Chennai Court February 1910 Judgments
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Maddu Yerrayya Vs. Yadulla Kangali Naidu and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-18-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad246
1. We are unable to uphold the decision of the District Judge. The plaintiffs are inamdars. They sue to eject the defendant, who and whose predecessors have been in possession for about fifty years. The plaintiffs have given no evidence of a right to eject the defendant which the Judge is inclined to accept. If the plaintiff's inam were in a zamindari they could not be in a batter position as regards the right to eject the defendant than the Zamindar who created the inam. If the inam were situated outside a zamindari and was granted by Government there would be no presumption in their favour that they were entitled to eject. The decision in Achayya v. Hanumantrayudu I.L.R. (1891) Mad. 269 has bean explained as based on the particular facts of that case in Cheskati Zamindar v. Ranasooru Dhora I.L.R. (1900) Mad. 318. As the plaintiffs have failed to prove a right to eject the defendant, we must reverse the District Judge's decree and restore that of the Munsif with costs here and in the ...
Palaniakkal Vs. Ramana Koundan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-18-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.695
1. The Subordinate Judge finds that the two brothers became divided in so far as their money dealings were concerned. He also finds that for 13 years previous to suit the two brothers resided in separate houses and messed separately. The lands were not divided by metes and bounds but they were cultivated jointly, and the produce was equally divided and the kist was also paid in halves. This evidence stands unrebutted. On these facts there can be no doubt that the parties became divided in status. We must, therefore, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff for possession of the property as sued for with mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 125 a year as found by the Munsif for one year before the date of suit and for subsequent mesne profits at the same rate till delivery or 8 years from this date.2. The plaintiff is entitled to costs throughout....
Ramaswami Pillai Vs. Kuppuswami Pillai
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-18-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.901a; (1910)20MLJ656
Miller, J.1. I agree with the decision in Govind Das v. Sarju Das 30 AA. 268 : 5 A.L.J. 274 : 129 A.W.N. (1908), which is in point. Even if the acknowledgment balance due 80 'rupees' implies a promise, it does not seem to me to be the promise required by Section 25 of the Contract Act. There is nothing to show that the debtor recognized that the debt was irrecoverable and still promised to pay it, and the promise to which Section 25 refers seems to me to be a promise to pay despite the consciousness that the debt is barred. The petition is dismissed with costs ...
R.M.A. Swaminatha Pillay Vs. N.A.K. Abdul Gafoor Sahib
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-17-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.810a
1. This was a suit upon a foreign judgment and not on the original cause of action. At the settlement of issues the claim on the foreign judgment was apparently abandoned. The suit should in consequence have been dismissed. But the Munsif framed issues treating the suit as on the original cause of action. The claim on the merits has now been negatived by both the Courts. In second appeal, Mr. Richmond argues that the cause of action based on the foreign judgment has not been tried. This apparently was not even argued before the District Judge.2. We do not think he should be allowed to raise it now. Bat we have looked at the judgment of the foreign. Court to see whether the plaintiff had a good claim upon it. The defendant is described in that case as a resident of British India and the suit was disposed of ex parte. It is clear law that a foreign judgment so obtained cannot bind the defendant. No other point has been argued3. We dismiss the second appeal with costs....
In Re: Seperumal Udayan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-17-1910
Reported in: 5Ind.Cas.928
ORDERMiller, J.1. I think I must ask the 1st Class Magistrate to re-hoar this appeal. A large number of grounds of appeal are entered in the petition of appeal to him, and probably many of them were not presented; but some of them must have been presented. The Magistrate has dealt with the prosecution evidence in a very general and summary way and has not even alluded to the evidence for the defence or the nature of the defence; and I infer that he has not given the evidence the consideration which he was bound to give it. Without going so far as to say with the learned Judges in Jamait Mullick v. Emperor 35 C. 138 : 12 C.W.N. 134 : 6 Cri. L.J. 427 that the judgment of the appellate Court should stand by itself, or that it should be unnecessary to refer to the judgment of the 1st Court, it is clear that if the appellate Magistrate gives a judgment which makes it appear probable that he has not fully heard and considered the appeal, his disposal of the appeal ought not to be allowed to ...
Venkatachelapathi Chettiar Vs. Periyasami Udayan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-17-1910
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.681a
Miller, J.1. The ruling in Chandramathi Ammal v. Narayanasami Iyer 19 M.L.J. 760 : 5 Ind. Cas. 23 hinds me to hold that the disposal of the suit must be referred to Section 157 of the Code of 1882. The plaintiff, therefore, was right in proceeding by way of application for restoration. The Subordinate Judge does not say that he disbelieved the plaintiff's explanation and it was not suggested to me that if that explanation is true, the cause shown was not sufficient. What is argued is that the Vakil's absence is not satisfactorily explained. It seems to me that if the plaintiff has shown sufficient reason for his own absence, he is at any rate, if his presence is necessary as in this case, entitled to ask for the order of restoration even if his Vakil was in default. 1 set aside the order refusing restoration and direct the restoration of the suit to the file and its disposal according to law.2. Costs will abide the event....
The Secretary of State for India in Council, Represented by the Collec ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-17-1910
Reported in: 7Ind.Cas.226
Arnold White, C.J.1. This is an appeal from a decree of the District Judge in favour of the plaintiffs in an action for damages for breach of contract. The contract in question was a contract between the plaintiffs and the Government for the sale by Government to the plaintiffs of firewood. The 2nd issue in the case was 'whether the delivery of wood by the defendant under the agreement referred to in the plaint was to be by volume or by weight ?' The third issue was whether the defendant failed to supply the full quantity of wood as per the said agreement ?' The 4th issue was whether the defendant is answerable for the shortfall, if any, by weight ?' At the hearing of the suit before the District Judge, the District Judge stated that the point for decision was whether the defendant warranted the weight of the wood,' and held that there was a warranty as to the weight of the wood purchased by the plaintiffs. It has been contended before us that there was a contract of warranty with refe...
Kandasami Asari Vs. Somaskanta Ela Nidhi Limited, Through Its Secretar ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-16-1910
Reported in: (1910)20MLJ371
1. Ramasami Asari and the 8th defendant were brothers and members of an undivided Hindu family. Ramasami mortgaged the suit properties (which must now be taken 011 the findings of the Courts below to have belonged to the joint family) to the plaintiff Nidhi. It is found by the Munsif, and that finding was apparently not disputed in appeal, that the mortgage was not for a family purpose. The facts set out in paragraph 14 of the Munsif's judgment make it abundantly clear that there was no justifiable family necessity for the alienation. The Munsif, however, found that the transaction was ratified by the 8th defendant and this conclusion has been accepted by the District Judge. It is argued on appeal that there could be no ratification of a transaction which was never entered into on behalf of the 8th defendant. This argument must be accepted as sound if Ramasami's alienation is rested on the footing of a contractual agency The manager of a joint Hindu family exercising the powers of a ma...
Ponnammal Vs. Kalithitha Mudali
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-16-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad115
1. Ayilandammal, widow of Arunachala Asari, owned three houses which may be called Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and a well. She mortgaged Nos. 1 and 2 and the well with possession to the plaintiff. The mortgage was renewed by her adopted son Ratna Asari. Subsequently house No. 3 and a half of the well were given to the first defendant by Ayilandammal. The plaintiff instituted Original Suit No. 18 of 1898 for recovery of certain rooms which he alleged formed part of No. 2 against the first defendant and the tenant in occupation and for an injunction against the latter restraining him from using the well. He obtained a decree as prayed for. The first defendant appealed but the appeal was dismissed. Ratna Asari instituted a suit against the first defendant for recovery of the house No. 3 and the half of the well given to her by Ayilandammal. This suit was ultimately dismissed by the High Court on appeal. Ratna Asari then conveyed all his rights in houses Nos. 1 and 2 and the entire well to the plainti...
Pichu Aiyar and anr. and Ramakrishna Iyer and ors. Vs. A.L.R.M.N. Pala ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-16-1910
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.291
1. That Narayana Iyer had no saleable interest at the time of the Court sale to the plaintiff is, we think, clear, for Narayana Iyer could not compel his vendees to pay him anything, they being entitled to apply the purchase-money to the discharge of the outstanding mortgage. We also find that the suit is not barred by limitation, for it is brought within three years of the judgment Exhibit A, by which it was found that consideration had failed. As to the question whether the plaintiff can recover money which has, been rateably distributed under Section 295, Civil Procedure Code, the words of Section 315, Civil Procedure Code, are wide enough to entitle him to do so and Krishna Pal v. Muhammad Safdar Alikhan 13 A. 383 supports this view. There remains the question of notice. The Subordinate Judge finds that the plaintiff had no direct notice. It is contended, however, that the plaintiff had constructive notice because his agent was aware of the mortgage. The Subordinate Judge does not ...
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