Chennai Court March 1900 Judgments
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Venkata Jogayya Vs. Venkatasimhadri Jagapatirazu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-09-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad25
1. The amendment of the decree related to the actual amount of costs, which was not settled in the judgment, but which, under the second paragraph of Section 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had as usual to be determined subsequent to judgment for entry in the decree. An order passed by the Court determining such amount must be treated as a continuation or completion of the judgment and the amendment made was, therefore, substantially an amendment made on review of judgment, and Article 179, Clause (3), of the second schedule of the Limitation Act strictly applies. The cases of Kali Prosanno Basu Roy v. Lal Mohun Guha Roy I.L.R. 25 Calc. 258 and Daya Kishan v. Nanhi Begam I.L.R. 20 All. 304 were cases where the decree differed from what appeared on the face of he judgment. As this is not a similar case, it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the contrary decisions arrived at in those cases. We dismiss the second appeal with costs....
Subrahmania Chetti Vs. Sattaya Pathan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-07-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ213
1. On the Subordinate Judge's finding that there was consideration for the bond A, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree on the assigrnent to him of that bond without reference to the question whether there had been an adjustment certified under Section 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section has reference only to disputes in execution between parties to the decree. Here the 1st and 2nd defendants were not parties to the decree The assignment hiving been made by a debtor to his creditor, no question of how much was paid for the transfer arises under Section 135 of the Transfer of Property Act now repealed. The decree of the lower appellate Court is accordingly set aside and the appeal remanded for fresh disposal with reference to the other questions raised. Costs will abide and follow the result.'...
Chennappa Nayinivaru Vs. Ramappa Nayinivaru
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-06-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ131
1. We must take the Judge's finding on the fact to be that both the widows received the boy is adoption,for that is the evidence of the plaintiff's 5th witness on which the Judge relied.2. The further statement that he makes that the adoption was made by the senior widow was merely a legal inference that he considered it necessary to come to for upholding the adoption. Taking it then as the fact that both widows took. part in the ceremony of adoption the question is whether that affected its validity. In this case the junior widow was authorized under paragraph 2 of the will to make the adoption of a boy approved of by the senior widow. Their act in joining to make the adoption must be deemed as done in pursuance of the will and if the senior widow was allowed to do more than she was required to do by the will, that would not detract from the validity of the act required to be performed and which was performed by the other widow. In point of Jaw the adoption should be taken to have bee...
Kalavathal and ors. Vs. Thirupathi Pallavarayan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-05-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ229
1. We are of opinion that Article 125 does not apply to the suit, because the plaintiff would not have been entitled to possession if the widow had died at the time of the institution of the suit. It follows that the suit is barred by limitation and ought to have been dismissed.2. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout....
Mahalinga Aiyar Vs. Rajam Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-05-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ232
1. In this case the District Judge has held that the Magistrate was protected by Act XVIII of 1850 on the ground that acts done by. him were done in the course of a proceeding in which he had jurisdiction, and he adopts the construction' of the Act which appears to have been adopted by the Allahabad High Court in Teyen v. Ramlal, I.L.R. 1890 12 A. 115 If it were necessary to deal with this case on the footing on which the District Judge dealt with it, we should have to consider carefully whether we were prepared to place the same construction on the word 'jurisdictron' as used in this enactment (Act XVIII of 1850) as that adopted by the Allahabad High Court. As at present advised we should he disposed to hold that the act of issuing the warrant was not an act within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate within the meaning of that word as used in Act XVIII of 1550. Dealing with the case on the assumption that the order for. the' issue of the warrant and so much of the order as awarded a te...
Perla Kristiah and anr. Vs. Boddu Narasimham and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-01-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ141
ORDER1. The facts of the case so far as they need be stated for the purposes of this second appeal are as follows:The 1st and 2nd defendants are the only co-parceners in an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law. Sometime ago the 2nd defendant sold to the 3rd defendant the, whole of a house, the property of the joint family, alleging the existence of family necessity to justify the sale. Subsequently 1st defendant sold to the plaintiffs his undivided half share in the same house.2. Plaintiffs brought the present suit to compel the defendants to divide off and deliver to him one-half of the house.3. The 2nd and 3rd defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the family owned another house and that, therefore, a suit for partition of the plaint house alone could not be sustained.4. The 3rd and 4th issues were framed on these allegations and are as follows:Whether the 2nd defendant has another family house in his possession?If so, whether the suit for partition of the house in que...
Masthan Sahib Vs. Assan Bivi Ammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-01-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ123
1. We think the decision of he lower Appellate Court that in the absence of an express contract the dower in this case was exigible on demand, was a right decis on, following the rule down in Tadiya v. Hasanebiyari. That rule has been quoted with approval by the Privy Council. Mirza Bedar Bukht Mohummad Ali v. Mirza Khurrum Bukht Ali (1873) 19 W.R. 315. The rule is in our opinion more consonant with reason than the rule held to prevail in some other Presidencies where the proportion in which such dower is to be considered prompt or deferred is left uncertain. We take it that the dower is consideration for the marriage and therefore that unless payment of the whole or part of it is, expressly postponed, it is payable on demand. This appears' to be the view the parties themselves entertained of the matter, for the defendant did not plead that any part of the dower was deferred, but on the other hand he pleaded that it had been paid in full, thereby showing his consciousness that it ought...
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