Chennai Court December 1909 Judgments
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K. Gopalasamy Chettiar Vs. Ramier and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-09-1909
Reported in: 5Ind.Cas.817
1. The District Judge was right in disallowing interest prior to the suit, Subramania Iyer v. Subramania Aiyar 31 M. k 25 but we do not think that he was right in disallowing it from the date of the suit. In modification of the decree of the Court below, we allow interest at 6 per cent, from that date. Each party will give and receive proportionate costs in this and the lower appellate Court....
Boppana Venkayya and anr. Vs. Boppana Paparayudu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-09-1909
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.600a
1. The only point argued is that the appellants have acquired a right by prescription by the fact that the branches in dispute have been in existence for more than 12 years. The appellants rely on the case of Ratnavelu Mudaliar v. Kolendavelu Pillai 29 M.K 511 : 16 M.L.J. 281, but that is not on all fours with this case. In it the right was in respect of a cornice. Here it is claimed in respect of the branches of a tree. Such a claim has been held to be inadmissible in Hari Krishna Joshiv. Sankar Vithal 16 B.K 420, and we think rightly so. We dismiss the second appeal with costs....
Sri Perarulala Ramanuja Jeer Swami Vs. the Secretary of State for Indi ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-09-1909
Reported in: 6Ind.Cas.601
Miller, J.1. In my opinion the suit is not barred by any provision of the Madras Forest Act. The forest in question was reserved under Section 25 of that Act as one which had been reserved by order of Government previous to the day on which the Act came into force.2. Before the Act came into force the forests were visited by a committee who took evidence on claims to various rights within the area which it was proposed to reserve and reported their opinion upon them to the Board of Revenue and the Government. Atthis enquiry claims were made on behalf of the institution now represented by the present plaintiff--a claim of a right to cut firewood free within the whole Tirukarangudi forest and a claim of a right to the free enjoyment for temple purposes of the forest at Nambikovil and for two miles westward. That is not the present claim there was no claim before the committee of any right of ownership in the forest itself (this is clear from the report) and consequently no enquiry into a...
Rosi Alias Hegi and anr. Vs. Yadala Pillamma and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-08-1909
Reported in: (1910)20MLJ400
1. The plaintiff was examined-in-chief. The cross-examination was not finished when the case was adjourned and he fell sick and became unable to appear again for cross-examination. There was an application for the issue of a commission to cross-examine him; but no commission was issued and the plaintiff died before the next hearing. There is no other evidence on record on the plaintiff's side to prove the pro-note sued on, except this incomplete examination of the plaintiff. It is contended before us that such evidence is wholly inadmissible and that the plaintiff's suit must, therefore, be dismissed. Without going so far as to hold that it is altogether inadmissible for any purpose, because the cross-examination was not completed (as to which see Wigmore's Evidence, Vol. II, p. 1742) we think it clear that the principle underlying Section 33 of the Evidence Act points to the conclusion that such evidence ought not ordinarily to be acted upon--J. Boisagomoff v. The Nahapiet Jute Co. Lt...
Annayyan Vs. Chinnan Alias Muni Venkata Chetti and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-08-1909
Reported in: (1910)20MLJ355
1. We think that the decree of the District Judge is right.2. The facts necessary for the purposes of this appeal may be thus stated:The relationship of the principal parties is as follows:--_______________|________________| |Venkatagiri Pillanan (died 1883)|Venkatasamy (who| sold to 3rd defendant.)Timaraya --Kept Sanjivammal|1st defendant (who soldto plaintiff).3. The lands in dispute originally belonged to Pillanan who died in 1883. His brother, Venkatagiri, unlawfully took possession of them in 1884, and on his death possession passed to his son, Timaraya, who died in 1896, and the land then passed into the possession of the 1st defendant who was the illegitimate son of Timaraya by his kept woman, Sanjivammal. The possession by the 1st defendant and his father and grandfather was adverse to Yenkatasamy from 1884 onwards. That possession was held through a tenant, the 2nd defendant, who was the actual occupant of the land. On the 29th September 1900, Venkatasamy sold his interest in ...
Adapala Adivaramma Vs. Rabala Ramachandra Reddy
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-08-1909
Reported in: (1910)21MLJ85
Wallis, J.1. This is an action for damages. The plaintiff was appointed guardian of the person, and the defendant guardian of the property, of the minor. Subsequently on the plaintiff's application the defendant was removed from the guardianship of the property. He then preferred an appeal to this Court and applied for stay of execution and filed an affidavit in support of that application. In answer to that affidavit, the plaintiff died a counter-affidavit and in answer to the counter-affidavit the defendant filed a reply affidavit in which he made statements reflecting on the character of the plaintiff which, unless privileged, were undoubtedly defamatory, and which, for the purpose of this judgment, must be taken to have been made both falsely and maliciously. Even so, I am of opinion that no civil action will lie. It is laid down by the Privy Council in Ganesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdry (1872) 11 B.L.R. 321 that 'witnesses cannot be sued in a civil court for damages, in respec...
Balasubramania Nadar Vs. Sivaguru Asari and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-08-1909
Reported in: (1911)21MLJ562
Charles Arnold White, Kt., C.J.1. The facts necessary for determining the question which has been argued in this appeal may be put quite shortly thus : In February 1873 there was a mortgage of a house by the Plaintiff's vendor to the 1st defendant's predecessor in title (Exhibit I). In June of the same year there was a transaction (Exhibit II) between the same parties under which a further advance was made by the 1st defendant's predecessor in title. In 1889 there was a sub-mortgage by the 1st defendant's predecessor to the and defendant's predecessor in title. In 1904, the plaintiff purchased the equity of redemption. With regard to Exhibit II the Munsif held that the instrument was a mortgage and decided in favour of the 2nd defendant. The lower appellate court took the view that it was neither a charge nor a mortgage and accordingly decided against the 2nd defendant's contention that he was entitled to be redeemed in the plaintiff's suit.2. Before passing to the question of the lega...
A. Ramanathan Chettyar Vs. P.S. Anathanarayana Iyer and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-08-1909
Reported in: 5Ind.Cas.291
1. A preliminary objection is taken that the order of the District Judge under Section 18, Act XX of 1863, is not open to revision under Section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code and reliance is placed on the case of Venkateswara, In re 10 M. 98. The petitioner's Vakil contends that the District Judge acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code in that he did not give his decision on a bare perusal of the application for leave to sue, but made some enquiry and received an affidavit from the Manager in reply to the allegations in the petition. No authority in support of this view is cited and we think that it is unreasonable. Section 18 would afford no protection against improper suits if the Court would refuse leave only if the facts alleged in the petition did not disclose any cause of action, for any plaint which disclosed no cause of action would be rejected under the General Law of Procedure independently of the sp...
Sangamma Naicker Vs. Ramasawmy Naicker
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-08-1909
Reported in: 5Ind.Cas.478
Arnold White, C.J.1. In this case I think the Subordinate Judge was wrong in his conclusion. With regard to the question of limitation, the ground of his decision, so far as I understand it, was that, inasmuch as in the earlier suit of 1901 the plaintiff set up a case that the mortgage was bad, the defendant was able to prescribe for title by adverse possession from the date of mortgage, that is, the 22nd June 1892, to the extent of the mortgage interest. 2. Then, as regards the other point which was argued before us, namely, Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 operating as a bar to this suit by reason of the earlier suit of 1901 having been brought, in which the plaintiff set up the case of the mortgage being bad, the question is settled, so far, at any rate as this Presidency is concerned, by long series of authorities. I may refer to the cases of Ramasawmy Iyer v. Vythinatha Iyer 26 M.k 760, Veerana Pillai v. Muthukumara Asary 27 M.k 102, Parangadan Nair v. Peruntoduka Il...
Rosi Alias Hagi and anr. Vs. Yadala Pillamma and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-08-1909
Reported in: 5Ind.Cas.512
1. The plaintiff was examined-in-chief. The cross-examination was not finished when the case was adjourned' and he fell sick and became unable to appear again for cross-examination. There was an application for the issue of a commission to cross-examine him; but no commission was issued and the plaintiff died before the next hearing. There is no other evidence on record on the plaintiff's side to prove the pro-note sued on, except this incomplete examination of plaintiff. It is contended before us that such evidence is wholly inadmissible and that the plaintiff's suit must, there-fore, be dismissed. Without going so far as to hold that it is altogether inadmissible for any purpose, because the cross-examination was not completed (as to which see Wigmore's Evidence, Vol. II p. 1742), we think it clear that the principle underlying Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act points to the conclusion that such evidence ought not ordinarily to be acted upon J. Boisagomoff v. The Nahapict Jute Co...
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