Chennai Court February 1910 Judgments
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Asundi Basavva Vs. Bareddi Govindappa and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-11-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad249; 5Ind.Cas.927
1. The plaintiff sued as really entitled on a promissory note executed by the second defendant in the name of the first Ha also asked for relief against the first defendant for not having collected the, money and paid it over. The munsif made a decree against the second defendant only for the suit amount, The Judge reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on appeal by him. The plaintiff preferred no appeal or memorandum of objections nor does it appear that he asked the Judge to make a decree in his favour against the first defendant on the ground that he admitted having received the money. The plaintiff prefers the second appeal and claims a decree against the first defendant. The ruling in Kulaikaia Pillai v. Viswanatha Pillai I.L.R. (1905) Mad. 229 is admittedly against the plaintiff's contention that the Judge should have passed such a decree under the old Code. Rup Jaun Bibee v. Abdul Kadir Bhuyan I.L.R. (1901) Cal. 643, Iswardhari Singh v. Bibisahebzadi I.L.R. (l908) Cla. 538, ...
The Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. M.K. Subba Row of Kurn ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-11-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad436
1. The rule in question is not easy to construe but we have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the Munsif was right.2. It seems to us clear that the words 'full water-rate' in Rule 2 means full water-rate in respect of wet cultivation and not full water-rate in respect of the crop actually raised, wet or dry as the case may be. We are not prepared to say that the same words in Rule 3 should be construed as having a different meaning, It seems to us that 'full' means something different from 'whole.' If it does not, the word is redundant. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that 'full' means without the deduction in the case of 'lift' which gives the cultivator the benefit of the lower scale, If this is the meaning, the cultivator, after the ten years, would have to go on cultivating without being entitled to any deduction for baling which is altogether unreasonable and contrary to the rules with reference to deduction for baling,3. The charge is leviable on the whole b...
Bapanna Venkata Subbarayadu Vs. Bappanna Ratnamma and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-11-1910
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.443
1. Article 125 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act exactly applies to the facts in the present case.2. The language of the article is sufficiently wide to cover the case of an adopted son suing for a declaration in respect of an alienation by the widow who adopted him made before the adoption. As was held in Sreeramulu v Kristamma 26 M. 143, the adopted son in such a case is only entitled to possession after the death or marriage of the widow. The suit is, therefore, clearly barred by limitation.3. The appeal is dismissed with costs....
Thannir Venkatarama Chetti Vs. Mudagutisami Chetti and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-11-1910
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.605
1. We do not think the judgment of the Court below as regards the eaves is open to exception.2. As regards the lane N, we are unable to uphold the view of the Courts below that the plaintiff had an easement of necessity. If the plaintiff could have access to A2 through the house B, he would have no right of way through N as an easement of necessity. See Krishnamaraza v. Marraju 28 M. 495 : 15 M.L.J. 255. But the mortgage deed Exhibit A expressly refers to a right of way through the lane and it might have been acquired by prescription. The 3rd defendant is a transferee of the mortgage right. The reference in Exhibt A to the right of way is evidence against him. It is true that the 3rd defendant is found to be the owner and as such he is entitled to raise the contention that there was no easement of a right of way. The District Judge is requested to find whether the plaintiff has acquired a right of way over the lane N. Fresh evidence may be taken if the Judge thinks fit. The finding sho...
Kurusu Kostha and ors. Vs. Thommai Savarimuthu Fernand Suthaki and ors ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-10-1910
Reported in: (1910)20MLJ367
1. This is a hopeless case. The plaintiffs are certain of the worshippers of St. Jacob's Church. They complain of obstruction by certain constructions made by the defendants who represent the Church of the Holy Ghost on a part of the public road in front of their church. It is said that the result of this new construction will be to obstruct the plaintiffs' view of a curusady--a pillar of brick and mortar with a cross on it--and their procession on the public roadway round the curusady.2. We are unable to see what right the plaintiffs have to represent the church of St: Jacob. We do not see what connection the curusady has with the church of St. Jacob. The view of the curusady is no part of the ritual of the church. It is found that there is no established practice of an individual worshipper crossing himself at the sight of the curusady. Even if there was such a practice, we cannot say he is entitled to the protection of the intervening public roadway being kept clear of all obstructi...
Chakkantavida Chakkan Abdula and anr. Vs. Thazath Chekkootti and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-10-1910
Reported in: (1910)20MLJ368
1. The plaintiff sues upon a lease granted by the 2nd defendant, the senior of two grantees in Putravakasam. It is argued that a lease by the senior member alone is invalid, and reliance is placed upon certain observations of Moore and Sankaran Nair, JJ. in Koroth Amman Kutti v. Perungottil Appu Nambiar I.L.R. (1906) M. 322. They have been considered and explained in the judgment of this Court A. No. 26 of 1905. The learned Judges who decided the case Koroth Amman Kutli v. Perungottil Appu Nambiar I.L.R. (1906) M. 322 are not to be understood as negativing the view that the senior member amongst the grantees has the right of management which a Karnavan would have in respect of the properties obtained by gift. Such a view would run counter to the decision in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee I.L.R. (1890) M. 201. In Koroth Amman Kutti v. Perungottil Appu Nambiar I.L.R. (1906) M. 322 the question under consideration was whether the grantees and their descendants became a new Tarwad in r...
Maddali Venkatarayudu (Deceased) and ors. Vs. Movva Sankarayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-10-1910
Reported in: (1910)20MLJ306
1. The 3rd issue was framed on the assumption that the case was governed by Article 144 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1877. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge proceeded on this view. He accordingly dealt with the case as if the onus was on the defendant. In this we think he was wrong. The article of the I/imitation Act which applies is Article 142 and the plaintiff must show possession and dispossession within twelve years prior to the date of the institution of the suit. See Gopaul Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Nilmoney Mitter I.L.R. (1884) C. 374 Mohima Chunder Mozoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neoghi I.L.R. (1888) C. 473 and Mahammad Amanulla Khan v. Badan Singh I.L.R. (1889) C. 437. We must therefore ask for a finding by the Subordinate Judge on the evidence on record whether the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was in possession and was dispossessed within twelve years prior to the date of the suit. The Subordinate Judge will of course, in determining this question, ...
Josiam Thiruvengada Chariar and anr. Vs. Samia Iyengar Alias Venkatach ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-10-1910
Reported in: (1910)20MLJ760
1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs against the 2nd defendant. The latter having died pending the second appeal, his widow has been brought upon the record. She raises the preliminary objection that the second appeal has abated on the ground that the right to sue did not survive after the death of the original 2nd defendant. The suit was brought for an injunction against the 2nd defendant restraining him from preventing the plaintiffs standing at a particular place in the Srirangam Temple. It is conceded by the appellants' Vakil that he has no right to prosecute the appeal as regards the injunction after the death of the 2nd defendant, but he contends that the Courts below have dismissed his suit with costs, that his estate has lost, and the estate of the 2nd defendant has gained to the extent of the costs awarded, and that he is therefore entitled to continue the second appeal against the 2nd defendant's representative to get rid of the liability imposed upon him by the actio...
Josiam Tiruvengadachariar and anr. Vs. Sawmi Iyengar Alias Venkatachar ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-10-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad76
1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs against the second defendant. The latter having died pending the second appeal, his widow has bean brought upon the record. She raises the preliminary objection that the second appeal has abated on the ground that the right to sue did not survive after the death of the original second defendant. The suit was brought for an injunction against the second defendant restraining him from preventing the plaintiffs standing at a particular place in the Srirangam temple. It is conceded by the appellant's vakil that he has no right to prosecute the appeal as regards the injunction after the death of the second defendant but he contends that the Courts below have dismissed his suit with costs, that his estate has lost and the estate of the second defendant has gainad to the extent of the costs awarded, and that he is therefore entitled to continue the second appeal against the second defendant's representative to get rid of the liability imposed upon ...
Chakkantavida Chakkan Abdulla and anr. Vs. Thazhath Cheekkootti and an ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-10-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad245
1. The plaintiff sues upon a lease granted by the second defendant the senior of two grantees in Putravakasam. It is argued that a lease by the senior member alone is invalid and reliance is placed upon certain observations of MOORE and Sankaran Nair, JJ., in Koroth Amman Kutti v. Perungottil Appu Nambiar I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 322. They have been considered and explained in the judgment of the Court in appeal No. 26 of 1905. The learned Judges who decided the case in Koroth Amman Kutti v. Perungottil Appu Nambiar I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 322 are not to be understood as negativing the view that the senior member amongst the grantees has the right of management which a Karnavan would have, in respect of the properties obtained by gift. If so understood it would run counter to the decision in Kunhaaha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee I.L.R. (1893) Mad. 201. In Koroth Amman Kutti v. Perungottil Appu Nambiar I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 322 the question under consideration was whether the grantees and their descenda...
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