Chennai Court November 1910 Judgments
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Krishnasami Chettiar Vs. Thippa Ramasami Chettiar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-04-1910
Reported in: (1912)ILR35Mad44
1. The only question argued in this case relates to mesne profits and costs. The suit is one for redemption of a mortgage. Before the suit the plaintiff paid the mortgage money into Court under Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act. Notice was issued to the mortgagee and he refused to take the money. Upon the pleadings we must assume, with the District Judge, that the plaintiff thereupon withdrew the deposit. The question is whether interest ceases from the date of deposit. We must answer the question in the negative. Under Section 84 of the Act interest ceases when the mortgagor 'has done all that has to be done by him to enable the mortgagee to take such amount out of Court.' Neither Section 83 nor Section 84 state expressly what are all the things that the mortgagor has to do. It is enough if he pays the proper amount into Court and causes a notice to issue to be served upon the mortgagee? There is nothing more that he has got to do under Section 83. Can he then withdraw the mo...
Narayana Chetty and anr. Vs. Muthiah Servai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-03-1910
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ44
1. We answer the question referred in the negative. It is immaterial whether possession has passed or not in accordance with the agreement. It is clear that the decision of the Full Bench in Raja of Venkatagiri v. Narayana Reddi I.L.R. (1884) M. 456 does not cover the point. As is explained in the order of reference what was held in Raja of Venkatagiri v. Narayana Reddi I.L.R. (1884) M. 456, was that a Kabuliat signed by the lessee but inadmissible to prove the lease for want of registration was admissible to prove the karar or the agreement to lease which preceded it. The decision in Konduru Srinivasa Charyulu v. Gottumukkala Venkataraju (1907) 17 M.L.J. 218 would seem to have proceeded upon a misapprehension of the Full Bench case. The learned Judges who decided it assumed that the Full Bench case was a suit for damages for the breach of an agreement in writing to let which was unregistered though compulsorily registrable. They held, and in our opinion rightly, that there was no dist...
Syed Ajam Sahib Vs. Madura Sree Meenatchi Sundareswarar Devastanam, Th ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-03-1910
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ202
Charles Arnold White, Kt., C.J.1. The first question which has been referred to us is whether the registered instrument referred to in Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act must be signed by the lessor. Section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a transfer of property may be made without writing in every case in which a writing is not expressly required by law. Section 107 provides that a lease to which the section applies can be made only by a registered instrument. This, I take it, is an express provision that lease to which the section applies must be in writing. Section 105 defines a lease of immoveable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property. I do not think that Section 107 can be relied on as enacting, either expressly or by implication, that a lease must be executed by the lessor. Can Section 105 be relied on for this purpose? I think not. By Section 105 a lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy property. I do not think, for the purposes of th...
Narayanan Chetty and anr. Vs. Muthiah Servai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-03-1910
Reported in: (1912)ILR35Mad63
1. Opinion.--We answer the question referred in the negative. It is immaterial whether possession has passed or not in accordance with the agreement. It is clear that the decision of the Full Bench in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Narayana Reddi I.L.R. (1894) Mad. 456 does not cover the point. As is explained in the order of reference what was held in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Naraycma Reddi I.L.R. (1894) Mad. 456 was that a kabuliat signed by the lessee but inadmissible to prove the lease for want of registration was admissible to prove the karar or the agreement to lease which preceded it. The decision in Konduri Srinivasa Charyulu v. Gotteemukkala Venkatardju (1907) 17 Mad. 218 would seem to have proceeded upon a misapprehension of the Full Banch case. The learned Judges who decided it assumed that the Full Bench case was a suit for damages for the breach of an agreement in writing to let which was unregistered though compulsorily, registrable. They held and in our opinion rightly that ther...
In Re: Kannusawmi Pillai
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-02-1910
Reported in: 9Ind.Cas.79
1. It is said the plaintiff is the indorsee of a negotiable promissory-note. The note is not produced before me and I am not in a position to say that this statement is correct. Assuming, however, that the promissory-note is a negotiable instrument, two questions were raised before the Subordinate Judge (1) whether there was consideration for the note and (2) whether there was consideration for the transfer? The consideration for the note apparently pleaded was that there was a cash payment. The parties went into evidence and the Subordinate Judge has discredited the plaintiff's case of consideration for the note in the only form in which he set it up. On the second, question, also the Subordinate Judge finds that there was no consideration for the indorsement. The plaintiff, therefore, is not a holder in due course. These findings of the Subordinate Judge cannot be attacked in revision. There is no point of law raised in respect of these findings except that it is averred that as the ...
In Re: a Vakil of the High Court
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-01-1910
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ76
1. In this case a vakil of the High Court presented a petition to the Sessions Judge on the day after the summing up to the assessors and before judgment had been delivered, in which he alleged, in paragraph 4, that the judge, before the arguments in the case were over, came to the court with a draft judgment, and added, in paragraph 5 : 'Not only that, but the draft judgment was the judgment for conviction.' These allegations were quite unfounded and there was no justification for making them. This has not been seriously contested by Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar. We think that in making unfounded allegations of this kind which involve a reflection on the conduct of the judge in the exercise of his office and in seeking to put them on record the vakil was guilty of professional misconduct for which he must be reprimanded and ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings....
William Dare Vs. Mrs. Bella Dona Igdaliah Dare and George Wheeler
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-01-1910
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ528
Charles Arnold White, Kt., C.J.1. In this case the petitioner (the husband) obtained in the District Court a decree against the respondent for dissolution of marriage under Section 14 of the Indian Divorce Act and for damages and costs against the co-respondent. On the decree coining before this Court for confirmation under Section 17 of the Act he asked that the petition might be withdrawn and the decree of the District Court rescinded. Affidavits were put in by the petitioner and the respondent in which they stated that since the decree they had become reconciled and were living together as husband and wife. The question is can we do anything more than refuse to confirm the decree or ca n we rescind it?2. The question now raised before us came before the Allahabad High Court in Culley v. Culley I. L. R. (1888) All. 559. In that case, on the decree coming before the High Court for confirmation, the petitioner and the respondent put in a petition expressing their intention of living to...
Subramania Pillai and anr. Vs. the Secretary of State for India in Cou ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-01-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad353
1. The plaintiffs in the suit out of which these appeals arise are the trustees of the Kuthalanathaswami temple of Courfeallam, the defendant being the Secretary of State for India. The plaintiffs sue to establish their title to about three acres of land lying immediately to the south of what are admittedly the temple premises, demarcated as S. No. 482 of Courtallam village. The land sued for is valueless for cultivation purposes, but its importance lies in the fact that it contains the famous Courtallam waterfall and bathing pool, and sundry mantapams and sacred sites adjacent thereto. The plaintiffs claim the site in virtue of immemorial possession as part of the temple precincts and also by adverse possession for more than the statutory period. The defendant denies that' there has been any exclusive or adverse possession of any portion of the disputed site on the part of the plaintiffs, and further pleads that by virtue of its inclusion in block No. Ill of the Tenkasi reserved fores...
William Dare Vs. Belle Donna Igdaliot Dare and George Wheeler
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-01-1910
Reported in: (1911)ILR34Mad339
Arnold White, C.J.1. In this case the petitioner (the husband) obtained in a District Court a decree against the respondent for dissolution of marriage under Section 14 of the Indian Divorce Act and for damages and costs against the co-respondent. On the decree coming before this Court for confirmation under Section 17 of the Act he asked that the petition might be withdrawn and the decree of the District Court rescinded. Affidavits were put in by the petitioner and the respondent in which they stated that since the decree they had become reconciled and were living together as husband and wife. The question is, can we do anything more than refuse to confirm the decree or can we rescind it?2. The question now raised before us came before the Allahabad High Court in Culley v. Culley I.L.R. (1888) All. 559. In that case on the decree coming before the High Court for confirmation the petitioner and the respondent put in a petition expressing their intention of living together as man and wi...
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