Chennai Court September 1915 Judgments
Browse smarter
Open an 18-section brief on any judgment
Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.
- AI Brief & Ask
- Semantic AI Search
- Devil's Bench
Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.
Kyroon Bee and anr. Vs. the Administrator-general of Madras
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-07-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad869; 31Ind.Cas.38
1. The respondent's learned Counsel took a preliminary objection that no appeal lay as the order appealed against was not a judgment. We overrule the preliminary objection as we are satisfied that an order setting aside the abatement of a suit is a judgment as interpreted by the Full Bench in the case Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar 8 Ind. Cas. 340 (1910) M.W.N. 696, though it may be, to use the words of the learned Chief Justice in the above case, an order on an independent proceeding 'which is ancillary to the suit.'2. The respondent's learned Counsel concedes that till his client (the Administrator-General of Madras) obtained Letters of Administration in March 914, his client was not the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff and that the deceased's widow and his two sons and his other children were his legal representatives. The suit abated six months after the plaintiff's death, that is, in May 1912. The present application was made by the Administrator-General in April ...
Vythinatha Aiyar Vs. Vaithilinga Mudaliar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-07-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad660; 31Ind.Cas.206a
Tyabji, J.1. In this case, the appellant did not appear in the Court of first instance. The other parties to the suit agreed to refer the matter to arbitration and an order to that effect was made by the Court. Judgment was pronounced in accordance with the award. A decree followed. The appellant now appeals and contends that the award purports to bind him though he was not a party to the reference. The scope of the Second Schedule, paragraphs 15 and In, Code of Civil Procedure, was considered in Second Appeal No. 1192 of 1913 to which I was a party, and it seems to me that on the authorities as they stand, an appeal would lie from a decree purporting to bind a person who never submitted to arbitration or where there has been no agreement to refer at all. The 1st respondent in the present case concedes that the decree ought not to bind the appellant and is willing to have it made explicit that it cannot be enforced against the appellant. It seems to me, therefore, that the decree shoul...
A.V. Subramania Aiyar Vs. Sellammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-07-1915
Reported in: 31Ind.Cas.296; (1916)30MLJ317
John Wallis, C.J.1. In this case the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was less than Rs. 10,000, but the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council exceeds that sum owing to the claim for mesne profits for the period between the institution of the suit and the petition for a certificate. It is clear that the case does not satisfy the provisions of the first paragraph of Section 110, Civil Procedure Code, but we are asked to grant the certificate on the ground that, in the circumstances, the decree of the High Court involves 'directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of like amount or value' within the meaning of the second paragraph. If this contention' be accepted, a certificate must be granted in any case in which the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to his Majesty in Council is not less than Rs. 10,000, whether or not the amount or value o...
Sheik MuhiuddIn Rowther Vs. Rangachariar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-07-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1028(2); 31Ind.Cas.913
1. In Karunakara Menon v. Krishna Menon 27 Ind. Cas. 952 : 2 L.W. 196 : 28 M.L.J. 262, it was held that the payment by one judgment-debtor into Court of money which (according to the arguments of Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar for respondents in that case) could have been withdrawn from Court by the decree-holder at once, could not be taken advantage of by the other judgment-debtor in making his necessary deposit to support his application under Order XXI, Rule 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure.2. It follows, a fortiori, that amounts paid by purchasers in Court auction whose purchases have not been confirmed and which amounts, therefore, could not be withdrawn by the decree-holder at his pleasure, could not be taken advantage of by any person who applies under Order XXI, Rule 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure.3. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs....
Karuturi Gopalam Vs. Karuturi Venkataraghavulu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1915
Reported in: (1917)ILR40Mad632
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.1. One Venkanna adopted the plaintiff in 1898, The first defendant was subsequently born. Venkanna died in 1902. The second defendant, the natural mother of the first defendant and the adoptive mother of the plaintiff managed the estate during the minority of the two sons. The suit is for partition for a half share in the family properties. The main contention of the first defendant is that the plaintiff is only entitled to a fifth share. The Subordinate Judge, relying on an observation in Raja v. Subbaraya I.L.R. (1884) Mad. 268, has held that the two sons were entitled to equal shares.2. The question has been argued at great length before us. I am unable to agree with the Court below. The parties in this case are Sudras. In Raja v. Subbaraya I.L.R. (1884) Mad. 268 the dispute was between the natural son of a brother and the adopted son of another. It is settled law in Madras, notwithstanding Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss I.L.R. (1879) Calc. 425 and Giriapa v...
Kathari Narasimha Raju Vs. Bhupati Raju Raghunadha Raju and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1126(2); 31Ind.Cas.52
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The plaintiff is the appellant. He owned the plaint land in 1900 and 1901. He brought the suit in 1909, having been out of possession for eight or nine years before the suit. His story was that the 3rd defendant became his lessee in 1900. That story has been found to be false. The lower Courts have further found that in 1901 the plaintiff sold the plaint lands to the 3rd defendant, executed an unregistered sale-deed for Rs. 50 to the 3rd defendant and put the 3rd defendant in possession of the land. On these findings they dismissed the plaintiff's suit. That unregistered sale-deed is not produced, the 3rd defendant suppressing it according to the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who are the vendees from the 3rd defendant.2. The contention in second appeal is that the plaintiff, though he failed to prove the lease to the 3rd defendant, is entitled to succeed on his title which existed in 1901 and had not been lost either by adverse possession when the suit was brought in 19...
P.S. Sivarama Aiyar Vs. Muthu K.R. Alagappa Chetty by His Agent Vedach ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad497; 31Ind.Cas.211
1. The first contention, of the appellant's learned Vakil is that the expression 'some act showing his' (lessor's) ' intention to determine the lease', occurring; in Section 111, Clause (g), of the Transfer of Property Act must be confined to an attempt at re-entry, or to the filing of suit in ejectment, where the forfeiture is incurred by the breach of a condition of the lease-deed providing for re-entry on such breach. We must decline to put such a restricted construction on the very general phrase some act occurring in the Statute. The Lawyer's notices by the plaintiff in this case showing unequivocally his intention to determine the lease are, therefore, sufficient.2. The next contention is that the appellant (2nd defendant) is not liable for rent, or to pay compensation for use and occupation, because he was neither the plaintiff's tenant, for did he continue in possession with the plaintiff's permission. The short answer to this contention is that he has been made liable for mesn...
Karuturi Gopalan being minor by his Maternal Grandfather's Younger Bro ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1915
Reported in: 31Ind.Cas.574
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.1. One Venkanna adopted the plaintiff in 1898. The 1st defendant was subsequently born. Venkanna died in 1902. The 2nd defendant, the Natural mother of the 1st defendant and the adoptive mother of the plaintiff, managed the estate during the minority of the two sons. The suit is for partition for a half share in the family properties. The main contention of the 1st defendant is that the plaintiff is only entitled to a fifth share. The Subordinate Judge, relying on an observation in Raja v. Subbaraya 7 M.K 253, held that the two sons were entitled to equal shares.2. The question has been argued at great length before, us. I am unable to agree with the Court below. The parties in this case are Sudras. In Raja v. Subbaraya 7 M.K 253, the dispute was between the natural son of a brother and the adopted son of another. It is settled law in Madras, notwithstanding Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss 3 C.L.R. 523 and Giriapa v. Ningapa 17 B.K 100 to the contrary, that, by ...
Ramakrishna Pillai Vs. Muthuperumal Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1165; 31Ind.Cas.924
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. Under the old Civil Procedure Code, Section 652, the High Court had power to make rules to regulate the procedure in the mufussil Courts only so far as such rules were consistent with that Code. Section 541 of the old Code made it compulsory on the appellant to produce a copy of the decree and a copy of the judgment (the latter unless dispensed with by the Appellate Court) along with the memorandum of appeal, I am inclined to hold that it is not consistent with that section to make any rule imposing a further obligation on the appellant that the copy which he produces, should be a printed copy. In Madurai Pillai v. Muthu Chetty 22 Ind. Cas. 775 a Full Bench of this Court held that where a rule abridges a substantive right granted by the Statute, such a rule is ultra vires, unless the Statute itself empowers the rule-making authority to alter the provisions in the Statute. In that case, the substantive right in question was a right to have a trial by a Full Bench of...
C.A. Easwara Iyer Vs. K. Govindarajulu Naidu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-03-1915
Reported in: (1916)ILR39Mad689
Napier, J.1. This is a reference under Section 69 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882). It is much to be regretted that the Judges of that Court did not adhere more closely to the directions of the section in making their reference. They do not state clearly the points on which there is a difference of opinion. They practically refer the whole case to this Court saying that they are not agreed on the question whether 'under the circumstances of the case, the bond should be enforced against the surety, the defendant.' In my opinion this is not a proper reference and were it not that one of the Judges of that Court has now retired, I would, speaking for myself, return the reference for resubmission in strict accordance with law. As that course is now impossible, I will deal with it as if the reference was on three points:--(1) whether there was any jurisdiction in the Court to take the bond, (2) whether the protection order granted by the High Court in the exercise of it...
- ‹ Prev
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 10
- Next ›
- Last »