Chennai Court March 1916 Judgments
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Ottapurakkal Thayath Suppi and ors. Vs. Sayid Alabi Masaber Alias Koya ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1916
Reported in: (1916)30MLJ523
John Wallis, C.J.1. The main question in this appeal is whether under Order 43, Rule 1(r) an appeal lay to the District Court from the refusal of the District Munsif to take action under Order 39, Rule 2(3) for an alleged breach of a temporary injunction granted under Order 39, Rule 2(2). It is quite clear that an appeal lay in a similar case under Section 94 of Act VIII of 1859, and also under Section 588(24) of the Code of 1882, which corresponds to Order 43 Rule 1(r); and that such appeals lay not only from orders in exercise of the powers conferred by the section but also from orders refusing to exercise such powers. It is also clear that refusal by the Court to take action on the breach of an injunction might seriously prejudice the party in whose favour the injunction had been granted, and it is said to be unlikely that the Legislature in intended to affect such right of appeal when it recast the language of Section 493 of the old Code when re-enacting it in the present Code. The...
In Re: Sellamani
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1916
Reported in: 33Ind.Cas.629; (1917)32MLJ212
1. The conviction is by a Jury and there is no misdirection.2. As regards sentence we observe that the case appears to fall under Clause (a) and not under Clause (b) of Section 23(1) of the Criminal Tribes Act 1911. Accused's last conviction was in 1907 so that his present conviction is his first after the enactment of Act 3 of 1911 and the notification of his tribe as a Criminal Tribe. Section 23(1) is not altogether easy of interpretation; but we think that the phrase second conviction has reference to the words in) the sentence 'is hereafter convicted' and not to the earlier; words 'having been convicted' as the Sessions Judge has read them. The section will thus read, 'whoever, having been convicted, is hereafter convicted, shall on a second conviction be punished, with imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years'; and we must take the words 'second conviction' to signify a first conviction for a scheduled offence after the coming into force of the Act following upon eithe...
Kudapa Venkayamma, Minor by Her Father and Guardian Mallina Kristnamma ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.150; (1916)31MLJ33
1. There are two questions arising in this appeal. The first relates to the construction of the will Ex. A. There can be no doubt that Subbanna, one of the sons of a daughter of the testator acquired a vested interest under the terms of the will on the death of the testator. He lived for sometime after the testator's death and then died leaving the plaintiff, his widow. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that upon a proper construction of the will, only such of, the sons of the testator's daughter would take as were born and living at the time of the testator's death and Mr. Ramesam relies for this construction upon a ruling of the Privy Council in Bhagabati Barmanya v. Kalicharan Singh I.L.R. (1911) C. 468 s.c. 21 M.L.J. 387. The question being one of construction, it has to be determined with reference to the terms of the document in each case, though in arriving at the true meaning of the document, one must have regard to any general rule of construction that bears on the matte...
Sunkara Venkataratnam and ors. Vs. Sri Rajah Varadarajah Appa Rao Baha ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.213; (1916)31MLJ123
John Wallis, C.J.1. The question in the case is whether land which had been uncultivated for 10 years immediately-preceding 1900 and was let in that year and was re-let to the present defendants after the expiry of the first lease and was in the occupation of the defendants at the time of the passing of the Madras Estates Land Act comes within the definition of old waste in that Act. The main principle of the Act, as declared in Section 6, is that every one in occupation of ryoti land at the passing of the Act or thereafter admitted to occupation acquires an occupancy right; but at a late stage of the Bill, as is well known, it was provided as a concession to land-holders that this should not apply to old waste as defined in the Act. The term 'old waste' is rather a misnomer. 'Tenyear old waste' would better describe what is meant and even this would not be satisfactory as in some cases it is not necessary to show that the land was waste for ten years. Old waste means ryoti land admiss...
Sunkara Venkataratnam and Four ors. Vs. Sri Rajah Varadarajah Appa Rao ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1916
Reported in: (1917)ILR40Mad529
John Wallis, C.J.1. The question in the case is whether land which had been uncultivated for ten years immediately preceding 1900, and was let in that year, and was re-let to the present defendants after the expiry of the first lease, and was in the occupation of the defendants at the time of the passing of the Madras Estates Land Act, comes within the definition of 'old waste' in that Act. The main principle of the Act, as declared in Section 6, is that every one in occupation of ryoti land at the passing of the Act, or thereafter admitted to occupation, acquires an occupancy right; but at a late stage of the Bill, as is well known, it was provided, as a concession to landholders, that this should not apply to 'old waste' as defined in the Act. The term 'old waste' is rather a misnomer. 'Ten-year old waste' would better describe what is meant, and even this would not be satisfactory, as in some cases it is not necessary to show that the land was waste for ten years. Old waste means ry...
Kudopa Venkayamma (Minor by Her Father and Guardian Mallina Kristamma) ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1916
Reported in: (1917)ILR40Mad540
Abdur Rahim, J.1. There are two questions arising in this appeal. The first relates to the construction of the will (Exhibit A). There can be no doubt that Subbanna, one of the sons of a daughter of the testator, acquired a vested interest under the terms of the will on the death of the testator. He lived for some time after the testator's death and then died leaving the plaintiff, his widow. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that upon a proper construction of the will, only such of the sons of the testator's daughter would take as were born and living at the time of the testator's death, and Mr. Ramesam relies for this construction upon a ruling of the Privy Council--Bangabati Barmanya v. Kalicharan Singh I.L.R. (1911) Calc. 468. The question being one of construction, it has to be determined with reference to the terms of the document in each case, though in arriving at the true meaning of the document, one must have regard to any general rule of construction that bears on the ...
K. Anavarsada Khan Pani Sahib Vs. Misiri Khan Pani Sahib
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1916
Reported in: (1916)31MLJ44
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The 4th defendant, one of the judgment debtors, is the appellant before us. He was the petitioner in the lower court. The respondent in this appeal is the 7th defendant, another of the judgment-debtors. The respondent (7th defendant) has been styled in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge by mistake as the 5th defendant and 5th res-pondent. The decree had been passed so long ago as in 1896 against the 1st defendant who was then the hukdar of the mosque and his five sons. The first defendant as such hukdar was entitled to the surplus profits of certain lands after meeting the expenses in connection with the upkeep of the mosque charities. The decree directed the realisation of the decree amount from such surplus income. Three sons, namely, defendants 2, 3 and 4 were afterwards, in actual possession of the lands as lessees from their father, the 1st defendant, under a registered leasedeed dated 26th October 1900. The other two sons, (the defendants 5 and 6) had died...
K. Anavarda Khan Pani Sahib Vs. Misiri Khan Pani Sahib
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.179
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The 4th defendant, one of the judgment-debtors, is the appellant before us. He was the petitioner in the lower Court. The respondent in this appeal is the 7th defendant, another of the judgment-debtors. The respondent (7th defendant) has been styled in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge by mistake as the 5th defendant and 5th respondent. The decree had been, passed so long ago as in 1896 against the 1st defendant, who was then the hukdar of the mosque, and his five sons. The first defendant as such hukdar was entitled to the surplus profits of certain lands after meeting the expenses in connection with the upkeep of the mosque charities. The decree directed the realisation of the decree amount from such surplus income. Three sons, namely, defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were afterwards in actual possession of the lands as lessees from their father, the 1st defendant, under a registered lease-deed dated 26th October 1900. The other two sons, (the defendants Nos. 5 and...
Naraprath Kummali Kandungo Kurup and anr. Vs. Paramboli Kandi Thavazha ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1916
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.494
1. Though Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act does not directly apply in favour of a Court auction-purchaser (the Transfer of Property Act dealing only with transfers by acts of parties), the principle of that section applies in favour of a Court auction-purchaser [Radha Madhab Paikara v. Kalpataru Roy 16 Ind. Cas. 811.2. But on the finding of fact arrived at by the lower Appellate Court in this case, namely, that the 2nd defendant (Court auction-purchaser) was aware that the properties purchased by him did not belong to the judgment-debtors as their private property, there is no basis for the application of the principle of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act in his favour and we, therefore, dismiss this second appeal (filed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2) with the plaintiffs' costs....
Tadepalli Pitchayya and ors. Vs. Tadepalli Subba Rao and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1916
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.787
1. These are appeals by the sons of the deceased 1st plaintiff in Original Suit No. 21 of 1907 in the Subordinate Court of Masulipatam, against the order passed in Execution Petition No. 17 of 1914 and in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 212 to 214 of 1914.2. The facts are somewhat complicated, but we will endeavour to state them as shortly as possible. One Tadepalli Garudachalam and his minor sons, the present appellants, brought a suit, Original Suit No. 10 of 1899, in the Masulipatam Sub-Court for partition. The parties to the suit referred the matters in dispute to arbitrators and presented a petition, Exhibit Gr, to the Court under Section 506, Civil Procedure Code, on 11th April 1900. The only fact, which it is necessary to state in regard to this reference to arbitration, is that it provided that the costs-presumably the' Court costs-of the plaintiffs and the defendants should be deducted and paid from the 'rasi amount' (joint family funds). On 24th September 1903 an interim decree,...
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