Chennai Court August 1911 Judgments
The Agent and Manager, S.i. Ry. Co. Vs. Vengu Pattar, Managing Partner ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-31-1911
Reported in: 12Ind.Cas.169; (1911)21MLJ1061
Phillips, J.1. The Subordinate Judge's decree is objected to on the ground that the notice contemplated by Sections 77 and 140 of the Railways Act was not duly given by the plaintiff. No doubt there are several rulings that the notice must be on the Agent of the Railway Nadirchand Shaha v. Wood I.L.R. (1907) C. 194, G.I.P. Railway Co. v. Dewasi I.L.R. (1907) B. 534 G.I.P. Railway Co. v. Chandrabai I.L.R. (1906) A. 552 but in Periannan Chetty v. S.I. Ry. Co. I.L.R. (1898) M. 137 the opinion of the learned judges was that it was sufficient to show that the Agent actually did get notice, whether in the manner prescribed in Section 140 or otherwise, and in Woods v. Maker Ali Behari (1908) 13 C.W.N. 24 the learned Judges held that a notice to the Traffic Manager when he was empowered by the Agent to dispose of the claim and action by him was sufficient notice. In this case also the Traffic Manager had authority from the Agent to dispose of the plaintiff's claim and he would enquire into the...
Tag this Judgment!Mohideen Kuppei and anr. Vs. Maria Kami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-30-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ1018
1. The only direct authority available to us on the question whether the District Munsif, who was asked to execute the decree, had the power to extend the time allowed for payment in the decree which was passed by the High Court, is C.M.S.A. No. 29 of 1909 in which it was held that the appellate court which passed the decree was the proper court to which the application should be made for extending the time. We are not propared to lay down a different rule. The ruling is in accordance with the dictum of Bahshyam Aiyangar J. in Vedapuratti v. Vallabha Valia Raja (1901) I.L.B. 25 M. 300 where that learned Judge points out that extending the time fixed by the judgment of an appellate court for the performance of a condition amounts to an amendment of it. The general rule is that 'specific directions contained in the mandate of the appellate court are beyond the judicial discretion of the lower court and hence must be implicitly followed by the latter court.' See American Cyclopaedia of La...
Tag this Judgment!M. Venkata Raghavalu Chetty Vs. A.N. Sabapathy Chetti and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-25-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ1013
Abdur Rahim, J.1. By these petitions we are asked to revise the judgments of Sir V.C. Desikachari, a Judge of the Presidency Court of Small Causes, Madras, decreeing the plaintiff's claim on a promissory note for Rs. 1,000 (Exhibit A) and of the Full Bench of that Court dismissing an application made to it by the petitioner for a new trial. The question is, accepting the findings of fact by the court of first instance, as we are bound to do, is there a proper case fat revision? The defendant admitted the execution of the note and pleaded want or failure of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act XXVI of 1881. The court is bound to presume, until the contrary is proved, that a pro-note was made with due consideration. It was incumbent on the defendant, therefore, to make out his plea. The learned Small Cause Court Judge has disbelieved the story set up by the defendant in support of his plea. Upon that finding the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, but after t...
Tag this Judgment!Pamulapati Authivedu and anr. Vs. Samulapati Subbiah and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-24-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ1010
1. As regards Exhibit II it is not contended that under that instrument the plaintiff is not entitled to pay off the mortgage debt at any time. He has in fact paid it, and we understand that the mortgagee has received it, but the Advocate-General has contended that notwithstanding this the Mortgagee is entitled to remain in possession until the expiry of the 12 years, the period of the mortgage as provided in the deed. The question of whether the provisions of the deed are unenfoceable on the ground that they fetter the right to redeem, of course, only arises if the parties intended, when they executed the deed, that the mortgagee should be allowed to remain in possession in the event which has in fact happened in this case, viz., discharge of the debt by the mortgagor. On the construction of Exhibit II we do not think the parties so intended. The Advocate-General relies on the provision in the deed that as soon as the debt is discharged the mortgagee shall pay tent to the mortgagor. T...
Tag this Judgment!P. Ankinedu and anr. Vs. P. Subbiah and Four ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-24-1911
Reported in: (1912)ILR35Mad744
1. As regards Exhibit; II, it is not contended that under that instrument the plaintiff is not entitled to pay off the mortgage debt at any time. He has in fact paid it and we understand that the mortgagee has received it, but the Advocate-General has contended that, notwithstanding this, the mortgagee is entitled to remain in possession until the expiry of the twelve years the period of the mortgage as provided id the deed. The question of whether the provisions of the deed ace unenforceable on the ground that they letter the right to redeem, of course only arises if the parties intended when they executed the deed that the mortgagee should be allowed to remain in possession in the event which has in fact happened in this ease, viz., discharge of the debt by the mortgagor. On the construction of Exhibit II we do not think the parties so intended. The Advocate-General relies on the provision in the deed that as soon as the debt is discharged the mortgagee shall pay rent to the mortgago...
Tag this Judgment!Patibandala Sitaramaiya Vs. Patibandala Pichaiya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1911
Reported in: 12Ind.Cas.269; (1911)21MLJ1005
Arnold White, Kt., C.J.1. A preliminary objection was taken in this case on the ground that no appeal lay. The appeal is from the judgment of the District Judge which directs that a certain award shall be filed and gives the plaintiff a decree in accordance with that award. Section 21, Clause (1) - of the arbitration section in the second schedule to the Code - provides 'where the court is satisfied that the matter has been referred to arbitration and that an award has been made thereon and where no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in para 14 or para 15 is proved the court shall order the award to be filed and shall proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award.' Then Sub-section 2 : 'Upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow and no appeal shall lie from such decree except in so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award.' Consequently qua decree it seems to me the contention that no appeal lies is well founded. Then we have Secti...
Tag this Judgment!Pitty Thayagaraya Chettiar Vs. Sivapada Mudally and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ1008
1. In the suit out of which this appeal arises the plaintiff, as purchaser of certain lands at a rent sale under Madras Act VIII of 1865, sued to get possession of the said lands with mesne profits from his daughters who had remained in occupation. The District Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that the sale having been held two days after the advertised date was illegal and invalid. The District Judge on appeal took the same view.2. The case quoted by the District Judge Venkata Chellapati Iyer v. Robert Fischer (1007) 17 M.L.J. 297, as well as the case Ramanasari v. Muthusamt Naick I.L.R. (1906) M. 248 are good authorities for holding that in a suit of this description the defendent may plead illegality of the sale as a defence even although he may have taken no previous steps to get the sale set aside and that, if the sale is found to be invalid, the suit must be dismissed. But it certainly does not follow that every irregularity in the sale proceedings will have the same effec...
Tag this Judgment!Mira MohidIn Rowthen and anr. Vs. Nallaperumal Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ1000
Ayling, J.1. In this case the plaintiffs wish to exclude the period from the 14th June 1908 (expiry of 3 years from date of cause of action) to the 6th July 1908 (date of filing the plaint in the Madura Sub-Court as well as the period from the 6th July 1908 onwards and it is necessary for them to do so in order to save limitation admittedly. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, cannot be extended to cover the period from the 14th June 1908 to 6th July 1908. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that it is covered by Section 4 and it is argued, apparently with reason, that the concessions awarded by the different sections of the Limitation Act are independent and cumulative. On the other hand, it is not denied that the proper court in which the suit should have been filed re opened before the 6th July 1908 and respondents' vakil quoted the decision in A.C. Chackerbutty v. G.M. Dutt (1875) 24 W.R. 26 as authority for holding that in such circumstances Section 4 cannot operate in plain...
Tag this Judgment!V. Andiappa Chetty Vs. P. Devarajulu Naidu Deceased, by His Son and Le ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ1024
1. Two letters marked Exhibits A, B, in the Small Cause Suit No. 19117 of 1909 have been referred by the Court of Small Causes, Madras, under Section 69 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, for our opinion whether they constitute; acknowledgments of liability within Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The letters run as follows:Exhibit A. Madras, 10th June 1908.ToR.V. Seshagiri Rao, B.A., B.L.,High Conrt Vakil,MADRAS.Sir,With reference to your letter dated 2nd instant I request yon be to sogood as to furnish me with a copy of a statement of accounts.Exhibit B. Madras, 18th June 1908.ToM.R. Ry. R.V. Seshagiri Rao, B.A., B.L.,High Court Vakil,MADRAS.Dear Sir,With reference to your letter of the 2nd instant o.n behalf of V. AndiappaChetty, landing contractor, Madras, I have to inform you that I wish toexamine the accounts as my accouuts do not show such an amount mentioned inyour letter. I therefore request you will please forward the copy of theaccount or instruct your client to send ...
Tag this Judgment!The Secretary of State for India in Council (Represented by the Collec ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1911
Reported in: (1914)ILR37Mad25
1. This appeal arises out of a dispute as to fishey rights in two channels in the Tanjore district, claimed by the first defendant, the head of the Teruppanandal Mutt. The plaintiff was a man who had taken a lease of the fishery rights in these and other channels from Government; and being obstructed in the exercise of his rights in respect of these channels by the first defendant, he filed this suit, imp leading not only the first defendant but also the Secretary of State as the second defendant. In his plaint he prayed for an injunction restraining the first defendant from interfering with the fishery in the plaint channels and for damages caused to him (the plaintiff) by such interference and he added an alternative prayer that in case it was found that the first defendant was not liable for the aforesaid damages, the second defendant should be directed to pay them.2. The Munsif dismissed his suit in toto and ordered him to pay the costs of both the defendants. He appealed to the Su...
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