Chennai Court March 1902 Judgments
Sreeramulu Vs. Kristamma and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1902
Reported in: (1902)12MLJ197
Bhashyam Aiyangar, J.1. It is found that the plaintiff was adopted in 1887 by the 1st defendant in pursuance of authority given to her by her husband who died prior to 1878. The lands mentioned in the plaint were sold in March 1879, during the minority of the 1st defendant, by her guardian and father, to the 8th defendant. This suit was instituted in 1895 (September), more than three years after plaintiff had attained his age of majority, to eject the 8th defendant and those claiming under him and recover possession of the lands on the ground that the alienation thereof was not made for purposes which will bind the inheritance in the hands of the reversionary heirs of the 1st defendant's husband. The District Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit as barred by limitation, either under article 142 or 144 on the ground that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of the alienation, i.e., 1879, and not from the date of the plaintiff's adoption, 1887, and that within the de...
Tag this Judgment!Periasami and ors. Vs. Krishnaiyan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1902
Reported in: (1902)12MLJ166
Charles Arnold White, C.J.1. The question which has been referred to the Full Bench is as follows: 'When there are two or more joint-decree-holders, and the execution of the decree is barred by limitation as against one or more of them whether one who is not so barred owing to minority can execute the decree for the benefit of sill or, if not, for his own benefit alone?' In other words, whether the minority of one of several joint judgment-creditors saves execution of the decree from being time-barred during the minority of the minor plus three years.2. In the case in which the order of reference was made, the material facts and dates were as follow:-- On June 30th, 1892, a joint decree was passed in favour of three brothers, who at the date of I he decree, were all minors. On January 8th, 1896, the last application for execution previous to the present application was made. At this date two of the brothers had attained majority and one was a minor. On February 27th, 1899, the present ...
Tag this Judgment!Muthusami Pillai and ors. Vs. Srinivasier
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1902
Reported in: (1902)12MLJ194
ORDER1. This is an application for review of judgment. A preliminary objection was taken that, since the ground of the application is that the judgment was wrong in law, we have no jurisdiction to entertain it. In our opinion we have jurisdiction, and we overrule the preliminary objection. The defendants were tenants of the plaintiff from year to year under a written instrument. The Advocate-General contended that the defendants' tenancy being a tenancy from year to year, and the defendants having repudiated their landlord's title in 1871 their tenancy came to an end at the end of that year, although nothing was done by the landlord to show that he intended to put an end to the tenancy. The Advocate-General relied on certain observations made by Sir S. Subramania Aiyar, in the course of his judgment in Ittappen v. Manavikrama I.L.R. 21 M. 153 with reference to the operation of the law of limitation in the case of repudiation by a tenant of his landlord's title. After dealing with the q...
Tag this Judgment!Periasami and ors. Vs. Krishna Ayyan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-26-1902
Reported in: (1902)ILR25Mad431
Arnold White, C.J.1. The question which has been referred to a Full Bench is as follows: 'When there are two or more joint decree-holders, and the execution of the decree is barred by limitation as against one or more of them, whether one who is not so barred owing to minority can execute the decree for the benefit of all or, if not, for his own benefit alone? 'In other words, whether the minority of one of several joint decree-holders saves the execution of the decree from being time-barred during the minority of the minor plus three years.2. In the case in which the order of reference was made, the material facts and dates were as follow: On June 30th, 1892, a joint decree was passed in favour of three brothers who, at the date of the decree, were all minors. On January 8th, 1896, the last application for execution previous to the present application was made. At this date two of the brothers had attained majority and one was minor. On February 25th, 1899, the present application was...
Tag this Judgment!Parameshri and anr. Vs. Vittappa Shanbhaga and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1902
Reported in: (1902)12MLJ189
Bhashyam Aiyangar, J.1. The plaintiffs (respondents) sue to evict the defendants (appellants) from the holding mentioned in the plaint on the ground that the permanent lease (mulgeni lease), dated 24th April 1862, under which defendants' claim to hold the property, has become void by, reason of its absolute assignment to them in or about 1894, by one Seshappayya, who in 1890 became the assignee of the lease from, the original lessee Yellappa Setti, and that by reason of such assignments in favour of the defendants there has been a forfeiture of the lease and the plaintiffs are entitled to re-enter. It was stipulated in the counterpart of the lease, Exhibit A, that the lessee 'had no right to alienate the holding to anybody in any manner whatever' and that in the event of his 'not requiring the land,' he would sell the improvements, which he might have made upon the holding by that time, to the lessor alone, for a price that might be fixed by four respectable persons and that he would n...
Tag this Judgment!Thathachariar Vs. Venkatesa Tawker and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1902
Reported in: (1902)12MLJ435
1. A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of this appeal. The first ground on which the objection was based was that the decree-holder having died after the hearing of the appeal Before the lower appellate Court, but before the delivery of the judgment by that court, the appellant who is the son of the decree-holder, ought to have applied, to be brought on the record before the judgment of the lower appellate Court was delivered. So far as this ground of objection is concerned, we think the judgment should be read as from the date when the court reserved judgment. As regards this question the authorities appear to be uniform. See Chetan Charan Das v. Balbhadrw Das I.L.R. 21 A. 314 Surendro Keshub Roy v. Doorgasoondery Dosse I.L.R. 19 C. 513 and Ramacharya v. Anantacharya I.L.R. 21 B. 314 and we are of opinion that the appellant is not incompetent to prefer this appeal by reason of the fact that he had not been brought on the record before the judgment of the lower appell...
Tag this Judgment!The Municipal Council of Mangalore, by their Chairman Vs. the Secretar ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1902
Reported in: (1902)ILR25Mad747
ORDER 1. The District Forest-officer of South Canara, as the representative [of Government, i.e., of the Secretary of State for India in Council, has been assessed by the Municipal Council of Mangalore under the last clause of class III, in schedule A, appended to Act IV of 1884 (Madras), as a shopkeeper or trader. The District Forest-officer paid the tax charged and the Secretary of State for India in Council filed a suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Mangalore to recover the amount so paid. The District Munsif gave the plaintiff a decree as sued for and the municipal council, by this civil revision petition, pray the High Court to set aside this decree. 2. A great deal has been said at the hearing of this case before the District Munsif as to whether the Secretary of State in Council can be held to be a person,' within the meaning that should be attached to that term as used in the schedule already alluded to. It is, however, not necessary to consider this question as the Se...
Tag this Judgment!Mangab Thuppan Vs. Kadir Kutti and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-12-1902
Reported in: (1903)13MLJ1
1. The decrees of the lower Courts cannot be upheld. The 6th defendant was not a necessary party to the suit. On the strength of Exhibit B, which appears to be nothing but a melkanom, the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the prior mortgages. There is at all events consideration for Exhibit B to the extent of the undertaking there given to redeem the prior mortgages. We accordingly set aside the decree of the Subordinate judge and dismiss the suit against the 6th defendant throughout on the ground that she was not a necessary party but without costs and give the plaintiff a decree with costs throughout against defendants 4, 5 and 7 for redemption of the kanom of the 13th December 1880(Exhibit A) on payment into court of the kanom amount Rs. 99 together with Rs. 63-4-0 as compensation for improvements within six months from this date and also for rent against the 4th and 5th defendants from date of plaint to date of payment at ten paras of paddy a year....
Tag this Judgment!Muthusami Mudaly Vs. Ayyalu Bathadu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-12-1902
Reported in: (1903)13MLJ367
1. The first contention relied upon by the appellant (the 9th defendant) was that by reason of an order (Exhibit I made under Section 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure in proceedings in which one Subraya Pillai was the judgment creditor, Subraya Chetty (the plaintiff's vendor) was the judgment-debtor, and the appellant was the claimant, the plaintiff's suit, as against the appellant (9th defendant) is barred by Section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order under Section 280 is conclusive as against the party against whom it is made unless a suit is brought within the prescribed time to establish the right claimed to the property in dispute. In the present case no suit was brought within the prescribed time. The question therefore is--was the order allowing the claim of the appellant made under Section 280 an order made against Subraya Chetty (the judgment-debtor) within the meaning of Section 283. We think the test to apply is that laid down in Guruva v. Subbarayndu I.L.R. 13 M...
Tag this Judgment!Kuttan Nayar Vs. Krishnan Mussad and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-11-1902
Reported in: (1902)12MLJ390
1. Following the decision in Sesha Ayyar v. Krishna Ayyanga I.L.R. 24 M. 96 which is based, on the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rahag Kishendatt Ram v. Rnjah Mumtaz Ali Khan L.R. 6 IndAp 145 and dissents from Erusappa Mudaliar v. Commercial and Land Mortgage Bank, Limited I.L.R. 23 M. 377 we must hold that the purchase was valid/arid also following the judgment of the Privy Council in Malkarjun v. Narhari I.L.R. 25 B. 337 that even if the sale were invalid, the time for setting it aside has passed long ago.2. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the District Judge, and restore that of the District Munsif with costs in this court and in the lower appellate Court....
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