Chennai Court February 1912 Judgments
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Singaram Chettiar and anr. Vs. Kaliyana Sundaram Pillay
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-15-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.383
Abdur Rahim, J.1. In my opinion, the order of the Subordinate Judge accepting the security tendered by the respondent is right. He has accepted the Rs. 10,000, deposited by the respondent in Court under a decree passed in a suit for redemption, as security for Rs. 3,000 for any mesne profits that might be recovered from him by the appellants. The money which is in deposit in Court under the decree is the amount which would be payable to the defendants, who are the mortgagees, as money due under the mortgage. The defendants respondents, who have appealed against the decree for redemption, will not be entitled to this money if they succeed in their appeal, and the decree for redemption is set aside, in which case the money will be available as security. On the other hand, if the defendants' appeal fails and the decree for redemption is confirmed, the defendants will be entitled only to the Rs. 10,000 and there would be no claim for mesne profits at all. The decree directs that the money ...
C.P.L.M. Palaneappa Chetty and anr. Vs. Bullock Brothers and Co. Ltd.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-14-1912
Reported in: 14Ind.Cas.248
Sankaran Nair, J.1. One of the grounds for dismissing the suit was that the plaintiffs gave no notice to the defendants and, therefore, the defendants are not liable under Section 118 of the Contract Act.2. Neither in the written statement filed in the case nor in the elaborate judgment of the Court of first instance is there any reference to the bar of the plaintiffs' claim under Section 118 of the Contract Act. To make that section applicable, it must appear that the plaintiffs accepted the goods without giving notice. There is no finding that the plaintiffs accepted the goods. The learned -Judges find that notice was only given to the defendants in October 1907, but, in the absence of a finding whether the goods were accepted, this is insufficient. Taking delivery for the purpose of sale in order to avoid further loss does not necessarily show acceptance.3. I have also to point out that the learned Judges, in holding that Binny and Co. are not agents of the defendants, have overlook...
The Honourable the Advocate General Vs. Govindasawmi Alias Kristna-saw ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-14-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.306
ORDER1. We are of opinion that the learned Judge erred in law in directing that the sentence of imprisonment, passed by him on Govindasawmy in respect of the second count in Case No. 12 of the Fourth Criminal Sessions of this Court for the year 1911, should run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment which had been passed on the said Govindasawmi in respect of the second count in Case No. 16 of the Third Criminal Sessions of this Court for the year 1911.2. We set aside the sentence and direction, and in lieu thereof, we sentence the said Govindasawmi to one day's rigorous imprisonment to commence at the expiration of the period of imprisonment to which he was sentenced in Case No. 16 of the Third Criminal Sessions for the year 1911....
Sri Rajah Prakasarayanim Garu and Two ors. Vs. Y.P. Venkata Rao
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-13-1912
Reported in: (1915)ILR38Mad160
Sundara Ayyar, J.1. This is an appeal against the order of the District Court of Rajahmundry reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Cocanada and remanding the suit for fresh trial. The Subordinate Judge had disposed of the suit on the merits but solely on evidence recorded by the District Munsif's Court of Peddapur. The suit was first instituted and tried in the latter Court, but its decree was reversed on appeal on the ground that the pecuniary value of the suit was beyond the jurisdiction of a Munsif's Court and the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court. The plaint was subsequently represented in the Subordinate Court. The parties presented a statement at the trial of the suit consenting to the evidence recorded at the former trial by the Peddapur Munsif's Court being treated as evidence in the suit and dispensing with any further evidence. The District Judge held that notwithstanding the consent of the parties the Subordinate Court's procedure in acting on...
Arunachalam Pattar Vs. L. Seshan Pattar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1912
Reported in: (1912)22MLJ406
1. The facts upon which this second appeal arises may be shortly stated as follows:There are two Brahmin villages in Palghat called Nurani and Thondikulam. The inhabitants of the latter who are represented by the defendant appellant were sued by the plaintiff-respondent representing the former village for the recovery of a certain sum of money out of the properties of the village community represented by the defendant including its half share in certain samuham property and for declaration of a charge on this half share for the amount sued for. The samuham properties are properties which according to the plaintiff belong to the Palghat Cherry Samuham; i.e., association or community, which consists of the villagers both of Nurani and Thondikulam. The money which the plaintiff seeks to recover by the suit represents a portion of the cost of certain litigation in the Cochin Court incurred by the representatives of Nurani Village on behalf of their own village and the Thondikulam village. ...
G. Arunajalam Pattar Vs. L. Seshan Pattar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1912
Reported in: 14Ind.Cas.189
1. The facts upon which this second appeal arises may be shortly stated as follows: There are two Brahmin villages in Palghat, called Nurani and Thondikulam. The inhabitants of the latter, who are represented by the defendant-appellant, were sued by the plaintiff-respondent representing the former village for the recovery of a certain sum of money out of the properties of the village community represented by the defendant, including its half share in certain samuham property and for a declaration of a charge on his half share for the amount sued for. The samuham properties are properties which, according to plaintiff, belong to the Palghatchery samuham (i.e., association or community which consists of the villagers both of Nurani and Thondikulam). The money which the plaintiff seeks to recover by the suit represents a portion of the cost of certain litigation in the Cochin Court incurred by the representatives of Nurani village on behalf of their own village and the Thondikulam village...
Sivavadivelu Pillay Vs. Ponnammal and Govindammal and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-09-1912
Reported in: (1912)22MLJ404
1. [S.A. 1406] - The plaintiff in this case prays for a declaration that a sale of the plaintiff's property by his mother as his guardian is not binding on him, and for possession and mesne profits. Both the lower courts have held that the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient proof of his age; and the question for decision is whether the period of limitation is 12 years from the date of alienation in 1904, under Article 144, or 3 years from the date of the plaintiff's majority under Article 44, of the Limitation Act, 1887. We are of opinion that the case falls within the decision of the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram I.L.R. (1899) M. 279 which was followed by this court in Madugula Letchiak v. Pally Mukkalinga I.L.R. (1907) M. 593 and that Article 44 applies. In view of these decisions we are unable to follow the cases in Unni v. Kunhi Amma I.L.R. (1890) M. 26 and Kamakshi Nayakan v. Ramasami Nayakan (1896) 7. M. J. 131. We may point out that in Gnana...
Muthusawmi Pillay Vs. Jafar HusaIn Khan Sahib and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-09-1912
Reported in: 14Ind.Cas.215
Abdur Rahim, J.1. There is nothing to show that the land in respect of which rent is claimed, is an estate or part of an estate as defined in Section 3, Clause (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908). On the other hand, the land itself is stated in the plaint to belong to the mosque, and the defendants, from whom rent is claimed, hold it under a permanent lease granted by one of the Inamdars. I, therefore, set aside the judgment of the Subordinate Judge and direct that he take back the plaint on his file and dispose of the case according to law. The respondents will pay the costs of this petition....
Sivavadevelu Pillay Vs. Ponnammal and Govindammal and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-09-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.365
In S.A. No. 1406 of 1910.1. The plaintiff in this case prays for a declaration that a sale of the plaintiff's property by his mother as his guardian is not. binding on him, and for possession and mesne profits. Both the lower Courts have held that the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient proof of his age; and the question for decision is whether the period of limitation is twelve years from the date of alienation in 1904, under Article 144, or three years from the date of the plaintiff's majority under Article 44, of the Limitation Act, 1877. We are of opinion that the case falls within the decision of the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram 23 M.P 271 : 27 I.A. 69 : 4 C.W.N. 329 which was followed by this Court in Madugula Latchiah v. Palli Mukhalinga 30 M.K 393 : 17 M.L.J. 220 : 2 M.L.T. 350 and that Article 41 applies. In view of these decisions, we are unable to follow the cases in Unni v. Kunchi Amma 14 M.K 26 and Kamakshi Nayakan v. Ramaswamy Nayakan...
Amavasaya Chinna Krishna Reddy and ors. Vs. Marri Poliah of Chilamanur
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-09-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.317
ORDERAbdur Rahim, J.1. The conviction udder Section 447, Indian Penal Code, cannot be sustained. None of the Magistrates find that the intention of the accused in entering upon the land in dispute was to intimidate, annoy or insult the Prosecution witness No. 1 or to commit any offence. The only inference to be drawn from the facts, as disclosed in the evidence, is that the accused entered the land in order to assert the right which they claimed in the land, but that is not sufficient to bring the conduct within the definition of criminal trespass as given in Section 441, Indian Penal Code. I set aside the convictions of all the accused under Section 447 and also the sentences against the accused Nos. 1 to 4. The fines, if paid, by the accused Nos. 1 to 4 will be refunded to them. The conviction of the fifth accused under Section 323, Indian Penal Code, is supported by evidence and will stand. But as he has been sentenced by the Joint Magistrate under Sections 323 and 447, Indian Penal...
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