Chennai Court September 1915 Judgments
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A.L.A.R. Arunachellam Chettiar and Three ors. Vs. Lakshmana Ayyar and ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-17-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad944; (1916)ILR39Mad936
Coutts Trotter, J.1. This appeal raises a question of some interest and the circumstances in which it is raised are these:--The appellant brings this suit against two persons who were at one time partners in respect of moneys advanced by him to them. The only question for decision is whether this action is barred by limitation as regards the various items in the account which became due more than three years before the date of this suit. The Courts below have held that this suit was barred in respect of these items An ingenious argument has been adduced before us to show that that decision was wrong and the plaintiff is entitled to take the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The circumstances in which he claims that benefit are these. He instituted a previous suit against the same parties as those in this proceeding, and as originally framed that suit included his claim now said to be barred and apparently included nothing that would have made that suit as originally launched...
In Re: Kanakasabhai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-17-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad516; 30Ind.Cas.745
ORDERSeshagiri Aiyar, J.1. In this case, an application was made to me on 14th September 1915 while I was sitting in the Admission Court to while I was sitting in the Admission Court to admit a criminal revision petition and to release the accused on bail. I granted both the prayers. Immediately after and before the prayers. Immediately after and before the order was transcribe, it was brought to my notice that Sir William Ayling, J., had the matter before him some days back and that he dismissed the petition. This was not brought to my notice as it ought to have been when I assed orders. I am asked to treat the dismissal by Ayling, J., as one for default of appearance. One of the Vakils was present before the learned Judge and though he says he represented his inability to o on with the case as the papers were with the other Vakil, I see no reason to think that Aylin, J., did not deal with the petition on its merits. The decision in Ranga Row v. Emperor 16 Ind. Cas. 518 : (1912) M.W.N...
A.L.A.R. Arunachellam Chettiar and ors. Vs. Lakshmana Aiyar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-17-1915
Reported in: 31Ind.Cas.234
1. This appeal raises a question of some interest and the circumstances in which it is raised are these: The appellant brings this suit against two persons, who were at one time partners, in respect of moneys advanced by him to them. The only question for decision is whether this action is barred by limitation as regards the various items in the account, which became due more than three years before the date of this suit. The Courts below have held that this suit, was barred in respect of these items. An ingenious argument has been adduced before us to show that that decision was wrong and the plaintiff is entitled to take the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The circumstances in which he claims that benefit are these. He instituted a previous suit against the same parties as those in this proceeding, and as originally framed, that suit included his claim now said to be barred and apparently included nothing that would have made that suit, as originally launched bad for mis...
Puchalapalli Adiseshadri Reddi Vs. Mungamur Sivaramayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-17-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1202(1); 31Ind.Cas.320
1. The High Court's preliminary decree superseded the District Court's preliminary decree. An error in the High Court's preliminary decree cannot be corrected by the District Court. The District Court was legally bound to draw up its final decree only in accordance with the High Court's preliminary decree.2. The District Judge, therefore, rightly refused the application to correct his final decree, which was in accordance with the preliminary decree passed by the High Court. There was, therefore, no ground for interference under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, with his said order of refusal. We dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal with costs on this ground, though we differ respectfully from the view of the learned Judge whose decision is now under appeal, namely, that there is anything in Order XXXIV, Rule 2, to prevent a Court from providing in its decree for interest on the total amount awarded to the plaintiff because such total includes interest on the bond sued on....
P.C. Raghavachariar Vs. Anantha Reddi and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-17-1915
Reported in: 31Ind.Cas.911
1. Defendants Nos. 2 to 5 mortgaged to the 1st defendant certain properties. One Arunachella obtained a decree for money against the 1st defendant. An application for attachment was made on the 15th July. After notice to the debtors, the attachment was made on the 29th July. On the 10th August, the District Munsif dismissed the petition as further steps were net taken. It is not clear what further steps were required to be taken by the attaching creditor. There is nothing in the order or in the papers before us to indicate that the creditor was guilty of any laches on his part and that the Court dismissed the petition on that ground. Under these circumstances, we must regard the dismissal as not having the effect of putting an end to the attachment. The Judicial Committee pointed out that the question whether by reason of the disposal of a petition, the attachment ceased to subsist, should be determined with reference to the facts of each case. We find no materials in this case for hol...
Davuluru Vijaya Ramayya Vs. Davuluru Venkatasubba Rao and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-16-1915
Reported in: (1916)30MLJ465
Tyabji, J.1. The present plaintiffs who are minors were parties to Original Suit No. 416 of 1905 which had been instituted by the present 1st defendant for partition. That suit was in the First Court referred to arbitration (by orders in November 1906 and March 1907). The award was dated 9th April 1907 and a decree passed in accordance with it. The present plaintiffs' father appealed from the decree passed on the award (A.S. No. 504 of 1907). The appeal was compromised and a decree was purported to be passed therein by the consent of the parties. The present suit is to have it declared that the consent decree does not bind the plaintiffs, to have it set aside, to obtain possession of the properties mentioned in the plaint, and other reliefs.2. It is admitted that, neither the reference to arbitration nor the consent decree was with leave of the court under 0rder 32, Rule 7 (Section 462 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882). I shall in the rest of my judgment refer only to the Code of 1908...
T. Narayanaswami Naidu Garu Vs. Krovidi Gantayya and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-16-1915
Reported in: 32Ind.Cas.691a
Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.1. In this case, the District Judge has appointed a Receiver for a mill mortgaged to defendant by it we insolvents who are now represented by the Official Receiver, plaintiff. In the plaint the Official Receiver alleges that the mortgage was only for 5 years, and that he tendered what he considered due to the mortgagee according to the terms of the mortgage, but the tender was not accepted. It would appear that the terms of the mortgage are onerous and now the Official Receiver has obtained an order for a Receiver on the ground that it is for the benefit of the insolvent's estate. For appellant (defendant) it is urged that the possession of a mortgagee in possession should not be disturbed by the Appointment of a Receiver. This is, no doubt, ordinarily true and very good grounds must be shown to justify the Court in interfering with such possession; but in this case we think that such grounds do exist; accepting as we do the statements in the plaint an application...
K.R. Manikam Mudaliar Vs. Kummalanguttay Munuswami Naidu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-16-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad666; 31Ind.Cas.246
1. This appeal arises out of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution.2. The question in the present case is, whether the defendant 'was directly responsible for any charge at all being made against the plaintiff:' Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh 10 Bom. L.R. 1080. Persons who have made the original report of the alleged crime knowing it to be false, have been made by the Privy Council to 'abide the consequences of their misconduct' notwithstanding that the prosecution was not technically conducted by them,' but by the Police.3. The facts in Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh 12 C.W.N. 1017 : 10 Bom. L.R. 1080 : 8 C.L.J. 337 : 35 I.A. 189. were that the Sub-Inspector instituted the charge at the instigation of the defendants and not of his own motion (page 533) and the defendants had concocted and produced false evidence to get the plaintiff charged with the crime (page 532).3. The instigation to prosecute apparently consisted in making the original report upon which the prosecution was ultim...
Raman Chetty Vs. Nagappa Chetty
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-16-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad672; 31Ind.Cas.285
1. We think that Section 44 of the Stamp Act was intended to give a right to an innocent party, who himself was not guilty of any default in the matter of the proper stamping of a document, to recover the duty or penalty he was obliged to pay, from the person or persons guilty of the default and that it was not intended to enable one of several persons, who were under a common duty to pay the proper stamp in proportionate shares, to claim recovery of the proportionate amount of the duty or penalty the whole of which he was afterwards obliged to pay owing to the common default. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the question of limitation, and we dismiss the Letters Patent Appeal with costs....
S.M. Venkatarama Aiyar Vs. Raja Gopala Iyer and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-16-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad680(1); 31Ind.Cas.704
1. The learned District Judge professed to decide this case after consideration of the terms of the partition-deed. No such deed is even alleged ever to have existed. The plaint discloses a possible cause of action under either Section 69 or Section 43 of the Contract Act. The practice of non-suiting plaintiffs in other than absolutely plain cases is to be deprecated. The art of pleading in this country has not reached the point at which it is safe to assume that the Pleader gives the exact effect of the contract pleaded and where the line of distinction between the actionable and the non-actionable was a fine one, as in this case, +he only proper course was to hear the evidence and examine the documents. This is doubly important where the pleading is applying the vernacular to complex legal conceptions and relations. It is most regrettable that the Subordinate Judge should have suggested that the plaintiff was officious in depriving the defendants of an opportunity of evading the paym...
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