Chennai Court November 1904 Judgments
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Kulaikada Pillai and anr. Vs. Viswanatha Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-28-1904
Reported in: (1905)15MLJ212
Charles Arnold White, C.J.1. This is a suit in which the plaintiff claims to recover certain property from the defendants on the ground of an alleged sale to him by the third defendant, or, in the event of sale being found invalid for the return by the third defendant of the purchase money paid to him by the plaintiff. The District Munsif held on the ground of linitation that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the property, dismissed the claim for possession and gave judgment for She plaintiff against the third defendant for the recovery of the purchase money. The third defendant appealed. The plaintiff did not appeal against the dismissal of his suit for possession against defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The Subordinate Judge set aside the Munsifs decree for the recovery of the purchase money and gave a decree for the plaintiff on his claim for possession against defendants Nos. 1and 2. The third defendant made the plaintiff a respondent to the appeal to the Lower Appellate Court. The...
Singarappa and ors. Vs. Sanjivappa
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-16-1904
Reported in: (1905)15MLJ228
1. The plaintiff on the 1st June 1895, executed a sham sale-deed in favour of his illegitimate sons, the defendants, neither party intending that it should be acted upon.2. Possession of the property sold remained with the plaintiff. The defendants sometime about February 1899 began to set up a claim to ownership on the strength of the deed. On the 3rd August, 1900 the plaintiff brought this suit for the cancellation of the deed of sale.3. The question for decision is whether the suit is barred by Article 91 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1877. That article provides that such a suit must be brought within three years from the time when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to him. The facts which would entitle a person to bring such a suit are stated in Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877) which provides that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable who has reasonable appreh...
In Re: K. Rangan and Forty ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1904
Reported in: (1913)ILR36Mad96
ORDER1. It is urged by counsel for the petitioners that some of the persons who have been required to give security for good behaviour reside outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate who took action under Section 110, Criminal Procedure Code, and our attention is drawn to the case of Ketaboi v. Queen-Empress I.L.R. (1900) 27 Calc., 993.2. In that case it was held that, according to the true construction of Section 110, the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to deal with the case, unless the person proceeded against was 'residing' within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate.3. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we are not prepared to follow their decision. The words of the section are 'wherever... a Magistrate... receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction... is by habit a robber' and so forth, he may proceed under the section. Had the legislature intended to restrict the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to persons r...
In Re: Kora Rangan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-14-1904
Reported in: 17Ind.Cas.413; (1912)23MLJ535
ORDER1. It is urged by Counsel for the petitioners that some of the persons, who have been required to give security for good behaviour, reside outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate who took action under Section 110, Criminal Procedure Code, and our attention is drawn to the case of Ketaboi v. Queen-Empress 27 C. 993.2. In that case, it was held that, according to the true construction of section. 110, the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to deal with the case unless the person proceeded against was 'residing within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate'.3. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we are not prepared to follow their decision. The words of the section are--Whenever...a Magistrate receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction...is by habit a robber' and so forth, he may proceed under the section. Had the Legislature intended to restrict the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to persons residing within the l...
M.S. Gopalasami Chettiar Vs. Robert Fischer
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-11-1904
Reported in: (1905)15MLJ14
1. This is one of a large batch of suits in which the Mittadar of Salem sued his tenants to enforce acceptance of puttahs in which he had entered a charge on account of fruit trees grown on their puttah lands, in addition to the acreage rent fixed on the lands at the time of the permanent settlement.2. The Mittadar claims that, by the custom of the Mittah, he is entitled to make a charge for every fruit tree coming into bearing as well as for every palmyra tree, whose leaves are useful for thatching, growing on the puttah land of a tenant,as soon as the tree comes into bearing, or yields useful leaves as the case may be. This charge by the same custom takes the form of a tax on each tree in addition to the rent on the field where the trees are scattered, and where the trees form a clump or tope, of an addition to the land assessment of the field of an amount equal to itself. The charge is made in all circumstances, whether the ryot raises the trees by irrigation from sources constructe...
Venkatarama Iyer and ors. Vs. Duraisami Iyer
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-01-1904
Reported in: (1905)15MLJ377
1. We think the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the share of the first defendant mentioned in paragraph 8 of the decree of the appellate Court meant the share of the first defendant as represented in the partition (including the shares in that shares of his sons). We are of opinion that it means only the share personal to the first defendant and does not include the shares of his sons, that is it meant only 1/5th of 1/3|rd of the whole property. Otherwise, it would be impossible to give effect to the direction of the High Court in their judgment in Appeal Suit No. 208 of 1889 that no order should be passed in respect of the appellants (that is defendants Nos. 2 to 5) except that they should bear their own costs. We, however, agree with the Subordinate Judge that there was no actual reversal of the Subordinate Judge's original decree by the High Court. The High Court in fact only modified the decree given for the plaintiff. That being so, there is no reason why the attachmen...
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