Chennai Court January 1912 Judgments
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S. Krishnama Charlu and anr. Vs. S. Venkammah (Minor by Guardian and F ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-24-1912
Reported in: (1913)ILR36Mad214
1. The question raised before us in this appeal is whether a succession certificate can be granted to a minor on an application made by him through his natural guardian. We answer the question, which is not absolutely free from difficulty, in the affirmative. Apart from Section 9 of the Succession Certificate Act VII of 1887 which we shall consider generally, there is nothing in the Act which precludes a minor from applying for a certificate, while we find that Sections 8 to 13 of Probate and Administration Act V of 1881 prohibits grants of probate and letters of administration to minors. If the minor is the heir of the deceased, as is the case, the property will vest in him and he would be the person entitled to institute suits to recover debts due to the estate. Section 4 of the Succession Certificate Act lays down that no Court shall pass a decree against a debtor of the deceased person in favour of a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of the deceased except on the produc...
Muthusawmi Chettyar Vs. Subramanya Iyer and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-24-1912
Reported in: 14Ind.Cas.69
1. We do not think that the District Judge was right in holding that there was no debt due by the father under the mortgage-decree because the personal remedy against him under that decree had become barred. The debt continued, though its recovery in a way had become barred. There was, in this view, an antecedent debt at the time when the sale which the plaintiff now seeks to set aside took place. That being so, the son's interest is liable for the father's debt, as held by the Privy Council in Bhagbut Pershad Singh v. Girja Koer 15 C.P 717 : 15 I.A. 97 which is not noticed by the District Judge. That decree was re-affirmed by the Privy Council, Mahabir Pershad v. Mohesuar Nath Sahai 17 C.P 584 : 17 I.A. 11. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Venkataramannya Pantulu v. Venkataramana Doss Pantulu 29 M.K 200 : 1 M.L.T. 28 : 16 M.L.J. 69 on which the District Judge relies, is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The judgment of the Full Bench refers to the decision ...
Savirimuthu Moopan and ors. Vs. Sattan Chinnappan Savari
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-24-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.185
1. The District Judge has decided the case on a finding that there is no evidence that the building was ever dedicated to religious uses. But this was not the case of either party and was not a matter on which any issue was raised.2. We must set aside the decree of the District Judge and remand the appeal for disposal according to law.3. It is open to the District Judge to settle fresh issues, if he finds it necessary to do so. Costs in the Court will abide the result....
Srinivasa Sundara Thathachariar Vs. Krishnasamy Iyengar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-24-1912
Reported in: ILR1912NULL354
1. We think that when Krishnasamy Iyengar alienated his one-third interest in the co-parcenary house in 1880, the joint-tenancy in respect of it was put an end to See remarks of Krishnasamy Iyer, J., at page 246 of the case of Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetty (1911) 2 M.W.N. 238 : 9 M.L.T. 389 : 21 M.L.J. 246 : 35 M.K 47 : 9 Ind. Cas. 596 and the plaintiff and his grandfather, who were the only coparceners at the time, became tenants-in-common, each having one-third of the house as his separate property. When the alienated one-third was purchased by the grandfather in the plaintiff's name in 1881 under Exhibit C, there being no evidence to show that the funds came from elsewhere, it must be held that the purchase was with the grandfather's funds and for the benefit of his grandson, the plaintiff, in whose name the deed stood. The plaintiff, therefore, was at that time entitled to two-thirds of the house, and the grandfather to one-third, and on the death of the grandfather, Krishnasam...
Singanamala Krishnamacharlu and anr. Vs. Singanamala Venkatamma
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-24-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.408
1. The question raised before us in this appeal is whether a succession certificate can be granted to a minor on application made by him through his natural guardian. We answer the question, which is not absolutely free from difficulty, in the affirmative. Apart from Section 9 of the Succession Certificate Act VII of 1889, which we shall consider presently, there is nothing in the Act which precludes a minor from applying for a certificate, while we find that Sections 8 to 13 of Probate and Administration Act, V of 1881, prohibit grants of Probate and Letters of administration to minors. If the minor is the heir of deceased, as is the case, the property will vest in him and he would - be the person entitled to institute suits to recover debts due to the estate. Section 4 of the Succession Certificate Act lays dawn that no Court shall pass a decree against a debtor of the deceased person in favour of a person claiming to be entitled do the effects of the deceased except on the productio...
In Re: Rama Naicker
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-22-1912
Reported in: 13Ind.Cas.471; (1912)22MLJ355
1. There is no provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers a Judge to question the jury as to their reasons for an unanimous verdict when there is nothing ambiguous in the verdict itself and no uncertainty in the minds of the jury themselves regarding it. Section 303 limits the power of the Judge to the asking of such questions as may be necessary to ascertain what their verdict is. The view of the scope of Section 303 is clear from its language, and is in accordance with the decision in Emperor v. Kondiba I.L.R.(1904) 28 Bom.412. In the present case there was no doubt as to what the verdict of the jury was, viz., a unanimous verdict of not guilty. The Judge had no power to question them as to their reasons for this verdict. It was this questioning and the conversation which then followed which led two of the Jury to say they had been misled as to some of the evidence by the notes of the foreman and that they would like to reconsider the case with the result that the jur...
Abdul Kadir Beari Vs. Bagade Shiva Rao and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-22-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.377
1. There is evidence to support the District Judge's finding that Exhibit I is genuine, We are bound by that finding in second appeal. We are further of opinion that the District Judge is right in finding that the amount due under that document must be paid by the plaintiff, as well as the amounts due under Exhibits II and XI before be can redeem the property.2. But we can find no grounds for not enforcing the terms of the contract evidenced by Exhibit I. It is not suggested that it was brought about by fraud or undue influence as defined in Section 16 of the Contract Act. It is pleaded before us that the. period of 30 years fixed for redemption is unreasonable and would not be enforced by a Court of Equity, but the 30 years expired in 1887, and it does not appear that the mortgagor, either before or since that time, ever wished to redeem. It is certainly no reason for not enforcing the terms of the contract. In the circumstances of this case, the Court has, in fact, no discretion. Dha...
In Re: Srinivasa Aiyangar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-19-1912
Reported in: 14Ind.Cas.681
Sundara Aiyar, J.1. I see no ground for interference in this case. The Kararnama, Exhibit B, does not constitute the 1st defendant the agent of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 so as to make them liable for all debts contracted by him. It provides that the family remain a joint one, and the brothers of Sreeni-vasa Iyengar agree to be liable to all debts contracted by Sreenivasa Iyenger on auspicious occasions in the family. This does not improve the position of Sreenivasa Iyenger beyond what it would be under the Law as the managing member of a family. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the debt was contracted under circumstances which would bind the other members of the family. The lower Courts hold that he did not succeed in proving it. On this finding, the suit was rightly dismissed. I dismiss the petition....
S.K. Sanka Aiyar Vs. S.K. Subbiah Iyer and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-19-1912
Reported in: 13Ind.Cas.642
Ralph Benson, J.1. The Article applicable is Article 161 of the 1st Schedule of the new Limitation Act (IX of 1908), and the time is 30 days from the date when the petitioner had knowledge of the decree in the cases where the summons was not duly served. In this case, the defendant alleged in his affidavit that he was duly served and that he had no knowledge of any of the proceedings. If that was true, there was no bar. The Subordinate Judge should have decided the plea before dismissing the application. He did not do so.2. His order is set aside, and he is directed to restore the petition to his file, and dispose of that according to law. The petitioner's costs will abide the event....
S. Venkataramana Iyer Vs. Kittammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-19-1912
Reported in: 15Ind.Cas.184
Sundara Aiyar, J.1. This is an application to revise an order of the District Judge of Coimbatore rejecting an application for leave to institute a suit as a pauper. The Judge has recorded no finding on the question of the plaintiff's pauperism, but has found that the petitioner was not entitled to sue as reversioner. This finding is based on a reported judgment of this Court in Govindayyar v. Dorasami 11 M.P 5. The judgment shows that the decision of this Court was based on grounds special to the parties in that case. It would not affect the plaintiff.2. Apart from this circumstance, Order XXXIII, Rule 5, entitles the Court only to see whether the plaintiff's allegations do not show a cause of action. The plaintiff does not admit that the 1st defendant was the adopted son of the deceased Subbier either in his plaint or at his examination. The judgment referred to by the learned Judge was not put in evidence. If it had been, he would probably have found oat that the decision in that ca...
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