Chennai Court March 1910 Judgments
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Munisami and ors. Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-24-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.416
ORDERMiller, J.1. The finding, that the accused, other than the second, 'surrounded the constable in a threatening attitude', is not to my mind a sufficient finding that an assault was committed by them within the meaning of Section 351 of the Indian Penal Code. It is not suggested that the assault committed by the 2nd accused was constructively the offence of all.2. As to the 2nd accused, I think on the facts found the conviction is right. The constable was in the execution of his duty at the time the blow was given. I set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the 1st, 3rd and 4th accused and confirm those passed on the 2nd accused....
Chellammal and ors. Vs. Ranganatham Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad277
1. The four plaintiffs sue to recover their Shave of the properties loft By 'their deceased father Kanagasabai Pillai from the defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4. who are also his sons, The defence is that the plaintiff's mother, the fifth defendant, was not the wife of their deceased father but a prostitute who was for some time his concubine.2. The learned Judge who heard the case held that the fifth defendant was validly married to the deceased Kanagasabai Pillai and awarded to the plaintiffs the share claimed by them. The first question for decision is whether the finding is supported by the evidence in the case. Kauagasabai Pillai was the Superintendent of Post Offices at Calicut for about six or seven years between 1890 and 1897. He was then transferred to Mysore, afterwards to Nellora and finally to Madras and while bo was the Superintendent of the Presidency Division died intestate at Conjeeveram in February 1906. The suit was filed in September 1906. The relations between the first de...
Sennayan Chetty Vs. Sinnappan Servai
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.901; (1910)20MLJ654
1. The only provision in the partition-deed, Exhibit A, as to the devolution of the trusteeship, is that 'after the life-time of the aforesaid Venkataraman Chetti the senior-most member for the time being shall manage the properties endowed.' There is no provision for the renunciation of the trusteeship by Venkataraman Chettiar and for the appointment by him of his successor. It does not appear from Exhibit A that this is a case of hereditary trusteeship.2. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. ...
Chinnasami Naidu Vs. Venkatasami Naidu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1910
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.719
1. The plaintiff sues upon a settlement of account. Looking at Exhibit B we can see no such settlement. It is not, however, signed. We are hot, therefore, prepared to hold that the plaintiff has three years from its date for the institution of the suit. See Amuthu v. Muthayya 16 M. 339. Then it is contended that the account is mutual, open and current. The Judge does not believe Exhibit A to be a correct extract. We are not in a position to say that the Judge is wrong in saying from the nature of the entries that it is not a mutual, open, and current account. The claim as to Rs. 4-1-0 depends on the correctness of Exhibit A which the Judge denies. We must dismiss the second appeal with costs....
Chanthiruthi Veluthakal Madhavi Ammati's Daughter Neelu Amma and Ors. ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1910
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.745
1. The suit note was executed in the name of Kunhi Lakshmi Amma and at the time of her death had not been endorsed to any one. The plaintiffs claim a right to sue on the note on the ground that Lakshmi. Amma is dead and that the money advanced under the note was really the money of the tarwad, and not of Lakshmi Amma. If Lakshmi Amma were alive, she alone could have sued on the note. Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar 30 M. 88 : 1 M.L.T. 377 : 16 M.L.J. 508, and her death cannot give the plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case, a right which they had not in her life-time. The plaintiffs do not sue as representatives, and the Subordinate Judge finds that the proper representative has not been made a party to the suit.2. The second appeal is dismissed with costs....
Karmam Sama Row Alias Venkata Naranappa Vs. Roddam Vencoba Row and ors ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1910
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.745a
Miller, J.1. Nothing more is urged than that the decision is wrong in law and it is said that in other similar cases the Courts have interfered in revision. It does not seem to me that a wrong decision as to limitation or as to the jural relation between parties necessarily involves any material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction. Dr. Swaminathan does not allege that the Court has refused to consider evidence or acted irregularly on insufficient evidence or acted with any irregularity in its procedure....
P.S.S. Muniappa Chettiar Vs. M.K. Balarangaiya Chetti and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.404
Miller, J.1. The acknowledgment is not signed by any one--principal or agent. The point is now raised that the statement at the opening of the letter that the letter proceeds from the 1st defendant is a signature within the rule in Mohesh Lal v. Busunt Kamaree 6 C. 340 : 7 C.L.R. 121. It was not taken below even in the application for review and I do not think I ought to allow it to be raised now. The petition is dismissed with costs....
The King-emperor Vs. Sunku Seethaiah and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1910
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ71
1. We think it is satisfactorily proved in this case that certain hours, which are not attacked as unreasonable, were, to the knowledge of the accused, fixed for public worship its the mosque and notified by the District Magistrate; that the hour between 6 P.M. and 7 P.M. is one of those hours; that the accused passed in procession before the mosque with music between 6 P.M. and 7 P.M. while public religious worship was going on, and that the accused by their action disturbed the worship. The charge against the accused is under Section 296 of the Indian Penal Code. Under that section it is an offence voluntarily to cause disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship. A person is said to cause an effect voluntarily when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew, or had reason to believe, to be likely to cause it (see Section 39, Indian Penal Code). It is not, therefore, n...
The Public Prosecutor Vs. Sunku Seethiah and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad92
1. We think it is satisfactorily proved in this case that certain hours, which are not attacked as unreasonable, were to the knowledge of the accused fixed for public worship in the mosque and notified by the District! Magistrate; that the hour between 6 P.M. and 7 P.M. is one of those hours; that the accused passed in procession before the mosque with music between 6 P.M. and 7 P.M. while public religious worship was going on, and that the accused by their action disturbed the worship. The charge against the accused is under Section 296 of the Indian Penal Code. Under that section it is an offence voluntarily to cause disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship. A person is said to cause an effect voluntarily when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means, which at the time of employing those means, he knew, or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it (see Section 39, Indian Penal Code). It is not therefore necess...
Visalakshi Ayi Vs. Mahalinga Alampiriyan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.800a
1. The property belonged to the undivided family of a father and three sons. An oral disposition by the father is alleged but that, even if true, cannot validate the gift. The eldest brother executed a deed of gift. But that again is not valid without the consent of the other brothers. They were both minors. One of them is now dead and the other, the 2nd defendant, is willing to stand by the transaction. But his consent alone, eves if we can treat his present statements as such, is insufficient.2. We must dismiss the second appeal with costs....
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