Chennai Court March 1913 Judgments
AlaudIn Saheb and anr. Vs. the Secretary of State for Indian in Counci ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-19-1913
Reported in: 45Ind.Cas.30a
1. The suit was for a declaration of the plaintiffs' absolute right to the sight of a pathway, free from any public right of way, to recover the penal, assessment levied by Government on the footing that the pathway belonged to it and not to the plaintiff, and for an injunction to restrain Government from interfering with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of the pathway as their absolute property. Both the lower Courts have found that the public have been walking along the way as a matter of right and not with the plaintiffs' license as urged by them, and that the public have a right of way. The plaintiffs did not contend that the right of way was abandoned by the public and we cannot, therefore, allow the contention to be raised at this stage. It is then argued that the ownership of the pathway is in the plaintiffs, though the public may have a right of way, and that, therefore, Government had no right to levy penal assessment under Madras Act III of 1905. The District Judge's view that even ...
Tag this Judgment!Karumuri Brahmanna Sastrulu Vs. Jaldu Venkatasubha Row
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-18-1913
Reported in: 19Ind.Cas.848; (1913)24MLJ561
1. We are bound to accept the finding that as a matter of fact the partnership was dissolved on the 31st May 1908. As regards the Plaintiff's claim in this appeal for Rs. 650 decreed to him by the Court of first instance, but refused by the Subordinate Judge in A. 67 of 1911, that sum was due to him under one of the terms of the dissolution, and though the plaintiff did not admit in his plaint that the partnership was dissolved, the 1st defendant alleged the dissolution and the liability of the firm to pay the plaintiff Rs. 650 and on this state of the pleadings, the District Munsif gave the Plaintiff a decree of Rs. 650 against the 1st defendant. We think the Subordinate Judge had not sufficient ground for reversing this decree. Though the sum was not due to the plaintiff, on his own case, it was due to him on the 1st defendant's case. The plaintiff's case was that what was due to him from the partnership had yet to be ascertained, the defendant's case was that that sum had already be...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Muthu Ibrahi and Three ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-17-1913
Reported in: (1914)ILR37Mad567
ORDEROldfield, J.1. The first and the fourth accused were convicted of an offence punishable under Section 363 and the second and the third accused of one punishable under Sections 363 and 114, Indian Penal Code.2. Objection is taken first to the finding that the fourth prosecution witness, the girl alleged to have been kidnapped, was aged less than sixteen. There was evidence to justify the finding, which was purely one of fact, and I cannot interfere with it in revision.3. It is urged that the fourth prosecution witness was not a minor and her mother, from whose keeping she was taken, was not her lawful guardian, because she had admittedly attained puberty and her minority and her mother's guardianship ceased under Mahomedan Law, when she did so. The fourth prosecution witness was unmarried, and her father was not living. There is therefore no question of any guardianship other than her mother's, as lawful, and. it is necessary to deal only, with the question whether the fourth prose...
Tag this Judgment!Veerappudayan and anr. Vs. Muthukarappan thevan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1913
Reported in: (1913)24MLJ534
1. The plaintiffs are purchasers of the whole or part of the equity of redemption in certain properties. They executed a mortgage for a period of 9 years to one Karuppa Udayan which authorised him to redeem an alleged prior mortgage in favour of the family of defendants Nos. 1 to 7. He obtained a decree for redemption against that family but failed to execute it. The plaintiffs were also impleaded as defendants in that suit (0.S. No. 388 of 1906) as persons having an interest in the mortgaged property. The plaintiff subsequently paid off Karuppa Oodayan's mortgage. They now seek to redeem the mortgage in the defendants' favour. The original mortgage deed has not been produced by the defendants, but. the plaintiffs have put in Ex 1 a registration copy of it. The defendants denied the mortgage set up by the plaintiffs and contended that they were themselves the owners of the property. An issue was therefore framed in these terms' whether the plaint mentioned mortgage is true.' Both the l...
Tag this Judgment!The Secretary to the Commissioner of Salt Abkari and Separate Revenue ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-13-1913
Reported in: 20Ind.Cas.865; (1913)25MLJ119
Arnold White, C.J.1. The only evidence to which our attention has been invited as to the course of business of the Bank is the statement contained in the letter of the Secretary to the Board of Revenue. In that letter, the course of business is thus prescribed : ' The bank grants loans on promissory notes payable on demand or otherwise. Before advancing money, it requires the borrower to make a declaration in the confidential register in the form thereto annexed and to sign it.' A translation of the form to which the Secretary refers is annexed to the letter. Reading the entries in the register by the light of the statement by the Secretary as to the course of business, I am unable to say that the entries in the register show that the signing of the declaration, the execution of the note, and the advance of money by the Bank were one and the same transaction. I express no opinion as to whether, if it appeared on the face of the entries that the signing of the declaration, the execution...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Solai Gounden and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-13-1913
Reported in: AIR1914Mad562; (1913)25MLJ403
1. We are of opinion that the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court to order a person who has been convicted of one of the offences mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not restricted to cases where the conviction was by one of the courts specified in the Sub-section The words 'an Appellate Court,' are quite general and the word 'also' indicates that the powers given by the section may be exercised by the courts mentioned in Sub-section (1) and by any Appellate Court.2. We think the words ' under this section' in Sub-section (3) have reference to the powers given by the section and not to the courts by which these powers are, in the first instance, exerciseable. We are unable to agree with the decision in Muthiah Chetty v. Emperor I.L.R. (1905) M. 190 and in the other cases referred to in the order of reference in which that decision was followed. We would answer the question which has been referred to us in the affirmative....
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Solai Goundan and Four ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-13-1913
Reported in: (1914)ILR37Mad153
1. We are of opinion that the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court to order a person who has been convicted of one of the offences mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not restricted to cases where the conviction was by one of the Courts specified in the sub-section. The, words 'an Appellate Court' are quite general and the word 'also' indicate, that the powers given by the section may be exercised by the Courts mentioned in Sub-section (1) and by any Appellate Court.2. We think the words 'under this section' in Sub-section (3) have reference to the powers given by the section and not to the Courts by which these powers are, in the first instance, exercise-able. 'We are unable to agree with the decision in Muthiah Chetti v. Emperor I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 190 and in the other cases referred to in the order of reference in which that decision was followed. We would answer the question which has been referred to us in the affirmative....
Tag this Judgment!T. Sivanna and anr. Vs. Venkatekrishna Murthy and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-12-1913
Reported in: (1913)24MLJ474
1. The question in this case relates to the construction of a clause in a compromise decree. The compromise provides that the 1st and 2nd defendants should pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 13,000. Then comes the clause in question 'until the said amount of Rs. 13,000 is paid the items 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 these immoveables of A schedule should not be dealt with by the 1st and 2nd defendants in any manner'. The question raised is whether this clause creates a charge on the property which the 1st and 2nd defendants agreed not to alienate till the payment of the debt. It is true as contended by Mr. Seshaghiri Aiyar that no particular form of words is needed to create a change, provided the language of the instrument manifests an intention that certain particular property should be made security for the debt, that is, that an interest in the property should be created in favour of the creditor to secure due payment of the debt. The promise contained in the compromise not to alienate the pr...
Tag this Judgment!imandi Appalaswami and anr. Vs. the Rajah of Vizianagaram
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-12-1913
Reported in: 20Ind.Cas.838; (1913)25MLJ50
1. The argument urged in second appeal is that as the defendant has not been using the land in question for a long time for agricultural purposes and as he constructed buildings on it long ago, the suit cannot be regarded as one for rent as defined in Section 3 Clause 11 of the Estates Land Act. The definition given in that clause is ' whatever is lawfully payable in money or in kind to a landholder for the use or occupation of land in his estate for the purpose of agriculture.' In our opinion the definition does not require that the ryot in possession should actually use the land for the purpose of agriculture supposing he does not use the land at all for any purpose or uses it for some other purpose, he is still liable to pay so long as his right to use it for agricultural purposes subsists and that what he is bound to pay is rent. We may add that this point does not seem to have been really raised in the Lower Courts. We dismiss the second appeal with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Sri Sri Sri Gajapathi Kistna Chendra Deo Guru, Proprietor of Nandigam ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-12-1913
Reported in: 20Ind.Cas.445; (1913)25MLJ433
Miller, J.1. The District Judge decided the case on the 2nd issue only and has construed Exhibit A as meaning that the plaintiff's father madea gift of the village free of land tax to the donee until the donor obtained separate registration of the village by the Collector and apportionment of the peishcush. The condition in the gift is ' we should get the village sub-divided in your name (we being the Zemindar), you should pay to the Government the peishcush fixed thereupon according to the said sub-division.' The Zemindar made the gift in 1890 and died in 1898 and during all that time the donee remained in possession of the village and paid no portion of the land tax. The conduct of the Zemindar, which may be looked to aid in construing the document, supports the construction which the District Judge has put upon it, and that is that so long as the village remained an unseparated part of the zemindar, the zemindar was to pay the land-tax. But he had the option of obtaining from the Co...
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