Chennai Court July 1916 Judgments
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Yellampalle Venkatappa Vs. Matam Nanjappa
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-17-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.594
1. Plaintiff's first application for execution was on 27th April 1907; his second application was on 22nd October 1912. It is prima facie barred by limitation. To save it from this bar, two arguments have been advanced before us. It is first contended that the second application should be treated as a continuation of the first one. The facts are that when properties were attached in pursuance of the first application one Nanjappa claimed them as his; his claims was dismissed. He thereupon brought Original Suit No. 383 of 1908 to establish his right. He got a decree in his favour for item No. 2 on 31st December 1809. Plaintiff appealed and on his appeal that decree was reversed on 11th August 1911. It is argued that execution under his first application should be treated as pending during the time he was litigating to remove the obstacle placed in his way by Nanjappa's claim and suit, and that this present application is one to revive it and carry out the prayer in the first application...
Poduru Lakshmi Narayana and ors. Vs. Ponnada Pallamraju and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-17-1916
Reported in: 37Ind.Cas.354
1. We agree with the conclusion arrived at by Spencer, J. What the appellants sought to do by the Execution Petition No. 46 of 1906 was to re-open entirely the partition effected on the application of the respondents. That was disallowed by the Subordinate Judge and his order was upheld in appeal by the High Court.2. As a matter of fact, as rightly found both by Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer, JJ., 3 Acres 72 cents in Survey No. 448 were not divided on the previous occasion and the mere fact that this was mentioned in the grounds of appeal to the High Court, cannot be said to have the effect of implied adjudication debarring the appellants before us, from having a division. The real question before the High Court was, whether the previous partition was liable to be re opened at all, and not as to the particular items of property which had or had not been divided.3. It would be absolutely going; too far to say that, under these circumstances, the principle of res judicata has any applicatio...
The Public Prosecutor Vs. Musa Sakharam
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1916
Reported in: (1916)31MLJ285
Oldfield, J.1. The accused have been acquitted on a charge of an offence punishable under Section 3(10) Act III of 1889, because the Lower Court was not satisfied on two points, that (1) the game was a game of chance, not skill and (2) it was being played in a place of public resort.2. As regards the second point, the Lower Court was moved by the fact that only a section of the general public, the Hindu Community, has a right to go to the place and that others can go there only with the permission of the Dharmakartha of the adjoining temple. It is in evidence that the place, a small open space, is in no way closed by gates or otherwise; and there is no evidence that the Dharmakartha's alleged right of exclusion is ever exercised. The definition of a public place as one where the public go, whether they have a right to or not, in E.V. Wellard (1889) 14 Q.B.D. 68 has been adopted in this country, Hari Singh v. Jadu Nandan Singh I.L.R. (1903) C. 542. In accordance with it, the Lower Court...
The King Emperor Vs. Musa and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1916
Reported in: (1917)ILR40Mad556
Oldfield, J.1. The accused have been acquitted on a charge of an offence punishable under Section 3(10), Act III of 1889, because the lower Court was not satisfied on two points, that (1) the game was a game of chance, not skill and (2) it was being played in a place of public resort.2. As regards the second point, the lower Court was moved by the fact that only a section of the general public, the Hindu community, has a right to go to the place and that others can go there only with the permission of the Dharmakartha of the adjoining temple. It is in evidence that the place, a small open space, is in no way closed by gates or otherwise; and there is no evidence that the Dharmakartha's alleged right of exclusion is ever exercised. The definition of a public place as one where the public go, whether they have a right to or not, in R. v. Wellard (1884) 14 L.R. Q.B.D. 63 has been adopted in this country. Hari Singh v. Jadu Nandan Singh I.L.R. (1904) Calc. 542 In accordance with it, the lo...
Dhanukodi Asari Vs. Muthuswamy Aiyar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.490
ORDERSeshagiri Aiyar, J.1 Mr. Seshachariar has raised two points against the order of the Magistrate directing compensation to be paid by his client. The first is that the order is contained in a separate proceeding and it, therefore, contravenes Section 250, Criminal Procedure Code. What happened is this. On the day the accused was discharged, in the same order discharging the accused, the Magistrate made a note to the effect that the complainant will be called upon to show cause why he should not pay compensation. This was read out to the complainant and the complainant asked for three days' time to answer the charge. On the 3rd day, on hearing the complainant the Magistrate came to the conclusion that he should be directed to pay compensation. It is argued that as this proceeding directing compensation is contained in a separate order, it is illegal. In In the matter of the complaint of Safdar Husain 25 A.P 315 Mr. Justice Banerjee points out that the order awarding compensation mus...
Emperor Vs. Sankar Narayana Chetti, Proprietor of AswIn and Co., Chemi ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.488
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.1. I do not think that the order of discharge is wrong. The Magistrate would have been well advised to have examined Sadagopa Naidu, but I cannot say that he was bound to do so. On two material points, the prosecution evidence is unconvincing. In the first place, there is no satisfactory evidence that the bottles before the Court were stolen from the Government Stores. The store keepers, prosecution 2nd witness and prosecution 3rd witness, say distinctly that nothing has been stolen from their Stores. The suggestion of the learned Crown Prosecutor is that the bottles must have belonged to some other Government store and must have been stolen from it. It does not follow that because the store mark is put upon the bottles, the stuff was stolen from some Government store. The evidence given by the 2nd prosecution witness shows that empty bottles are sold. Further, there is the evidence of Mr. Smith, the Court witness, who says the bottles before the Court are common bot...
In Re: Katari Veeranna
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.820
ORDERSeshagiri Aiyar, J.1. I have serious doubts whether the Magistrate has jurisdiction to send a person, who has not been a party to any proceedings before him and who has not been examined as a witness in the case, to the nearest Magistrate under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. But apart from that, there are serious objections to the maintainability of his order. In the first place as regards the direction to enquire into the offence under Section 161, Indian Penal Code, it is clear, as pointed out by Dr. Swaminathan, that that section is not one of those mentioned in Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Public Prosecutor does not press this portion of the case. Then as regards the prosecution under Section 196, Indian Penal Code, it is clear from a reading of that section that there must be some evidence in existence which the party is either using or attempting to use. The evidence in this case taken at its best shows that the accused has been attempting to get ...
Rayarath Parkum Kuruman Kandiyal Kombilan Ammotti Vs. Kottekulath Kunh ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1916
Reported in: 37Ind.Cas.83
1. The second appeal is argued only on the plea of limitation. It is urged with reference to Seydarakath Kakkachi V. Valiarath Muhamad Kutti (1) that Article 110, not Article 116, of the Limitation Act is applicable. In that case, however, the question was of a tenant holding over after the expiration of an ordinary lease. Here it is of a kanomdar; and the kanom tenure, involving the taking of an account for the whole period of the kanomdar's occupation, is not, in our opinion, subject to the legal incidents of a lease in this respect.2. The second appeal is dismissed with costs....
In Re: Musa and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1916
Reported in: 36Ind.Cas.839
Oldfield, J.1. The accused have been acquitted on a charge of an offence punishable Under Section 3(10), Act III of 1889, because the lower Court was not satisfied on two points, that (1) the game was a game of chance, not skill and (2) it was being played in a place of public resort.2. As regards the second point, the lower Court was moved by the fact that only a section of the general public, the Hindu community, has a right to go to the place and that others can go there only with the permission of the dharmakartha of the adjoining temple. It is in evidence that the place, a small open space, is in no way closed by gates or otherwise; and there is no evidence that the dharmakartha's alleged right of exclusion is ever exercised. The definition of a public place as one where the public go, whether they have a right to or not, in Beg. v. Wellard (1884) 14 Q.B. 63 : 54 L.J.M.C. 14: 83 W.R. 156, has been adopted in this country. Hari Singh v. Jadu Nandan Singh 8 C.W.N. 458. In accordance...
Vitoba Rao and anr. Vs. T. Narasinga Rao and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-13-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.507
ORDERSeshagiri Aiyar, J.1. It is to be regretted that the proceeding in this case which commenced in the year 1904 should have been allowed to continue all these years. The dispute, which culminated in the order of 1904, began by the assertion of Narasinga Rao son of of Ramappa that he was entitled to the whole of the property in dispute by virtue of a release from the sous of Ranga Row and also because he was himself entitled to a share in the property. The release was denied by the sons of Ranga Rao and as a result the Magistrate who has cognizance of the dispute attached the property, as he was not satisfied that any one of the parties was in possession of the property in dispute; that was, as I said, in the year 1904. After that, a suit was brought by Narasinga Rao in which he obtained a decree for a sixth share of the properties. He says in his plaint that he reserves his right to recover the property belonging to the half share of Ranga Rao's in a separate suit. Admittedly, that ...
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