer Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-09-1917
Reported in: AIR1918Mad150; 43Ind.Cas.593
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The appellant has been convicted of the offence of forgery of a valuable security under Section 107 of the Indian Panel Code or in the alternative of being in possession of a valuable security knowing it to be forged and intending to use it as genuine under Section 474 of the Indian Penal Code.2. The facts are complicated and they may be shortly stated thus:(a) The appellant, G.S. Ramasami Iyer, is the son-in-law of prosecution 2nd witness, Vengappa Aiyar. Prosecution 2nd witness's daughter, accused's first wife, died in 1910, leaving a minor male child Narayanasami. During her lifetime, the accused's family consisting of the accused, his father and his two brothers became involved in debts and all their lands in the Ganapathi Agraharam and Manalur villages were brought to sale in Court auction by their creditors. They were purchased in the name of one Aiyyasami Aiyar, the benamidar of the accused's father-in-law, Vengappa Aiyar (prosecution 2nd witness), and the s...
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