Chennai Court November 1912 Judgments
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In Re: Mogambara Pattan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-27-1912
Reported in: 34Ind.Cas.305; (1915)28MLJ379
ORDERSadasiva Aiyar, J.1. Unless the appellate Magistrate found same material already on record tending to indicate that the house was a common gaming house or unless the Magistrate was given by the prosecution assurance of sufficient weight indicating that there would be produced practically unimpeachable evidence that the gaming took place in a common gaming house if a re-trial was ordered, he ought not to have sent back the case for re-trial and ought to have acquitted the accused in the absence of evidence to show that the house where they word found gaming was a common gaming house, that is, a house kept by the owner of it for profit and to be used by the public indiscriminately (or practically indiscriminately) for gaming purposes.2. So much of the order of the lower Court as directs a re-trial is quashed. A similar order is made in the connected petition....
Srinivasa Aiyangar and ors. Vs. the Secretary of State for India in Co ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-26-1912
Reported in: (1913)24MLJ41
1. This is a suit to set aside a sale held for arrears of revenue on the ground of fraud. The suit has been dismissed by the Lower Courts on the ground that it has been barred by limitation. Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864 provides a period of 6 months for such a suit from the date on which the cause of action arose. There are several ways in which the plaintiffs attempt to get rid of the bar. We consider it sufficient to deal with one of their contentions as we have come to the conclusion that it must succeed and that the suit must be held to be not barred. Section 15 Clause 2 of the Limitation Act enacts that 'in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded.' This clause did not exist in the previous Statute, Act XV of 1877. The six months provided by Section 59 Act II of 1864 elapsed on the 31 Dec. 1908. The Co...
Rebala Ramana Reddi Vs. Rebala Babu Reddi and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-26-1912
Reported in: (1913)24MLJ96
1. This appeal is against an order of the District Court of Nellore dismissing an application for execution of the decree of the Subordinate-Judge's Court of Nellore in O.S. No. 15 of 1892. The decree is one for partition and was passed on the 3rd August 1897. There were several intermediate applications for execution presented on the plaintiff's behalf during his minority by his next friend. One of them was compromised on the 31st October 1910. The plaintiff's present application ignores the compromise, his case being that it was illegal and not binding on him. The application has been dismissed by the lower Court on the ground that it is barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it having been presented more than twelve years after the date of the decree, although within three years after the attainment of majority by the plaintiff. The first question for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 7 of the Limitation Act a...
R. Ramana Reddi Vs. R. Babu Reddi and Four ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-26-1912
Reported in: (1914)ILR37Mad186
1. This appeal is against an order of the District Court of Nellore dismissing an application for execution of the decree of the Subordinate-Judge's Court of Nellore in Original Suit No. 15 of 1892. The decree is one for partition and was passed on the 3rd August 1897. There were several intermediate applications for execution presented on the plaintiff's behalf during his minority by his next friend. One of them was compromised on the 29th January 1900. The plaintiff's present application ignores the compromise, his case being that it was illegal and not binding on him. The application has been dismissed by the lower Court on the ground that it is barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it having been presented more than twelve years after the date of the decree, although within three years after the attainment of majority by the plaintiff. The first question for consideration is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 7 of the Limitat...
In Re: Suppaya Tharagan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-26-1912
Reported in: (1914)ILR37Mad317
ORDER1. We are unable to agree with the Sessions Judge that there was any illegality in the order of THOMAS, the Magistrate, under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, on the 15th January 1912.2. His omission to at once direct the accused to be taken before the nearest First Class Magistrate was at most an irregularity, which was set right by the subsequent order directing him to be taken before such Magistrate. Such irregularity is expressly cured by Section 537(b), Criminal Procedure Code. We are unable to agree with the view taken by Stanley, C.J., in In the matter of the petition of Bhup Kunwar I.L.R. (1904) All. 256 with reference to the construction of that clause.3. We set aside the order of acquittal made by the Sessions Judge and direct him to restore the appeal to his file and dispose of it according to law....
Srinivasa Ayyangar and Two ors. Vs. the Secretary of State Foe India R ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-26-1912
Reported in: (1915)ILR38Mad92
1. This is a suit to set aside a sale held for arrears of revenue on the ground of fraud. The suit has been dismissed by the lower Courts on the ground that it is barred by limitation. Section 59 of Madras Act II of 1864 provides a period of six months for such a suit from the date on which the cause of action arose. There are several ways in which the plaintiffs attempt to get rid of the bar. We consider it sufficient to deal with one of their contentions 'as we have come to the conclusion that it must succeed and that the suit must be held to be not barred. Section 15, Clause (2) of the Limitation Act enacts that' in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit...of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded.' This clause did not exist in the previous statute, Act XV of 1877. The six months provided by Section 59 of Act II of 1864 elapsed on the 31st December 1...
Veeraraghava Aiyar and ors. Vs. K. Lakshmana Aiyar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-26-1912
Reported in: 18Ind.Cas.247
Miller, J.1. While certain immoveable property was under attachment after a money decree and before it was sold by the Court, the plaintiff obtained a mortgage of the property and undertook, as part of the consideration thereof to discharge the amount of the decree. He failed to do so and the property was sold. The judgment-debtor then had recourse to the appellants and giving him a mortgage on the same properly obtained from him the payment required by Section 310A of the former Code of Civil Procedure and got the sale set aside. The appellants now claim that their mortgage should be given priority to that of the plaintiff. Mr. Ramachandra Iyer put his claim on four grounds. He claimed that under Section 69 of the Indian Contract Act, his client was entitled to a prior charge, that he was also entitled under Section 70 of that Act and, failing either of those two sections, claimed priority on the principle of Section 101 of the Transfer of Property Act and lastly be claimed a salvage ...
Ajapa Natesa Pandara Sannadhi Vs. S.M.R.M. Ramalingam Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-25-1912
Reported in: 20Ind.Cas.767; (1913)24MLJ658
1. A general question of jurisdiction has been raised viz., that the Subordinate Judge's Court had no jurisdiction, since the proper tribunal was the District Court (Section 14 of Act XX of 1863) and a preliminary application to that Court for leave was necessary (Section 18). The present suit is a suit falling within Clauses (a) and (g) of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure viz., a suit in which a decree is sought removing a trustee and settling a scheme.2. It seems to us that the suit is governed by the code and not by the Religious Endowments Act of 1863. In our opinion the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant has no application to a case like this when the general enactment contains special provisions relating to the matter dealt with in the earlier special enactment. The object of the new sub-section to Section 92 of the Code was to make it clear that the provisions of the section were mandatory and not permissive, and the object of the saving clause in the sub-section ...
Nellathuru Venkatarayacharlu and anr. Vs. Nedathuru Krishnama Charlu a ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-25-1912
Reported in: (1913)24MLJ697
1. It seems clear that the suit instituted with the consent of the Collector is a good suit for' all reliefs referred to in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedare. That section and Section 14 of Act XX of 1863, so far as the forms of relief to which they relate are the same, appear to offer a choice to persons interested in the trust; they may proceed under either. It cannot be that they are bound to proceed under both; for they might lead to a dead lock, if. per chance the Collector were to consent to a suit and the District Judge to refuse leave. It is not necessary to read the sections as involving this possibility and they ought not therefore so to be read.2. The Collector's consent was given to a suit for these reliefs, the plaintiffs prayed for the removal of certain trustees, the appointment of others and the vesting of the property in the newly appointed incumbents. The consent was given in November 1908 and the suit was instituted on the 29th January 1909. It is now contend...
Veeraraghava Iyer and ors. Vs. K. Lakshmana Iyer and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-24-1912
Reported in: (1913)25MLJ248
Miller, J.1. While certain immoveable property was under attachment, after a money decree and before it was sold by the Court the plaintiff obtained a mortgage of the property and undertook, as a part of the consideration thereof, to discharge the amount of the decree. He failed to do so and the property was sold. The judgment-debtor then had recourse to the appellant and giving him a mortgage on the same property, obtained from him the payment required by Section 310 A, of the former Code of Civil Procedure and got the sale set aside. The appellant now claims that his mortgage should be given priority to that of the plaintiff. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar put his claim on four grounds. He claimed that under Section 69 of the Indian Contract Act, his client was entitled to a prior charge, that he was also entitled under Section 70 of that Act and, failing either of those two sections, claimed priority on the principle of Section 101 of the Transfer of Property Act and lastly he claimed a salv...
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