Chennai Court February 1911 Judgments
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Bammidi Bayya Naidu Vs. Bammidi Paradesi Naidu (Died) and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-15-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ344
Munro, J.1. The plaintiff, a land-holder to whom the provisions of Section 3 of Madras Act VIII of 1865 apply, sues the defendants, his tenants, for rent for Fasli 1316. Under Section 7 of the abovementioned Act no suit brought to enforce the tortus of a tenancy shall be sustainable unless patta and muchilika have been exchanged, or unless it be proved that the party attempting to enforce the contract had tendered such a patta or muchilika as the other party was bound to accept, or unless both parties shall have agreed to dispense with pattas and muchilikas. Under Section 4 of the Act the patta must contain, among other things, the local description and extent of the land. The patta in the present suit gives the extent and boundaries of the land alleged by the plaintiff to be in the defendants' occupation. The defendants alleged that the extent of jerayiti land entered in the patta was greater than the extent of such land held by them. The plaintiff contended that the matter was res ju...
Bammid1 Bayya Naidu Vs. Bammioi Paradesi Naidu and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-15-1911
Reported in: (1912)ILR35Mad216
Munro, J.1. The plaintiff, a landholder to whom the provisions of section f3 of Madras Act VIII of 1865 apply sues the defendant?, his tenants, for rent for fasli 1316. Under Section 7 of the abovementioned Act, no suit brought to enforce the barms of a tenancy, shall be sustainable unless patta and muehilika have been exchanged, or unless it be proved that the party attempting to enforce the contract had tendered such a patta or muchilika as the other party was bound to accept, or unless both parties shall have agreed to dispense with pattas and muchilika. Under Section 4 of the Act the patta must contain, among other things, the local description and extent of the laud. The putta, in the present suit gives the extent and boundaries of the land alleged by the plaintiff to be in the defendants' occupation. The defendants alleged-that the extent of jeroyiti land entered in the patta was greater than the extent of such land held by them. The plaintiff contended that the matter was res ju...
Kaliba Sahil and ors. Vs. Balgia Nachial
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-15-1911
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.886
1. The other Kasi Pangu holders have not the same interest as the original plaintiff and should not have been made plaintiff under Section 30, Civil Procedure Code. The proper cause would have been to make them defendants, We set aside the order under Section 30, Civil Procedure Code. We also think that the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The original plaintiff seeks to recover Rs. 1,232-15-10, and also prays that the defendant may be ordered to pay the loss sustained by her owing to their improper action. The loss as stated in paragraph' 17 of the plaint to be Rs. 16,000, and the original plaintiff offered to pay additional Court-fee, if necessary. The original plaintiff, therefore, sought to establish her right to more than Rs. 2,500 and the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. We, therefore, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and return the plant for presentation to the proper Court. Costs hitherto incurred will abide the resul...
Kamakka Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-14-1911
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.790a
1. We think the evidence of the medical witnesses establishes the fact that the child was thrown into the well. The accused in her first statement and also before the Committing Magistrate, stated that she threw the child into the well, bat in the first statement she said that the child had died soon after delivery and it was the dead child that she threw into the well. It seems to us that it is possible that, when the prisoner threw the child into the well, she might have thought that it was dead. We do not think that we can safely rely on the evidence of Prosecution witness No. 2, who was examined as an approver and made contradictory statements at different stages of the case. The case rests really upon the admission of the accused that she threw the child into the well; but she says that it was dead at the time. She may well have been under that impression; and, if the conviction is to be based solely on a statement of her own, it is fair that that statement should be taken in its ...
Palavesa Tevan and ors. Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-14-1911
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.788
1. The appellants in this case were tried before the acting Sessions Judge of Tinnevelly and a Jury on charges under Sections 395, 402 and 393, Indian Penal Code. The first ground on which the summing up to the Jury is attacked is that it does not set forth the evidence of the prosecution and the defence and the points which arose for consideration in a manner calculated to help the Jury in arriving at a proper verdict. It seems to us the charge of the acting Sessions Judge is by no means a lucid statement, either of the law bearing on the charges against the prisoners, or of the evidence of the prosecution and the defence, or of the points which required consideration in determining the truth or otherwise of the case of the prosecution. The allegations of the prosecution are that on the 1st July the first prosecution witness, who has been acting as informer of the police and had received a reward in the shape of a gold bangle, was waylaid by the prisoners against whom or whose relativ...
Puthia Valappil Ayissa Alias Hayumma and ors. Vs. V. Lakshmana Prabhu ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-14-1911
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.795
1. We are unable to agree with the lower Court in holding that the question whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation is res judicata by the decision in the previous suit between the parties. Exhibit C is the judgment of the District Court and Exhibit E that of the High Court in that suit. The High Court could be taken to have decided only that the 1st defendant had not been excluded from possession within 12 years prior to that suit. Exhibits H and O in that suit, referred to in Exhibit C, only show that the 1st defendant's title to a two-fifths share was recognised in June and July 1895. The present suit was instituted more than 12 years after the dates of those documents. This Court has more than once held that a decree in favour of a party with regard to property does not by itself stop the running of limitation when the property continues to be in the possession of the defendant. It is, therefore, possible, that, though the former suit was not barred, when it was instit...
Kondi Ramasawmy Chetty Vs. Neli Hari Krishna Chettyar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-13-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ705
1. The question is whether this suit is barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge has held that Article 62 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, 1877, applies and that the suit is barred as it was brought more than three years after the defendants realised the decree amount. We do not think that Article 62 applies. For that article to be applicable the money realised by the defendants must have been actually or constructively received by the defendants for the plaintiff's use. But seeing that at the time the money was realised the plaintiff was debarred from collecting the money himself by reason of the dismissal of the suit, we do not think the money can, in any sense, be said to have been received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use. See Narayana v. Narayana I.L.R. (1889) M. 473. We do not think that either Article 29 or Article 49 applies to a case like the present, and no other article is suggested. In these circumstances, we have to fall back upon Article 120, and under tha...
Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur, Minor by Mr. W.A. Varadachar ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-13-1911
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ709
1. The suit in this case was instituted for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,929 10-0 with interest which the plaintiff alleges to hi due to him from the defendants from the 27th April, 1900. The plaintiff's case is that the villages mentioned in Schedules A and B appended to the plaint were mortgaged by the plaintiff to the defendants' father, Subbi Chetty, on the 21st of May 1890 tinier two documents for a sum of Rs. 100,000 and Rs. 51,5,00, respectively; that the first of these mortgage deeds, filed as Exhibit A in the suit, was void and unenforceable, being contrary to Section 257-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the second deed, Exhibit B, was also void for the same reason with respect to Rs. 31,343-9-1 out of the total sum of Rs. 51,500; that the villages mortgaged under the two deeds passed into the possession of the mortgagee and continued to remain in his possession till July 1900, when they were taken possession of by the Court of Wards when the superintendence and m...
Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur, Minor, by Guardian Mr. W.A. ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-13-1911
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.875
1. The suit in this case was instituted for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,929-10-9 with interest which the plaintiff alleges to be due to him from the defendants from the 27th April 1900. The plaintiff's case is that the villages mentioned in Schedules A and B appended to the plaint were mortgaged by the plaintiff to the defendants' father, Subbi Chetty, on the 21st of May 1890 under two documents for a sum of Rs. 100,000 and Rs. 51,500, respectively, that the first of these mortgage-deeds filed as Exhibit A in the suit was void and unenforceable being contrary to Section 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the second deed, Exhibit B, was also void for the same reason with respect to Rs. 31,343-1-9 out of the total sum of Rs. 51,500; that the villages mortgaged under the two deeds passed into the possession of the mortgagee and continued to remain in his possession till July 1900, when they were taken possession of by the Court of Wards when the superintendence and managemen...
Pattath Veeran Kutty Vs. Kuni Kandi Shazhath Veethil Appu Alias Unni K ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-10-1911
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.760
1. The order was not under Section 245 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882, but under Section 249 and is appealable as if it was a decree. This, disposes the preliminary objection.2. The judgment-creditor, who is the respondent in the appeal, applied to the District Munsif for proclamation and sale of certain property of the judgment-debtor, and so far as it appears he insisted that he had a right to sell the property in execution of his decree which was a decree for money, even though the property had never been attached. It was rightly held by the Munsif that such an application could not be granted and the judgment-creditor so far as we have been able to ascertain never asked the District Munsif to permit him to amend the petition by adding a prayer for attachment. He appealed against the order of the Munsif, but while the Subordinate Judge held that no relief could be granted on the respondent's petition he allowed him to amend the petition by asking for attachment ...
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