Chennai Court March 1911 Judgments
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S. Visweswara Sarma Vs. Dr. T.M. Nair and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ533
Charles Arnold White, Kt., C.J.1. I do not think we ought to interfere with an established practice in this Presidency unless we are fully satisfied that the practice is contrary to law. In this case, on the facts stated in the Order of Reference, I am not so satisfied.2. The plaint presented to the Small Cause Court is the same plaint as that which was presented to the City Civil Court and returned by that court under Order VII, Rule 10, of the first schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. The amount actually paid on the plaint is an amount which satisfies the requirements of Sections 71 and 75 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, and the notifications under the latter section. No doubt the stamp on the plaint when it was presented to the City Civil Court was cancelled by the City Civil Court in pursuance of Section 30 of the Court-fees Act, because the court purported to 'act upon' it by returning it. But I do not find anything in the Court-fees Act which compels me to ho...
In Re: the District Munsif of Tiruvallur
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1911
Reported in: (1914)ILR37Mad17
Charles Arnold White, C.J.1. In this matter a point was raised by the Government Pleader as to whether the rules, in connection with which this reference arises, have now any legal effect.2. The power given to the Local Government by Section 269 of the old Code to make rules for the maintenance of attached livestock is now given to the High Court by Section 128(2)(b). Order XXI, Rule 43, reproduces the old Section 269, but it does not reproduce the provision requiring the officer attaching the property to act in accordance with the rules notwithstanding they may be inconsistent with the provisions of the section. Section 157 of the Code of 1908 keeps alive the rules, etc., made under the old Code so far as they are consistent with the Code of 1908. There is nothing in the Code of 1908, as distinguished from the orders in the first schedule to the Code, which is inconsistent with the rules issued under Section 269, though there is an inconsistency between the rules and Order XXI, Rule 4...
Bhogaraju Venkatrama Jogiraju and ors. Vs. Addepalli Seshayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-20-1911
Reported in: (1912)ILR35Mad560
1. The plaintiffs who have preferred this appeal against the decision of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Ellore, are the sons of the sixth defendant who inherited the lands in suit and other property from her father Ramjogi, after the death of her mother Seshatmma, in 1883, Ramjogi himself having died in 1873. The suit is for a declaration that the decree in Original Suit No. 540 of 1903 on the file of the District Munsif of Ellore was not binding on the first plaintiff who was the second defendant in that suit, and for a declaration that in any event, the decree and the Court sale in execution thereof of the land in suit could not affect the reversionary right of the plaintiffs after the death of the sixth defendant. Original Suit No. 540 was instituted by the first defendant against the sixth defendant, her husband Venkiah and her elder son the present first plaintiff on a bond (Exhibit II, dated 6th October 1902) which was itself a renewal of an earlier bond (Exhibit III, dated 3rd...
Rangathayi Ammal Vs. Neli Munusawmy Chetty
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ706
1. The main question for decision is what is the proper rate of maintenance to be awarded to the plaintiff against the minor defendant, her step-son. The Subordinate Judge finds that the family property in the hands of the defendant would be worth Rs. 19,500 and that the annual income thereof might be taken to be Rs. 1.710. He awards maintenance to the plaintiff at Rs. 15 per mensem, being of opinion that one-sixth of the income of the estate or one-third of the income of her husband's share would be a proper allotment to her. He made no award for the plaintiffs residence or any extraordinary expenses. The learned vakil for the appellant objects to the principle adopted by the lower court and further offers to show that the value of the family property and the income derivable therefrom would be considerably more than what the Subordinate Judge has found them to be. We need hardly point out that what a Hindu widow is entitled to for her maintenance is an amount which, in the opinion of...
P.T. Govinda Panikker and Nine ors. Vs. T.P.V. Nani Alias Narayani Nan ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1911
Reported in: (1913)ILR36Mad304
1. Three points have been argued for the appellants in this second appeal. The first point is that the lower Court has wrongly presumed that properties acquired in the name of a junior member of a tarwad belong to him and not to his tarwad. It has no doubt been stated in several cases by this Court that the presumption is just the other way. See Vira Rayen v. The Valia Rani, Calicut I.L.R., (1881) Mad., 141, Second Appeal No. 1153 of 1888 and Second Appeal No. 1549 of 1902. We do not however, understand these cases as laying down that there is any presumption of law either way. The presumption is one of fact, see Mayne's 'Hindu Law', paragraphs 289 to 291, and whether a presumption in favour of the property being tarwad property should be drawn or not in any particular case would depend on various circumstances such as the relationship of the member in whose name the title stands to the karnavan at the time of the acquisition of the property in question, the possession of private means...
In Re: P. Venkata Reddy
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-15-1911
Reported in: (1913)ILR36Mad216
Charles Arnold White, C.J.1. The question which has been referred to us is this--'Is the statement of a person charged with an offence in answer to a question by the Court trying him 'What have you to say,' an absolutely privileged statement so as to make him not liable to be punished for an offence under Section 499, Indian Penal Code, in respect of the statement?' There can be no question that under the law of England the occasion would have been absolutely privileged. Mr. Rozario, who argued in support of the view that under the law of this country the statement was not privileged unless the prisoner could show that it was made in good faith within the meaning of the ninth exception to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, has conceded this. The law of England is that there are occasions when it is for the public interest that persons should not be in any way fettered in their statements. In this case the privilege is absolute and no action lies for words spoken. The occasions are (...
Srimatu Rajah Y. Mallikarjuna Prasada Naidu Bahadur Vs. V. Subbayya an ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1911
Reported in: (1913)ILR36Mad4
1. The suits are brought to enforce acceptance of pattas which were tendered by the plaintiff to his tenants. The main contention is as to the rate of Rs. 3-3-0 per acre which is entered in the pattas as payable on dry lands converted into wet by means of Kistna water. 2. The Judge has found that till fasli 1278 the village was entirely under dry cultivation and the sharing system was in force. In fasli 1279 the money rent system was introduced and it was agreed between the parties that the ryots were to pay a rent of Rs. 27-4-0 per khatti, and in the event of the ryots cultivating dry lands with wet crops by means of Kistna water without the zamindar's permission they were to pay Rs. 100 per khatti.3. The pattas produced by the zamindar for fasli 1300 contain this stipulation and they also state that the right of cultivation should be relinquished if the lands are cultivated without such permission. Following the decision in Appa Rau v. Ratnam I.L.R. (1890) Mad., 249 , the Judge has e...
In Re: Ellore Venkata Vyammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-13-1911
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.1019
ORDER1. The second accused left opium contained in a locked-up box in the house of the 1st accused and 1st accused has been convicted under Section 9(c) of Act I of 1878 for being in illegal possession of opium. The only question is whether the 1st accused was in possession of the opium. We think he was. Admittedly he knew there was opium in the box and the box was in his custody in his house. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the conviction. We think, however, a fine of Rs. 5 is sufficient penalty in the circumstances of the case and we reduce the fine to that amount. The balance of the fine will be refunded. Fine reduced....
Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Arunachellam Chetty and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-07-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ432
1. The question in the appeal is whether the hundi, Exhibit B, for Rs. 1,000 was accepted by the plaintiff in part satisfaction of the amount due. The established rule is that a bill of exchange or hundi given for a debt operates only as a conditional discharge of the debt see Jambu Chetty v. Palaniappa Chettiar I.L.R. (1903) M. 526 although it might be proved that in any particular case it was taken unconditionally in satisfaction of a debt. In this case the hundi was drawn by the defendant on his uncle in favour of a third person to whom the plaintiff had to pay money. That person was under no obligation to present it for payment to the drawee nor is there any evidence that when the hundi was drawn he discharged the plaintiff from the liability to pay him his debt. It is extremely improbable that the plaintiff would unconditionally accept the hundi in part pajmentof the debt under these circumstances. No doubt the fact that payment of Rs. 1,000 was endorsed on the original pro-note e...
Thandapaneni Krishnayya and ors. Vs. Peddilibotta Subbaya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-07-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ784
1. The 3rd and 4th defendants contend that the land in question was not dedicated to the public. But the written statement of the defendants (Exh. C) and the other evidence on record completely establish the contrary.2. The lower court is wrong in holding that the court could remove any of the existing trustees in a suit under Section 539, Civil Procedure Code - see Rangasawmi Naiken v. Vardappa Naiken I.L.R. (1891) M. 462. The direction in the decree dismissing the 3rd and 4th defendants must be set aside. As the office descends by hereditary succession, the trustee cannot be appointed from amongst the members of the family by selection. The defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are all entitled to be trustees. Having regard to the conduct of the members of the family in the past, some being guilty of breach of trust and others of gross carelessness, we concur with the lower court in holding that it is desirable to associate a respectable resident of the village in the management of the trust. The 3...
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