Chennai Court March 1916 Judgments
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M.R.P.R.S. Shanmuganatha Chettiar and ors. Vs. K. Srinivasa Aiyar and ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.219; (1916)31MLJ138
Abdur Rahim, J.1. The learned Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore has found that the execution of the promissory notes in question has been proved and also that consideration was paid for them. These notes were executed by the 1st defendant, father of defendants 2, 3 and 4 and by the 5th defendant. Defendants 5, 6 and 7 are brothers and members of a joint Hindu family. They have nothing to do with the 1st defendant except so far as this business is concerned.2. There can be no doubt that there was a joint business carried on in rice and tobacco by the 1st, 5th and 6th defendants. But so far as the liability of the 7th defendant goes, the evidence does not show with sufficient clearness that he was a partner in the joint business carried on by the 1st, 5th and 6th defendant. Ex.W which was relied on by the Subordinate Judge in order to make out that the 7th defendant was a partner does not prove anything of the kind. Nor does Ex.R. Ex. Rule apparently refers to some busi-ness other than the...
Pilakkatan Chetttotan Tharamal Kunhamma and ors. Vs. Vazhakarambath Mo ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1916
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.755
1. A melkanom during the subsistence of a previous kanom is not void altogether, but is only voidable at the instance of the members of the tarwad who were not parties to it. In this case it is found that the only remaining member of the tarwad has recognized the melkanom granted by his predecessor. The defendant whose kanom has expired is not entitled to plead that he should hold on even after the expiry of his term,2. The decision of the lower Appellate Court is right. The second appeal is dismissed with costs....
Puthenpurayil Parkum Chathu Choyichimkandiyal Parkum Poovamulla Vs. Ka ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1916
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.906
1. This is an appeal by the 2nd defendant in the suit which was brought for the specific performance of a contract of sale entered into by the 1st defendant with the plaintiff on 4th July 1910. The first defendant is the Jenmi of the property which was held on kanom by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that the 1st defendant agreed to sell the property to him for Rs. 400. The 2nd defendant resisted the suit on the ground that he had purchased the property on 4th September 1910 from the 1st defendant without notice of the alleged agreement for sale. The lower Courts have found that the agreement set up by the plaintiff is true, and this finding cannot be questioned in second appeal. The Subordinate Judge held that there was no satisfactory evidence to show that the 2nd defendant had actual notice of the agreement to sell but that he must be deemed to have had constructive notice of the agreement since, although he was aware of the plaintiff's possession, he had abstained from maki...
Palaniandi Chetty and ors. Vs. M.V. Appavu Chettiar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1916
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.778; (1916)30MLJ565
Coutts Trotter, J.1. Although this appeal raises questions of difficulty and importance the facts material to it can be stated very shortly. The plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was the absolute owner by purchase of the suit properties as against the defendants who were holders of decrees against his vendor. The plaintiff's title was based on a sale deed dated the 5th of September 1903, from Vcelayudham Chetty to himself for a consideration of Rs. 14,250. It has been found that this deed and the transaction which is carried out was brought into existence with intent to defraud and defeat the creditors of the transferor, and that finding is not and cannot be challenged, but the appellant contends that it is not competent to the defendant to invoke that finding in aid in the present proceedings. For the moment, I am assuming that the transaction in question, was in this sense a real one, that it effected and was meant to effect a real transfer of the property from the transferor ...
Murugayya Maniyakaran Vs. Palaniyandi Maniyakaran, Minor Through His M ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1916
Reported in: 36Ind.Cas.507; (1916)31MLJ147
Abdur Rahim, J.1. This is an appeal preferred by the 1st defendant in the suit against the decree of the Court of the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Ramnad declaring that the partition made of the family properties during his life time by the 1st plaintiff, the appellant's father is valid and binding upon the appellant. The 1st plaintiff died after the institution of the suit and is represented by the 3rd plaintiff (2nd respondent) his widow, the 2nd plaintiff (1st respondent) being minor grandson of his.2. The first question argued before us relates to the power of a Hindu father to effect a partition of ancestral family property without the consent of his sons. It has been held in this Court as far back as 1880 in Kandasami v. Doraisami Aiyar I.L.R. (1880) M. 317 that the father is vested under the Hindu Law with such authority upon certain conditions and this ruling has been mentioned with approval in a number of subsequent decisions of this Court ('see Karuppannan Chetti v. Bulokam...
Shaik Davud Rowther and ors. Vs. Paramasami Pillai
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1916
Reported in: 35Ind.Cas.70; (1916)31MLJ207
1. This is an appeal by defendants 2, 11, 13 and 14 in O.S. No. 38 of 1903 in the Subordinate Judge's Court of2. Kumbaconum against an order rejecting an application to record satisfaction of the decree. The facts which have given rise to this appeal may be shortly stated. The decree was obtained by the South Indian Export Company against the members of a Muhammadan family and was transferred by the Company (decree-holder ) to the respondent. On 1st February 1915 the appellants applied to the Court under O. XXI E. 83 C.P.C. for permission to sell the properties which had been attached by the respondent for the purpose of discharging the decree-debt and to execute a sale-deed. On the same date the Subordinate Judge passed the following order: ' Permission granted' In his affidavit in support of his petition the 2nd defendant stated that the respondent had attached the judgment-debtor's share in the family properties in Athur village, that the disputes between the respondent and the judg...
Ranganadha Mudaliar and anr. Vs. Baghirathi Ammall and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1916
Reported in: (1906)ILR29Mad412
1. The first ground upon which the deed of settlement of October 13th, 1894 was impeached by the plaintiff was that it was executed by Rajaratna in ignorance of its content'and its legal effect. The suggestion was that when Rajaratna executed the deed he did so under the belief that he was merely appointing his brother-in-law Guruswami as his agent.2. The trustees appointed by the deed are Rajaratna's wife and his wife's brother Guruswami. There is not a title of evidence that anything in the nature of undue influence was exercised by Guruswami or that Rajaratna was not in full possession of his faculties when he executed the document. The solicitor who drafted the instrument deposed that its contents were explained to Rajaratna. During his lifetime Rajaratna never disavowed or attempted to repudiate the document. His cousin Gopalaswami (the father of the plaintiff), the representative of the branch of the family whose interests were adversely affected by the deed, was aware that it ha...
Ponnusami Pillai Vs. Samu Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-16-1916
Reported in: (1916)31MLJ247
1. The appellant claimed either that the attachment should be set aside in its entirety, as the decree was fraudu-lently obtained or in the alternative, that the sale under the attachment should be subject to the mortgage. In either case we think that the claim is covered by Order XXI Rule 58 of the Civil Procedure Code. Rule 62 provides for the recognition of the mortgage. Rule 61 provides for the rejection of the claim. We are unable to accept Mr. Deva Doss's contention that the Code does not contemplate the rejection of a claim of a mortgagee as such; the decision in Nemagauda v. Paresha I.L.R (1897) B. 640 shows, that claims founded on mortgages are as much within the rule as any other claim. The learned Counsel for the appellant has quoted no cases to the contrary : the decision Bhiku v. Shujat Ali I.L.R. (1901) C. 25 refers to the question of possession being disturbed after sale : that has no bearing on the present question. Moreover the language of Article 11 of the Limitation ...
Nachiappa Chetty Vs. Thangavelu Chetty and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-16-1916
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.696
1. Following the decision in Muthukaruppan Chettiar v. Muthuraman Chetttar (1914) M.W.N. 899 : 1 L.W. 1012, we hold that an order of adjudication on a creditor's application, without the issue of the general notice to creditors, prescribed by Section 12 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, of the date fixed under section (12) (1) for hearing the petition, is wholly irregular and ought to be set aside.2. Even if the appellant (petitioner) had somehow got private notice of the presentation of the petition to adjudicate, he is not bound to appear unless the general notice in the local Official Gazette calls upon him and the other creditors to so appear, and the order passed without the issue of such general notice will not be validated by proof that the creditors had private notice, assuming, of course, that the creditors, who had such private notice, could, if they choose, inform the Court that they dispensed with the issue of the general notice in the local Official Gazette.3. We set a...
T.S. Ari Chetty Vs. theerthamalai Chetty and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-16-1916
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.791
1. We are unable to agree with the lower Courts on the question of limitation. As Benson, J., said in Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal 26 M.s 91: All periods of limitation are more or less arbitrary, and it is of the highest importance that they should be laid down with clearness and certainty, and that subtle distinctions not warranted by the language of the Legislature should not be introduced by the Courts.'2. Again, as Sir Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., said in the same case at page 96, There cannot be two final decrees in such a suit, one by the Court of first instance and the other by the Court of Appeal.' The question of limitation ought not to be made to depend upon the other question (which is almost always a very difficult and doubtful one) whether the appeal by one of the defendants, or as regards a part of the decree of the first Court, imperils the decree passed against, the other defendants, or the other portion of the decree. [See also Loke Nath Singh v. Gaju Singh 31 Ind. Cas. 42...
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