Chennai Court April 1900 Judgments
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N.A. Subrahmania Aiyar Vs. Queen Empress
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-30-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ147
Charles Arnold White, C.J.1. The first point of law which is raised in the certificate of the Officiating Advocate-General is with reference to the pardon tendered to the Second accused (paragraph A.). The certificate states as follows:'That, in my judgment, the learned Judge who presided at the First Criminal Sessions of the High Court of Judicature at Madras for 1900, erred in law in deciding that it was competent to him to tender a pardon to D'Santos not with standing that none of the offences in respect of which the said N.A. Subrahmania Iyer was being tried, was, with in the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code, exclusively triable by the High Court.'2. The question of the legality of the pardon turns entirely upon the construction of Sections 337 and 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On principle it ft difficult to see why the discretionary power of Judge of a Sessions Court or of a Judge of the High Court to tender a conditional pardon should, when a case has been committ...
ShamshudIn Rowthen and ors. Vs. Asa Bivi Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-25-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ313
1. In our opinion this suit is one which ought to have been tried as a Small Cause Court suit as there was no real question of title.2. But there was an order-under Section 23 of Act IX of 1887 which order is final and has the effect of giving jurisdiction to the Court having ordinary jurisdiction.3. The case was accordingly tried by the District Munsif. There was an appeal to the Subordinate Judge and it is said that the point of jurisdiction was not pressed. The appeal was heard on the merits.4. Now the appellants seek to have all the proceedings set aside in order that the plaintiffs may begin their suit again in the Small Cause Court. The case is not unlike that reported in Mahamaya Dasya v. Nitya Hari Das I.L.R. 23 C. 425. In that case and in the case reported in {In re Hansambhar Abdulabhai I.L.R. 20 B. 283, it was held that the order under Section 23 was final.5. Adopting this opinion we must dismiss the appeal with costs.6. But the decree must be modified by striking out the wo...
Liladhara Vias Vs. Official Assignee of Madras
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-25-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad160
Arnold White, C.J.1. In my opinion the words 'in all other cases' in Article 18 in schedule A of the table of fees prescribed under the authority conferred by 24 and 25 Vict , cap. 104, Section 15, cover a Memorandum of Appeal presented under Section 73 of 11 and 12 Vict., cap, XXI, and the fee payable is Rs. 50 irrespective of the value of the subject-matter of the appeal....
The Municipal Council of Chidambaram Vs. Venkatanarayana Pillai
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-24-1900
Reported in: (1901)11MLJ312
1. The question is whether a money-lender, whose income is below Rs. 30 a month, is chargeable with any tax under Section 53 of the District Municipalities Act. There is no doubt that he exercises one of the trades specified in the schedule A. Apart from the proviso that schedule does not include persons whose income is under Rs. 30. It is said that the proviso has the effect of bringing such persons within the schedule, because, as it is argued, every money lender shall be placed at least in class VII irrespectively of his income. 2. If the income was not under Rs. 30, no doubt that would be the effect of the proviso, and that is all we think that the Legislature intended and not to bring within one of the classes persons who apart from the proviso would be in no class at all. This is indicated by the words immediately preceding the proviso, viz., every person described in class1, whose pay, salary or pension amounts, or whoso income is estimated to amount to Rs. 30 a month or upwards...
Chinnammal and ors. Vs. Athinatha Lyengar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-24-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ228
1. Following Tirumal Rao v. Syed Dastaghiri Miyah I.L.R. (1898) M. 286 we must hold that the District Judge was wrong in the view that Section 310-A of the Code does not apply to the case. The District Judge had no jurisdiction, We must reverse the order....
Kanniammal Vs. Ammakannu Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-23-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ253
ORDER1. On the main question in this case, viz., whether the house was the property of Munisami at the time of his death, we are clearly 'of opinion that the Judgment of the City Civil Judge is against the weight of evidence.2. The two witnesses who at the trial said that the house was bought in the name of Munisami, benami told a contradictory story at a previous trial, and it is quite beside the point to say that the precise question now in issue was not then in issue,. The two stories are irreconcilable.3. The recital in the sale-deed of 29th March 1897 refers to the debts contracted by the vendor's father and makes no reference to any claim to the house as the property of the vendor independently of her father.?4. The burden of proof was on the defendants, and we are of opinion that the alleged title of Munisami's vendor has not been proved.5. The question then arises as to the' terms' of the decree to which the plaintiff is entitled.6. It is argued on her behalf that the purchaser...
Venkatanarasimhulu and ors. Vs. Narasimhamurti and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-23-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ241
1. We agree that there would be no appeal in this case but for the fact that the commissioner set the court in motion as ii he were a party to the decree, and, therefore, cannot now be allowed to turn round and say that his application is not made under Section 244 of the Code. The order appealed against is clearly wrong. The order for payment of fees to the commissioner is not an order which can be 'executed at the instancs of the commissioner as if he were party to a decree.2. The order ought to have provided for payment of the money into court (Section 397) or it was open for the commissioner to sue.3. We inust reverse the order as one made without jurisdiction and with costs throughout....
Muthian Puniyan Vs. Karri Pillai Ammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-23-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ309
1. The effect of Act XV of 1856 is that on the remarriage of a Hindu widow her preferential right of guardianship is displaced, and it is open to the judges to appoint any of the relatives there mentioned as if the mother were dead. This Act seems to have been overlooked by the District Judge. It is also said that the mother improperly withheld the property of the minor. The District Judge must, before making any appointment as prayed, take into consideration the possibility of appointing one of the relatives mentioned in Section 3 of the Act, having regard to the interests of the minor.3. We do not say that the District Judge is not at liberty to appoint the mother if he thinks it best for the minor to do so. But we think that the relatives abovementioned, if there are any, ought to have notice before any order is made in the mother's favour.4. We set aside the order and remand the petition to be dealt with according to law. The District Judge will deal with the costs....
Kothandaramappa Vs. Subbanna and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-11-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ136
Shephard, J.1. I cannot understand how it can he said that two distinct trespass as committed at different times on different parts of the same plot of land can be regarded as giving one cause of action only. The case of Jumoona Dassee Chowdranee v. Ramasoonderee Dassee Ghowdranee no doubt supports the contention of the respondents. On the other hand, the decision in Court of Wards v. Rajah Leelanand Singh Bahadur 2 supports the contrary view. It may be that the plaintiff might have so framed his action as to have made it obligatory on him to claim all the land which was wrongfully withheld. But I cannot, in the circumstances, say that he was bound to do so.2. We must reverse the decree of the Lower Appellate Court and remand the appeal. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal for appellant.Davies, J.3. I see no reason to differ....
Ramanadhan Chetti Vs. Murugappa Chetti
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Apr-10-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad45
1. In this case the petitioner was directed 'not to 'interfere with the management' of a certain 'kovil.' In our judgment this is a direction to 'abstain from a certain act' within the meaning of these words as used in Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order therefore, so far as this point is concerned, was not made without; jurisdiction. The case is distinguishable on the facts from the case of Ananda Chandra Bhuttacharjee v. Carr Stephen I.L.R. 19 Calc. 127.2. The order directed the petitioner to abstain from taking any part in the management until the counter-petitioner was duly evicted from the management by due course of law. This contravenes the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 144, and to this extent the order was made without jurisdiction. We accordingly set aside so much of the order as directs that the order shall remain in force until the counter-petitioner is evicted from management....
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