Chennai Court July 1914 Judgments
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Mohammad Koolayappa Rowthan Vs. Sheik Abdul Khadir Rowthan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: (1914)27MLJ169
Ayling, J.1. With all deference to the view of the learned Judge who heard the revision petition I am unable to construe the finding of the Deputy Magistrate as anything, but a finding that both parties were in joint possession. This being so, it seems clear that Section 146 criminal Procedure Code gives him no jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment. The order must therefore be set aside.Seshagiri Aiyar, J.2. The petitioner complained to the Sub Divisional Magistrate of Dindigal that the County petitioner was preparing to commit a breach of the peace by forcibly entering upon properties which were in his exclusive possession. The defence was that the properties in dispute were the joint properties of the Petitioner arid the Counter-petitioner and 'that they are in their joint enjoyment' The Magistrate enquired into the matter and came to the conclusion that the allegation of the Counter-petitioner as regard's item 3 was true. He held 'that he could not issue an order declaring joi...
Noor Muhammad Sahib and ors. Vs. Karim Bibi Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: (1914)27MLJ270
1. The Lower Courts seem to have rightly held that a suit for possession of the mosque properties could not be maintained by the worshippers in their individual or collective capacity as that principle of law seems to be derivable from the observations in Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Srinivasa Swami I.L.R. (1892) M. 31 Kamaraju v. Asanali Sheriff I.L.R. (1899) M. 99 and Dasandhay v. Muhamad Abu Nasar I.L.R. (1911) A. 660.2. The plaintiffs have not established that by Muhammadan Law the worshippers as a body can be collective muttawallees of the plaint Mosque and we are further unable to hold that the suit is brought by the plaintiffs in this case as trustees and not as merely belonging to and representing the community of worshippers. We dismiss the second appeal with costs....
In Re: M. Vijiaraghava Pillai; P. theagaraya Chetti and
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: (1914)27MLJ227
ORDER1. These are petitions to revise the order of the Presidency Magistrate, George Town. Two applications were made to him by the counter-petitioners to declare that the inclusion of the petitioner as a candidate for Municipal election by the President of the Corporation was illegal under Rule 5 of the rules framed by the Government in pursuance of the powers given to them by Section 413 of Act III of 1904. The Magistrate allowed the applications. Against that order these petitions have been filed. The learned Judge who admitted the petitions expressed doubts regarding the powers of the High Court to revise the order of the Magistrate. We therefore called upon the petitioner's Vakil to argue that preliminary point. Mr. T. Ethiraja Mudaliar, who appeared for the petitioner, conceded that the petition did not lie under Section 439. He however contended that under the Charter Act, the High Court was competent to revise the order. Section 15 says that the High Court shall have superinten...
Venkatesha Mallia Vs. Bammampalli Ramayya Hegade and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: AIR1915Mad127; (1914)27MLJ241
1. Under Section 18 of Act XX of 1863 the District Judge gave sanction to two individuals to sue for the removal of the Respondents who are the Mokhassors of the Shri Anaritha Padmanabha temple of Pudur for misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty.2. Although the sanction was given jointly to both, only one of the individuals took action thereon and sued the trustees.3. When the suit came on for trial before the same Judge who gave the original sanction, a preliminary objection was taken that the suit was bad because the joint-sanction-holder had not joined in the suit. The Judge upheld this objection and dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff could not prosecute it alone. He further expressed a doubt as to the plaintiff's bond fides. The question before us therefore is whether one man should be allowed to sue under Section 14 of this Act upon the strength of a sanction given to two men. Such sanctions are a condition precedent to the exercise of 'the right of suit Venkat...
M. Vijiaraghavalu Pillai Vs. P. theagaroya Chetti and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: (1915)ILR38Mad581
ORDER1. These are petitions to revise the order of the Presidency Magistrate, Georgetown. Two applications were made to him by the counter-petitioners to declare that the inclusion of the petitioner as a candidate for Municipal election by the President of the Corporation was illegal, under Rule 5 of the rules framed by the Government in pursuance of the powers given to them by Section 413 of Act III of 1904. The Magistrate allowed the applications. Against that order these petitions have been filed. The learned Judge who admitted the petitions expressed doubts regarding the powers of the High Court to revise the order of the Magistrate, We therefore called upon the petitioner's vakil to argue that preliminary point Mr. T. Ethiraja Mudaliyar, who appeared for the petitioner, conceded that the petition did not lie under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code. He however contended that under the Charter Act, the High Court was competent to revise the order. Section 15 says that the High Co...
Venkatesha Malia Vs. B. Ramaya Hegade and Twelve ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: (1915)ILR38Mad1192
1. Under Section 18 of Act XX of 1863 the District Judge gave sanction to two individuals to sue for the removal of the respondents who are the moktessors of the Shri Anantha Padmanabha Temple of Perdur for misfeasance, breach of trust or neglect of duty.2. Although the sanction was given jointly to both, only one of the individuals took action thereon and sued the trustees.3. When the suit came on for trial before the same Judge who give the original sanction, a preliminary objection was taken that the suit was bad because the joint sanction-holder had not joined in the suit. The Judge upheld this objection and dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff could not prosecute it alone. He further expressed a doubt as to the plaintiff's bond fides. The question before us therefore is whether one man should be allowed to sue under Section 14 of this Act upon the strength of a sanction given to two men. Such sanctions are a condition precedent to the exorcise of the right of suit Venkate...
M. Vijiaraghavalu Pillai, Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: 25Ind.Cas.345
ORDER1. These are petitions to revise the order of the Presidency Magistrate, George Town. Two applications were made to him by the counter-petitioners to declare that inclusion of the petitioner as a candidate for Municipal election by the President of the Corporation was illegal under Rule 5 of the Rules framed by the Government in pursuance of the powers given to them by Section 413 of Act III of 1904. The Magistrate allowed the applications. Against that order these petitions have been filed.2. The learned Judge who admitted the petitions expressed doubts regarding the powers the High Court to revise the order of the Magistrate. We, therefore, called upon the petitioner's Vakil to argue that preliminary point. Mr. T. Ethiraja Mudaliar, who appeared for the petitioner, conceded that the petition did not lie under Section 439. He, however, contended that under the Charter Act the High Court was competent to revise the order. Section 15 says that the High Court shall have superintende...
Noor Mahammad Saib and ors. Vs. Karima Bibi Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: AIR1915Mad687(1); 25Ind.Cas.559
1. The lower Courts seem to have rightly held that a suit for possession of the mosque properties could not be maintained by the worshippers in their individual or collective capacity, as that principle of law seems to be derivable from the observations in Strinivasa Ayyangar v. Strinivasa Swami 16 M. 31, Kamaraju v. Asanali Sheriff 23 M. 99 and Dasondhay v. Muhammad Abu Nasar 11 Ind. Cas. 36 : 33 A. 660 : 8 A.L.J. 710. The plaintiffs have not established that by Muhammadan Law the worshippers as a body can be collective mutawallis of the plaint mosque and we are further unable to hold that the suit is brought by the plaintiffs in this case as trustees and not as merely belonging to and representing the community of worshippers.2. We dismiss this second appeal with costs....
Muhammad Koolayappa Rowthan Vs. Sheik Abdul Khadhir Rowther and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-28-1914
Reported in: 25Ind.Cas.324
Ayling, J.1. With all deference to the view of the learned Judge who heard the revision petition, I am unable to construe the finding of the Deputy Magistrate as anything but a finding that both parties were in joint possession. This being so, it seems clear that Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, gives him no jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment. The order must, therefore, be set aside.Seshagiri Aiyar, J.2. The petitioner complained to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dindigul, that the counter-petitioner was preparing to commit a breach of the peace by forcibly entering upon properties which were in his exclusive possession. The defence was that the properties in dispute were the joint properties of the petitioner and the counter-petitioner and that they are in their joint enjoyment.' The Magistrate inquired into the matter and came to the conclusion that the allegation of the counter-petitioner as regards item 3 was true. He held 'that he could not issue an order declaring j...
Malamal Vittil Krishnan Nair Vs. Kavalappara Moopil Nair
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-27-1914
Reported in: AIR1915Mad41(1); (1914)27MLJ171
1. The District Judge passed an order under Order 41, Rule 5 refusing to stay the execution of a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge against which an appeal is pending before himself. This is an appeal against his order.2. A preliminary objection is taken that no appeal lies. We think the objection is well founded. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar contends that the order falls within the purview of Section 47 and is therefore appealable. But that section only applies to orders passed by the court executing the decree. In this case the District Court is not the Court executing the decree. See Ramachandra v. Balmukund I.L.R. (1904) B. 71.3. We therefore uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal with costs....
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