Chennai Court December 1915 Judgments
Browse smarter
Open an 18-section brief on any judgment
Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.
- AI Brief & Ask
- Semantic AI Search
- Devil's Bench
Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.
V.V. Srinivasa Aiyangar, High Court Vakil, Receiver to the Estate of A ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1915
Reported in: (1916)30MLJ120
John Wallis, C.J.1. The first question in this appeal is whether a suit for damages for cutting and carrying away trees is a suit for land or other immovable property within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent as held by Sankaran Nair J, as, if so, the suit was properly dismissed as the land on which the trees were growing was situated outside the jurisdiction. I do not think the question whether a decision involving the question of title in such a suit would be res judicata in a subsequent suit for the land is very relevant to an inquiry what is included in the words 'suit for land or other immovable property,' and assuming that a suit for cutting and carrying away trees does not come within these words, a decision in such a suit on a question of title by a Court other than the Court within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated would not in my opinion under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure be res judicata in a subsequent suit in the proper Courts fo...
Mohideen Ibrahim Nachi Vs. L. Mahomed Ibrahim Sahib by Agent L.M.E. Le ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1915
Reported in: 33Ind.Cas.894; (1916)30MLJ21
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. This appeal is against the order of the District Judge of Tinnevelly passed under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act directing that the minor Shaik Abdul Khadir who is between 15 and 16 years old, be returned to the custody of his father the petitioner. The appellant is the petitioner's mother-in-law (the mother of the deceased mother of the minor Shaik Abdul Khadir).2. The contentions in appeal are (1) 'that it has not been proved to be for the welfare of the minor to be returned to the custody of the father.' (6th ground of appeal) : (2) 'The District Judge erred in holding that Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act applied to the case.' (1st ground of appeal). (3) 'The parties being Shafts and the boy being 16, (he) has a discretion in law to reside with his mother and in her absence with his grandmother.' (5th ground of appeal.)3. As regards the first of these three contentions, the District Judge's conclusion that it is for the welfare of the minor ...
Mohideen Ibrahim Nachi Vs. L. Mahomed Ibrahim Sahib by Agent, L.M.E. L ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1915
Reported in: (1916)ILR39Mad608
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.1. This appeal is against the order of the District Judge of Tinnevelly passed under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act directing that the minor Shaik Abdul Khadir who is between 15 and 16 years old be returned to the custody of his father the petitioner. The appellant is the petitioner's mother-in-law (the mother of the deceased mother of the minor Shaik Abdul Khadir).2. The contentions in appeal are: (1) 'that it has not been proved to be for the welfare of the minor to be returned to the custody of the father' (sixth ground of appeal); (2) 'the District Judge erred in holding that Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act applied to the case' (sixth ground of appeal); and (3) ' the parties being shaffis and the boy being 16 has a discretion in law to reside with his mother and in her absence with his grandmother ' (fifth ground of appeal).3. As regards the first of these three contentions, the District Judge's conclusion that it is for the welfare of the min...
Pangi Achan Vs. P.N. Bheeman Achan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1915
Reported in: 32Ind.Cas.501
1. Appellant sues on a melcharth obtained from Dharman Achan, the late karnavan of his and respondents tarwad, and the only question for determination now is whether this melcharth is valid or not, respondents contention being that Dharman Achan was not empowered to grant such a melcharth owing to the provisions of the family karar, Exhibit I. This karar Was executed by Dharman Achan, who was then karnavan, the second anandravan, and the two senior ladies of the tarwad, and we have the finding of fact, which we must accept, that it was executed at the edom or family house and was approved by all the members of the family, except the senior anandravan, who is now 26th respondent. About 6 months before granting the suit melcharth to plaintiff Dharman Achan purported to cancel the karar by the notice Exhibit II, and it is contended for appellant that he was entitled to cancel Exhibit I, which was merely a delegation of part of his rights as karnavan to three other members of the tarwad. W...
In Re: Blamboyil Kuttasheri Ahamad
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1915
Reported in: 32Ind.Cas.672
1. The gun which is the subject of the charge in this case was found concealed in the house of the accused, when it was being searched by the Police in connection with a case of dacoity. The accused has been convicted under Section 20 of the Indian Arms Act, XI of 1878, and the facts show that the offence is made out. He has been sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment. No special grounds are mentioned in the judgment for imposing such a heavy sentence. Having regard to the circumstances of the case we reduce the sentence to three months' rigorous imprisonment....
Rajah P. Ramakrishna Rayaningaru Vs. Rangachariar and anr., and Audi L ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1915
Reported in: 32Ind.Cas.737
1. The plaint does not allege any custom to grant remissions in case of 'savi'. There is no finding of the existence of any such custom and the evidence as to custom is insufficient. The plaintiff in paragraph 3 of the plaint alleged an agreement to grant remissions but there is no evidence of any such agreement. In the absence of the proof of custom or contract the obligation to grant remissions is purely moral, and not legal, and cannot be enforced by suit. [Thandavaraya Moodaliar v. Ramaswamy Mudaliar Sudder Adalut Reports of 1859, p. 105 and Alagappa Chettiar v. Tirunagawali 13 M.L.J. 377 We reverse the decrees of the lower Courts and dismiss the suits with costs throughout....
V.V. Srinivasa Aiyangar, High Court, Vakil Receiver to the Estate of a ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-07-1915
Reported in: 33Ind.Cas.906
John Wallis, C.J.1. The first question in this appeal is, whether a suit for damages for cutting and carrying away trees is a suit for land or other immoveable property within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent as held by Sankaran Nair, J., as, if so, the suit was properly dismissed as the land on which the trees were growing was situated outside the jurisdiction. I do not think the question whether a decision involving the question of title in such a suit would be res judicata in a subsequent suit for the land, is very relevant to an inquiry what is included in the words suit for land or other immoveable property,' and assuming that a suit for cutting and carrying away trees does not come within these words, a decision in such a suit on a question of title by a Court other than the Court within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated would not in my opinion under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure be res judicata in a subsequent suit in the proper Cour...
Ramanathan Chetty Vs. Yagappa Chetty and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-06-1915
Reported in: (1916)30MLJ241
Cottus Trotter, J.1. This was a suit for dissolution of partnership. The partnership was entered into in 1902 or 1903 between the plaintiff, the 1st defendant, the 5th defendant and one Subramanian Chetti. The sole question we have to determine is whether this suit for dissolution which was launched on the 12th March 1912 is or is not barred by limitation, the period of limitation in such cases being 3 years. Various points of time were suggested when it was said that the plaintiff's cause of action arose but, in my opinion it is sufficient to confine our attention to the year 1908 when Subramanian Chetty died. It is clear that if on his death, the cause of action arose, plaintiff's suit cannot be in time. Prima facie one would suppose that if a person who was a partner in a firm died, the partnership would stand dissolved. But it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the ordinary rule of law is not applicable to cases where the partner who dies is a member of an undivided Hindu...
N.C. Kuppuswami Iyengar and anr. Vs. N.C. Narayana Iyengar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-06-1915
Reported in: 32Ind.Cas.3
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The learned Judge is right, in my opinion, as regards the scope of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. I regret that I am unable (with the greatest respect) to agree with the decisions (each by a single learned Judge of this Court) reported as Ratnam alias Nanjunda Chetty v. Kolandai Ramasamy Chetti 31 Ind. Cas. 536; 2 L.W. 1115, Naraya Hegde v. Vetla Prabhu 12 Ind. Cas. 75 and Subramania Pattar v. Narayana Pattar 28 Ind. Cas. 189. The case of Shew Prosad v. Ram Chunder 23 Ind. Cas. 977; 41 C.K 323, deals with the scope of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in a manner which appeals to my mind as enunciating the correct legal principles.2. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.Napier, J.2. I agree both with the above ruling and also with the dissent from the cases referred to....
In Re: Sangan,
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-06-1915
Reported in: 32Ind.Cas.147
Abdur Rahim, J.1. Eight accused persons in this case were tried by the Jury on a charge of dacoity. Of these, one, that is, accused No. 5, has been found not guilty and acquitted. 2. The learned Sessions Judge in his charge to the Jury has gone up to a certain point very fully into the matter. Perhaps he has gone into some features of the case in mere detail than was necessary. The chief objection taken by the learned Counsel for the accused to the charge is, in the first place the absence of any reference to the evidence in support of the defence of the 4th, 7th and 8th accused. All these persons produced evidence of alibi which, if believed by the Jury, would lead to their acquittal. The learned Sessions Judge deals with their case apparently in paragraph 13. All that he says about their defence is this; 'As for the defence made by the Other accused the Vakils for the accused have not laid much emphasis upon it; and so it is unnecessary to go into it. You have heard how, when I now a...
- ‹ Prev
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 8
- 9
- Next ›
- Last »