Chennai Court March 1915 Judgments
Browse smarter
Open an 18-section brief on any judgment
Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.
- AI Brief & Ask
- Semantic AI Search
- Devil's Bench
Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.
In Re : S. Kuppusami Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: (1915)28MLJ505
ORDERKumarasami Sastri, J.1. This is an application under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 15 of the Charter Act praying that the charges framed against the petitioner by the Second Class Magistrate of Tranquebar may be quashed.2. The case for the accused is that he was charged under Sections 189 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, that the evidence on record is insufficient to substantiate either of the charges and that the proceedings were instituted out of pure malice and with the object of harassing the petitioner.3. A preliminary objection has been taken by the Public Prosecutor as to the maintainability of the petition and the power of the High Court to interfere. So far as the power of the High Court is concerned the point seems to be concluded by authority. In Chandi Pershad v. Abdur Rahman I.L.R. (1894) C. 131 it was held that the High Court had power to interfere at any stage of a case if it considers that the grounds have been made out for interference...
R. Srinivasa Iyengar Vs. S.K.M.R.M. Ramaswami Chettiar by Agent, Somas ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: (1916)ILR39Mad235
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.1. We are bound by the decision of the majority of the Full Bench of five Judges in Chappan v. Moidin Kutti (1899) 22 Mad. 68 to hold that in disposing of an application to exercise the High Court's revisional jurisdiction over a Court subordinate to it a single Judge acts in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court within the meaning of Section 18 of the High Courts Act, and consequently that, if his order of disposal amounts to a judgment, an appeal lies from it under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.2. We also think that we are bound by the decision of the Full Bench in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar (1912) 35 Mad. 1, to hold that such order is a judgment even when the Judge merely declines to interfere in revision, and that it is immaterial whether before such refusal the records were called for or notice issued to the other side. The decisions in Venkatarama Ayyar v. Madalai Ammal I.L.R. (1900) Mad. 169 and Puthukudi Abdu v. Puvakka Kunhikutti (...
In Re: S. Kuppuswami Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad408; (1916)ILR39Mad561
ORDERKumaraswami Sastriyar, J.1. This is an application under Sections 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and 15 of the Charter Act praying that the charges framed against the petitioner by the Second-class Magistrate of Tranquebar maybe quashed.2. The case for the accused is that he was charged under Sections 189 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, that the evidence on record is insufficient to substantiate either of the charges and that the proceedings were instituted out of pure malice and with the object of harassing the petitioner.3. A preliminary objection has been taken by the Public Prosecutor as to the maintainability of the petition and the power of the High Court to interfere. So far as the power of the High Court is concerned the point seems to be concluded by authority.4. In Chandi Pershad v. Abdur Rahman I.L.R. (1895) Calc. 131, it was held that the High Court had power to interfere at any stage of a case if it considers that grounds have been made out for interference. ...
In Re: B. Dasappa
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1109; 29Ind.Cas.85
Kumaraswami Sastri, J.1. The petitioner has been convicted under Sections 217 and 411 of the Indian Penal Code. The grounds urged in revision are:2. (1) that there is no evidence that the property was stolen property, and3. (2) that the accused did not disobey any direction of the law.4. Both Courts found that the petitioner who was a Police constable, having received a complaint of theft, held an investigation on his own responsibility (without reporting the fact that he received a complaint to his superior officers), got possession of a piece of gold (said to be a portion of the stolen property) and only delivered it to the Sub-Inspector when he was about to be searched.5. There can be little doubt that the accused took possession of a bit of gold during his investigation and the first question is, whether it was part of the stolen kasitali. Kittachari, P.W. No. 2, who was accused of the theft denies that the piece, M.O. No. 1 which was found on the petitioner was part of the stolen ...
In Re: Rukmani Ammal and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1059; 29Ind.Cas.98
Kumaraswami Sastri, J.1. This is an application to revise the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Vellore, on the grounds that he had no jurisdiction to try the charges against the accused and that his order dated 8th October 1914 is illegal.2. On the 13th February 1914, the 1st accused, who is the wife of the deceased Seshachari, Inspector of Police, is alleged to have left her husband's house, gone to the house of the second accused with her jewels and some property. Keshachari went to the house of the Deputy Magistrate at about 9 P.M. and the 1st accused, his wife, was there. He presented a complaint (Exhibit E) describing himself as the complainant and the present 1st and 2nd accused as the accused. The complaint runs as follows: The 2nd accused enticed away the 1st accused, the wife of the complainant. The 2nd accused made away with the jewels valued at Rs. 2,050 and 3 silver vessels.... The 1st accused abetted this theft. So I charge the 1st accused under Sections 498 and 3...
R. Srinivasa Iyengar Vs. S.K.M.R.M. Ramaswami Chettiar by Agent Somasu ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad120(2); 29Ind.Cas.846
Seshagiri Ayyar, J. 1. We are bound by the decision of the majority of the Full Bench of five Judges in Chappan v. Moidin Kutti (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 68 (F.B.) to hold that in disposing of an application to exercise the High Court's revisional jurisdiction over a Court subordinate to it a single Judge acts in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court within the meaning of Section 18 of the High Courts Act, and consequently that, if his order of disposal amounts to a judgment, an appeal lies from it under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. We also think that we are bound by the decision of the Full Bench in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar (1912) I.L.R. 35 Mad. I (F.B.), to hold that such order is a judgment even when the Judge merely declines to interfere in revision, and that it is immaterial whether before such refusal the records were called for or notice issued to the other side. The decisions in Venkatarama Ayyar v. Madalai Ammal (1900) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 169 and Puthu...
Narayana Asari and ors. Vs. Kandasami Asari
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad967(2); 29Ind.Cas.541
1. These proceedings arose out of a dispute as to the right to the possession and management of a temple in the village of Valavellam Eral. Both parties are Asaris, the appellants to this Court being bell-metal workers and the respondents goldsmiths. The goldsmiths claimed that no other persons than themselves had any right of access to the temple except by their sufferance; the bell-metnl workers have maintained that, while the right of worship and access to the temple is common to all Asaris, the management and consequent possession of the temple belongs to certain huqdars of whom they are four.2. The dispute, which has been in existence for many years, became exceptionally acute in January of last year. Petitions were presented by both parties to various Magistrates and Police officials; it is not clear, nor is it material, which party took the initiative or what the petitions contained. On the 20th January 1914 with the aid of the Police, kodai was performed by the goldsmiths, and ...
Hansraj Sowcar Vs. S.M. Sheik Mohideen Rowther and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1915
Reported in: 29Ind.Cas.745
1. The fact that all the property is not situated within the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree does not affect its jurisdiction to sell the property comprised in the decree. Tincouri Debya v. Shib Chandra Pal Chowdhury 21 C.P 639. The alleged undervaluation of the property in the proclamation for wale is not a material irregularity within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.2. The civil revision petition is dismissed with the costs of the 1st respondent. The petition for stay of sale also is dismissed with costs....
Chandu Alias Shinivasa Pai Vs. Koaja Poojari and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad940(1); 30Ind.Cas.370
1. In the present case the mortgage provides for the re-payment of part of the mortgage-debt at the end of March 1910 and for the re-payment of the rest 'within the end of March 1952' which, we think, must mean on or before the 31st March 1952. There has been some difference of opinion as to whether under a provision of this kind a mortgagor is entitled to redeem before the end of the period. It was held in Vadju v. Vadja 5 B.K 22 and in Husaini Khanam v. Husain Khan 4 A.L.J. 375 that he was not. On the other hand it was held that he was, in Rose Ammal v. Rajarathnam Ammal 23 M.K 33 and in Chinnasami Reddiar v. Krishna Reddy 16 M.L.J. 146 and in Purna Chandra Sarma v. Peary Mohan Pal 15 Ind. Cas. 287. The recent decision of the Privy Council in Bakhtawar Begam v. Husaini Khanam 23 Ind. Cas. 355 on appeal from Husaini Khanam v. Husain Khan 4 A.L.J. 375 lays down that ordinarily and in the absence of a special stipulation the mortgagor is not entitled to redeem before the close of the pe...
Era Dodda Basappa Vs. Rama Reddi
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1915
Reported in: AIR1916Mad1054(2); 29Ind.Cas.505
1. We do not think that under the Will which required everything to be done in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the executors, three executors could bind the estate by a contract entered into by them without reference to the others. This is the rule where a majority of trustees have power to act. See Kumban v. Moorthi 7 Ind. Cas. 422 : 20 M.L.J. 951 : (1910) M.W.N. 359 : 8 M.L.T. 208 : 34 M.P 406, and we see no reason why the same principle should not apply to a majority of executors authorised to act under a Will. We do not think Section 92 of the Probate and Administration Act has any application as it is overridden by the express provisions of the Will to which it is made subject.2. The appeal is dismissed with costs....
- ‹ Prev
- 1
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- Next ›
- Last »