Chennai Court August 1913 Judgments
Hajee Aboobuckor Rahimtulla Saib Vs. the Official Assignee of Madras a ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-08-1913
Reported in: (1913)25MLJ560
ORDERRahimtulla Saib, J.1. I do not accept the validity of the contention of the appellant's learned Counsel that the decree of the High Court on its original side should not bear the same date as the date of its judgment or that the appellant is entitled to calculate the limitation period from when the decree was signed by the Registrar. I agree with Barney v. Broughton I.L.R. (1884) C. 652 the practice of the Court being the law of the court even if the Civil Procedure Code does not apply and differ from the rulings contra. As regards the affidavit in support of the application to excuse the delay, let notice go to the other side to show cause why the delay should not be excused. Post that matter before two judges....
Tag this Judgment!U.A. Srinivasa Aiyangar Vs. the Official Assignee of Madras and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-08-1913
Reported in: (1915)ILR38Mad472
Charles Arnold White, C.J.1. This is an appeal from an order made by Bakewell, J., transferring an insolvency petition pending before him to the District Court of Tanjore. The learned Judge, as appears from the terms of the order, purported to make it under the powers conferred by Section 90 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code. The question as to whether the learned Judge had jurisdiction to make the order does not appear to have been raised before him. But Mr. Chamier, who appears, for the appellant (the insolvent), has taken the point here that the Judge had no jurisdiction to make the order.2. Section 90 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act states, 'In proceedings under this Act the Court shall have the like powers and follow the like procedure as it has and follows in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.' In Section 2 of the Act 'the Court' is defined as meaning 'the Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act,' ...
Tag this Judgment!John Howe Vs. Charlotte Howe
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-07-1913
Reported in: (1913)25MLJ594
1. This case comes before us, under Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act for confirmation of a decree for a dissolution of marriage made by a District Judge.2. The petitioner alleged in his petition to the District Judge that the respondent had been living in adultery in his (the petitioner's) house and that she admitted that she was living the life of a prostitute. He also alleged that he did not know any of the persons with whom adultery had been committed and asked to be excused from making the alleged adulterors, co-respondents.3. In the course of the proceedings the learned judge on his own initiative made an order making one Alexander a co-respondent In view of the terms of the petition, and in the absence of any application by the petitioner we do not think the learned judge was called on to do this. In our opinion he was certainly in error in not directing the amendment of the petition so that the allegations against the co-respondent might be stated therein. As the petition st...
Tag this Judgment!Govindan Nair (Pulikote Puthan Veettil Karnavan and Manager) and Eight ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-06-1913
Reported in: (1915)ILR38Mad464
1. In our opinion the Subordinate Judge's findings of fact as to the plaintiff's right to redeem cannot be said not to be based on evidence and must be accepted.2. The appellant's vakil argues relying on Narayan v. Nagappa : (1910)12BOMLR831 that the award of interest on a debt payable in kind is not authorised by Act XXXII of 1839. With great respect to the opinion of the learned Judges who were parties to the decision above quoted, we are unable to agree with their view.3. We fail to see why a debt which is specifically expressed in measures of grain and payable at a specified time should not be regarded as a debt certain (assuming the latter adjective in Section 1 of the Act to qualify the word 'debt' as well as 'sum,') merely because the commutation rate at the time of payment or suit may have to be subsequently determined. We do not find anything, in the other case quoted by the appellant's vakil, Juggomohun Ghose v. Manickchand (1859) 7 M.I.A. 263 to conflict with this view. In o...
Tag this Judgment!Govindan Nair and ors. Vs. Cheral Alias Krishna Panduval and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-06-1913
Reported in: 30Ind.Cas.432
1. In our opinion, the Subordinate Judge's findings of fact as to the plaintiffs right to redeem cannot be said not to be based on evidence and must be accepted.2. The appellants' Vakil argues, relying on Narayan Ramchandra Bhatta v. Manager Nagappa 8 Ind. Cas. 411 : 12 Bom. L.R. 831 that the award of interest on a debt payable in kind is not authorised by Act XXXII of 1839, With great respect to the opinion of the learned Judges who were parties to the decision above quoted, we are unable to agree with their view.3. We fail to see why a debt which is specifically expressed in measures of grain and payable at a specified time should not be regarded as a debt certain (assuming the latter adjective in Section 1 of the Act to qualify the word 'debt' as well as 'sum') merely because the commutation rate at the time of payment or suit may have to be subsequently determined. We do not find anything in the other case quoted by the appellants' Vakil, Juggomohun Ghose v. Manickchund 7 M.I.A. 26...
Tag this Judgment!T. Ruthna Gramany and anr. Vs. N. Veerabudra Aiyar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-04-1913
Reported in: (1913)25MLJ281
Arnold White, J.1. In this case an appeal from a decree of a Judge sitting on the original side of this Court was preferred 10 days after the prescribed period of limitation. An explanation was called for, and an affidavit was filed explaining the cause of delay. The case was then posted before the admission Court ' for orders.' In the Admission Court the learned Judge ordered that notice should go to the respondents to show cause why the delay should not be excused. The appellants' Vakil served the respondents with a formal notice of this order. The respondents other than the fifth appeared before another Judge, sitting in the ' Admission Court' and shewed cause why the delay should not be excused. The judge excused the delay and admitted the appeal.2. When the appeal was called on for hearing before an appellate Bench, Mr. V.V. Srinivasa Aiyangar on behalf of the 5th Respondent took the preliminary objection that the appeal was out of time. He contended that it was open to him to tak...
Tag this Judgment!Subramania Nadan, Minor by His Maternal Uncle and Next Friend Kuthalal ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-04-1913
Reported in: (1913)25MLJ563
1.The first point raised by the Appellant is as to whether the mortgage deed executed by the 1st defendant to the 17th defendant Exhibit III is binding on the plaintiff. Two of the three items of consideration for this transaction aggregating Rs. 677 were admittedly devoted or intended to be devoted to paying the sale price of certain other lands purchased by the 1st defendant, the family manager by Exhibit X. The Munsif found these items of consideration not binding on the plaintiff.2. The District Judge has reversed this decision on the ground that it has not been shown that the purchase under Exhibit 10 was disadvantageous to the family or contrary to the interests of the plaintiff (who was a minor at the time). This is in our opinion not the true test, the mortgage affected by the manager included the share of a minor co-parcener the purchaser must show that it was effected for family necessity or at any rate that he (the purchaser) believed bona fide that it was for family necessi...
Tag this Judgment!K. Sheik Meera Sahib and Co. Vs. Sheik Naina Lubbay Marcayar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-01-1913
Reported in: (1913)25MLJ259
Arnold White, C.J.1. In this case : the plaintiff sued the defendants for a certain sum of money. He instituted his suit in 1909. He sued defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in a representative capacity as the legal representatives of a deceased person. He sued defendants Nos. 4 to 6 also in a representative capacity. He sued defendant No. 7 in his personal capacity alleging him to be a partner in the firm with which the plaintiff had had transactions. In February 1912 the plaintiff applied for leave to amend his plaint. The amendment he asked for was that the claim against defendants No. 1 to 3 should be made as against them not in their representative, but in their personal capacity as partners. The learned Judge gave leave to amend on certain terms. The exact words of his order after giving leave to amend are ' written statements of all the defendants to be filed before the 20th March....defendants to be at liberty to raise all defences available to the amended plaint as if the plaint had been f...
Tag this Judgment!Sree Balusu Buchi Saravagarudu Garu Vs. Kovvuri Venkata Raju and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-01-1913
Reported in: (1913)25MLJ617
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. Section 23 of the Madras Estates Land Act says that a land ' shall be presumed to be ryoti land other than old waste ' until the contrary is proved. The important question in issue in this case is whether the plaint land is ryoti land coming under the definition of old waste or ryoti land not coming under the definition of ' old waste '. For, if it was not ' old waste'. Section 6 gives the ryot in possession on the date of the passing of the Act an occupancy right in the land; and this suit by the landlord (appellant before us) in ejectment was rightly dismissed by the lower courts. Old waste is defined in Section 3 Claues 7. Clause 7 contains two sub-clauses Nos. 1 and 2. The plaint land admittedly does not come under Sub-clause (1). As regards Sub-clause (2) there are two parts in it. The land in question does not come under the description of the land in the second part, that is, land in respect of which an ejectment decree against the ryot has been obtained bef...
Tag this Judgment!Sri B.B. Sarvarayudu Garu Vs. K. Venkataraju
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-01-1913
Reported in: (1915)ILR38Mad459
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.1. Section 23 of the Madras Estates Land Act says that a land' shall be presumed to be ryoti land other than old waste 'until the contrary is proved. The important question in issue in this case is whether the plaint land is ryoti land coming under the definition of' old waste 'or' ryoti 'land not coming under the definition of' old waste. 'For, if it was not' old waste, 'Section 6 gives the ryot in possession on the date of the passing of the Act an occupancy right in the land; and this suit by the landlord (appellant before us) in ejectment was rightly dismissed by the Lower Courts.' Old waste is defined in Section 3, Clause (7). Clause (7) contains two sub-clauses Nos. (1) and (2). The plaint land admittedly does not come under Sub-clause (1). As regards Sub-clause (2), there are two parts in it. The land in question does not come under the description of the land in the second part, that is, land in respect; of which an ejectment decree against the ryot has been o...
Tag this Judgment!- ‹ Prev
- 1
- 3
- Next ›
- Last »