Chennai Court July 1915 Judgments
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Potla Subbarayudu Vs. Ravi Lakshmayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad554(2); 30Ind.Cas.260
1. We regret that we cannot accept the learned District Judge's decision. The decree of the District Munsif in Original Suit No. 290 of 1910, which is pleaded as res judicata, is not, in our opinion, deprived of that character, because (with or without the parties' consent) the present plaintiff's right to sue again to recover back the amount then decreed and paid was referred to in the connected judgment as reserved. The fact, if it be one, that the present defendant agreed to that reservation could not be material. For no agreement between the parties could have enabled the Court to dispose of the case in a manner not recognized by the Civil Procedure Code or by authority.2. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed, the lower Appellate Court's order of remand being set aside and the District Munsif's decision dismissing the suit with costs being restored.3. There will be no order as to costs here and in the District Court....
Thomas Pillai and anr. Vs. Muthuraman Chetty
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-14-1915
Reported in: AIR1915Mad907; 30Ind.Cas.264
Napir, J.1. The point of limitation is one of great difficulty arising out of construction of Section 15 of the new Limitation Act. I cannot treat it as a question of jurisdiction. The other point that the whole procedure in the suit for a declaration has been wrong from beginning to end and that the proper suit was one for possession and that execution should have been sought in such a suit was not taken before the lower Courts and I cannot go into it here.2. The petition is dismissed with costs....
Srinivasa Mudali Vs. Ramasamy Mudali and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-13-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad809; 30Ind.Cas.380
Oldfield, J.1. The question before the learned District Judge was whether petitioner's application for the appointment of a Commissioner to work out the shares recoverable under a compromise decree for partition was an application for execution thereof or whether, the decree being merely preliminary, the application was a step in the suit and was not barred by any limitation. As we shall decide for the latter alternative, we dismiss Appeal against Order No. 162 of 1914 and pass our decision on Civil Revision Petition No. 344 of 1914. The provisions of the compromise are in every respect appropriate to a preliminary partition decree, such as is contemplated in Latchman Chetty v. Ramanathan Chetty 14 M.L.J. 436 and Appadu v. Venkata Ranga Rau 18 M.L.J. 23 and these two eases show that such an order, as petitioner asked for, could have been made by the lower Court at any time of its own motion, as a step in the disposal of the suit, and that there could be no question of any bar of limita...
Krishniengar Vs. Sri Viraraghavathathachariar, Trustee of Nachiar Kovi ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-13-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad549(1); 30Ind.Cas.771
1. Petitioner holds a decree directing certain trustees to perform a festival. In the petition under disposal he moved the Subordinate Court to issue a direction to the trustees to perform the festival, the time for which was approaching. Neither that Court nor this has any power under the Code to issue such a direction in the circumstances. The appeal against order is dismissed with costs....
K. Narayana Moothad Et Al. Vs. the CochIn Sirkar Now Represented by J. ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-12-1915
Reported in: (1916)ILR39Mad661
Oldfield, J.1. The question in these appeals is whether His Highness the Rajah of Cochin was legitimately impleaded as a defendant in connected suits in the absence of consent by the local Government under Section 86, Code of Civil Procedure.2. It is urged firstly, that the absence of such consent is immaterial, because His Highness has waived his privilege by proceeding, after pleading it, to plead also on the merits. I do not consider whether the course of his pleading did in fact amount to a waiver or not, because in my opinion the recognition of cases of waiver, as excepted from the ordinary provision of International Law as understood in England, cannot be imported into the clear language of the Indian Code. The contrary view was no doubt taken in Chandulal v. Awad bin Umar Sultan I.L.R. (1897) 21 Bom. 351. But with all respect I find the reasoning therein inconclusive and doubt whether reference to the supposed intention of the legislature is permissible or, if permissible, wheth...
Kuthaledath Narayana Moothod and ors. Vs. the CochIn Sircar Represente ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-12-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad835; 30Ind.Cas.511
Oldfield, J.1. The question in these appeals is whether His Highness the Rajah of Cochin was legitimately impleaded as a defendant in the connected suits in the absence of consent by the Local Government under Section 86, Code of Civil Procedure.2. It is urged, firstly, that the absence of such consent is immaterial, because His Highness had waived his privilege by proceeding, after pleading it, to plead also on the merits. I do not consider whether the course of his pleading did in fact amount to a waiver, because, in ray opinion, the recognition of cases of waiver, as excepted from the ordinary provisions of international law as understood in England, cannot be imported into the clear language of the Indian Code. The contrary view was, no doubt, taken in Chandulal Khushalji v. Awad bin Umar Sultan Nawaz Jung Bahadur 21 B.k 351. But with all respect I find the reasoning therein inconclusive and doubt whether the reference to the supposed intention of the Legislature is permissible or,...
In Re: Hawkins, General Manager, the Indian Aluminium Company Limited
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-03-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad655(2); (1916)ILR39Mad686
Ayling, J.1. In making this reference the Presidency Magistrate should have distinctly formulated the questions of law which he referred for our opinion.2. As far as we can deduce them from his letter of reference they are two in number--(1) Whether the term 'every person' in Section 33 of Act IX of 1910 is confined to parsons licensed under Parts II and III of the Act?(2) Whether Section 33 is confined to cases in which the accident actually results in personal injury or death?3. Our answer to both questions is 'No.' As regards the second we may add that the wording of the section is perfectly clear and specifies cases likely to have resulted in loss of life or personal injury as well as those which actually so resulted. Whether such a result was likely in any case in which it did not actually ensue is a question of fact to be determined with reference to the surrounding circumstances....
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