Chennai Court December 1908 Judgments
Emperor Vs. Chota Singh
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-22-1908
Reported in: 3Ind.Cas.885
1. One Chota Singh was tried by a Presidency Magistrate for an offence under Section 52 of the Prisons Act IX of 1894 and was acquitted. Against the acquittal the present appeal has been filed by Government. Objection is taken on behalf of Chota Singh that the Presidency Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offence.2. Under Section 52 of the Prisons Act, prisoners guilty of certain offences may be forwarded by the Superintendent to the Court of the District Magistrate or of any Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. No specific mention of Presidency Magistrates is made, and the question is whether either of the terms District Magistrates' or Magistrate of the first class' includes a Presidency Magistrate for the purpose of the Prisons Act. The terms Magistrate, 'District Magistrate,' and 'Magistrate of the first class' are not defined in the Prisons Act, and in the General Clauses Act the only one of these three terms defined is Magistrate, 'which is said to include al...
Tag this Judgment!Abdul Khadar and ors. Vs. N.P.R.M.L.C.J. Chidambaram Chettyar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-22-1908
Reported in: 3Ind.Cas.876
1. Assuming the facts of the case to be as found by the Subordinate Judge of Tinnevelly, the Question raised for pur decision in this appeal is whether the defendants Nos. 3 to 6 in the action have been rightly held to be liable on the promissory note for Rs. 5,000(Exhibit A) executed in favour of the plaintiff by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on the 17th May 1902 under the following circumstances. Defendants Nos. 3 to 6 who were minors not only at the time when the money sought to be recovered was advanced by the plaintiff but also at the date of the institution of the suit, are the children of one Mowl Ally Tharagan, a Muhammadan, and the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are Mowl Ally's brothers. The three brothers lived together and traded jointly until 1896 when Mowl Ally died. The first defendant, t who, soon after Mowl Ally's death, married his widow, the mother of defendants Nos. 3 to 6 earned on the old business jointly, with the second defendant on behalf, not only of themselves but of t...
Tag this Judgment!AmIn Miran Sahib and ors. Vs. Medan HussaIn Sahib
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-22-1908
Reported in: 4Ind.Cas.1118
1. If the suit for which sanction has been granted was a suit under Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act there would be no ground for interference under Section 622, C.P.C. But it is clear from the application for sanction that the suit for which sanction is sought is not the suit against the defendants as trustees, managers, or superintendents of the mosque or as members of Committee. It is only such suits that are contemplated by Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act and it is not shown that the Act makes any other provision for the bringing of suits. It is for the institution of suits referred to in Section 14 that sanction is required under Section 18. The District Judge has, therefore, no jurisdiction to grant sanction in the present case and the sanction is set aside with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Muthuveeru Mudaliar Vs. Vythilinga Mudaliar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-18-1908
Reported in: 3Ind.Cas.476
Arnold White, C.J.1. Assuming Exhibit I to be a genuine document and the recitals in the instrument to be true, I do not think that the effect of the transaction first recited, namely, an agreement between the brothers of the deceased and his widow that the former should take the whole of his share of the property,' operated as an effective conveyance to the brothers of the widow's limited estate by inheritance. The recital itself .states that the agreement was conditional on the debts of the deceased being paid by the brothers, and the second recital (the conveyance by one ! brother ' to the other of the whole of the deceased's share of the property, on condition! that the brother to whom the Conveyance is a recited to have been made should pay the debts of the deceased) states that the debts had not been paid by the two brothers. There is no statement in the deed that the debts have been paid by the brother to whom the last mentioned conveyance is recited to have been made. The third...
Tag this Judgment!Mullath Tarwed Karnavan and Manager Katungi Velloti and ors. Vs. Mulla ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-18-1908
Reported in: 4Ind.Cas.1128
1. In our opinion the Subordinate Judge finds that Exhibit I under which the appellants claim their Anubhavam right is a forged document. He does not say that he deems himself bound by the decision of this Court on that point, but as we understand his judgment, he accepts the reasons of the learned Judges in that suit, and concurring with them pronounces Exhibit I and Exhibit II which depends on it to be unreliable. His judgment might have been better expressed but we have no doubt that that is what he meant.2. The appellants thus have not proved an Anubhavam tenure under the Zamorin and they have for a long series of years paid rent to the Para Nambi. From this it may be inferred, as the Subordinate Judge infers, that they were tenants under the stani and it cannot be presumed that they held on a permanent tenure, because a stani cannot be presumed to have attempted to create a tenure which he ordinarily would have no power to create. The transactions between the Stani Rama Nambi and ...
Tag this Judgment!Balakrishna Aiyar and ors. Vs. Muthusawmy Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-16-1908
Reported in: 3Ind.Cas.878
1. Appeal No. 6 is an appeal by the defendants against a decree in a partition suit with reference to certain sums of money which the Subordinate Judge held were payable by the defendants to the plaintiff under the decree. Appeal No. 23 is an appeal by the plaintiff against the same decree. In Appeal No. 2i the plaintiff raised the general question whether he was entitled to an account as incidental to his suit for partition. In his plaint he asked for an account as from October 1884, the date when the first defendant became the managing member of the family. An issue was taken as to whether the first defendant as managing member was liable to render accounts to the plaintiff for any and what period. The Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff had not made out a case to be entitled to call upon the first defendant to render an account of past transactions. The plaintiff appealed against this finding. There is considerable conflict of authority on the question whether a member of an u...
Tag this Judgment!K.S. Srinivasa Pillay and anr. Vs. Vasudeva Mudaliar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-16-1908
Reported in: 4Ind.Cas.501
1. On the 13th March 1905 this Court gave judgment for the plaintiff for the amount due under the mortgage on which the suit was brought, on the footing that the period of limitation applicable was sixty years under Article 147 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act of 1877.2. This view was in accordance with a series of previous decisions as to the scope of Articles 147 and 132.3. On appeal, however, by the defendant to the Privy Council, their Lordships declared that, on the true construction of the Limitation Act, the article applicable was No. 132, and they remitted the case to this Court to be disposed of in accordance with this declaration Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai 30 M. 426; 17 M.L.J. 444; 11 C.W.N. 1005; 4 A.L.J. 625; 6 C.L.J. 255; 2 M.L.T. 333; 9 Bom. L.R. 1104.4. If nothing further had occurred it would now be necessary for us to re-open the appeal on the footing that the twelve years' rule of limitation in Article 132 was primarily applicable, and we should...
Tag this Judgment!Mooriyat Putikayil Kuntimina and ors. Vs. Mooriyat Patikayil Kuntambi ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-16-1908
Reported in: 1Ind.Cas.195
1. The gift by Mammi (Ex. A) under which items 1 to 4 were held by Biyathumma, is a gift to his wife and his three surviving daughters to be enjoyed by them and their female descendants hereditarily, males being excluded.2. It was not contended on either side that the condition of enjoyment can stand so far as it excludes males altogether, and the gift must, therefore, be taken as a gift without that condition to Kunhi Pathumma and her three daughters.3. Biyathumma having survived her mother and sisters, the question now is, whether she had a right to give the property to her own descendants or whether the plaintiffs who are descendants of one of her sisters, Uppennu, have joint rights in it and the gift is consequently bad and must be set aside.4. It is contended, on the one hand, that the property became the absolute property of Biyathumma, as the survivor of the four donees, or if the donees held as tenants-incommon, the gift cannot be set aside, because Biyathumma was competent to ...
Tag this Judgment!Rajaruthna Kavundan Vs. Doraisami Kavundan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-16-1908
Reported in: 4Ind.Cas.1134
1. The application of the 2nd February 1904 was returned for amendment and return in 7 days. On the 4th March, the application was re-submitted after correction. The question is whether the re-submission amounts to an application to the Court to take a step-in-aid of execution under Article 179(4) of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act. We are clear that it does not. All that the applicant did on the 4th March, was to comply with an order of the Court. This is very different from making an application to the Court to do something towards the execution of the decree. The application is dismissed with costs....
Tag this Judgment!K. Raghavalu Chetty Vs. Adinarayana Chetty and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-16-1908
Reported in: 2Ind.Cas.616a
1. The District Judge has misunderstood the cases quoted by him. In the case of Yaramati Krishnayya v. Chundru Papayya 20 M.k 326 it is pointed out that 'a defendant is allowed to show the turpitude of both himself and the plaintiff in order to protect himself against an action by the plaintiff to give effect to a contract or deed entered into for an illegal or immoral purpose, Here an exception is allowed not for the sake of the Wrong-doer, but on grounds of public policy, since the Court ought not to assist a plaintiff to recover property or enforce a contract in respect of which he has no true title or right. The rule of public policy cannot be applied without allowing the defendant to benefit by it. But the benefit is allowed him by accident as it were and not in order to secure him any right to which he is entitled. Holman v. Johnson Cowper 343 per Lord Manfield and Luckmidos Khimji v. Mulji Canji 5 B.k 295. In the present case too, the 6th defendant does not set up his own fraud ...
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