Chennai Court March 1900 Judgments
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Doraisamy Aiyar Vs. Annasamy Aiyar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-30-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ307
ORDER1. An objection is now taken in appeal that the Judge should have taken down the evidence in the manner prescribed by Section 182 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This, it is admitted, was not done. The Judge has recorded nothing more than notes. We observe, for example, that he gives the name of the petitioner's 8 witnesses and states that his evidence is as to certain matters the same as that given by the preceding witnesses but does not record his deposition. We must hold that this procedure was irregular, Proceedings connected with orders passed in execution from which an appeal lies must be held to be cases in which an appeal lies within the meaning of Section 182 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and such being the case evidence should be recorded as there required. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that granting that the procedure of the District Judge was irregular, it cannot be held that such irregularity affected the merits of the case and that we should therefore no...
Chinnappa Mudaliar Vs. Sikha Naicken
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-29-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ249
1. It is found that the plaintiff, a Government ryot, has suffered damage by reason of the negligence of the defendant, a Revenue Office; of Government, in causing the Government channel from which the plaintiff's land derives its supply of water to be closed before the date on which it ought to be closed.2. These are the facts found by the District Munsif, and the District Judge does not express any dissent. It must be taken - that there was no malice on the defendant's part and no intention to harm the plaintiff. It was part of the defendant's duty as Tahsildar to see that the channel was closed at a certain date but he made the mistake of closing It fifteen days too Soon.3. On these facts the question is whether the plaintiff can maintain an action for damages against the defendant. In support of the judgment Mr. Dasikachariar contends that the plaintiff's right to the water is in the nature of an easement, and that the plaintiff has a right of action against any person who disturbs...
Sadasiva Pillai and anr. Vs. Kalappa Mudaliar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-29-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad39
1. A preliminary objection has been taken that no appeal lies.2. The suit was instituted in the District Court of Chingleput on 5th August 1897. In October 1897 a notification was published under Section 2 of Madras Act II of 1894. The effect of this notification was that as from the date of the notification Section 11 of Regulation XXV of 1802 and Regulation XXIX of 1802 ceased to apply to the office of karnam. The District Judge held quite rightly, that notwithstanding the notification he had jurisdiction to hear the suit on the ground that it bad been instituted before the notification came into force. The question before this Court is, have we jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the District Judge's decree dismissing the suit? We are of opinion that we have. The appeal is from a Court exercising original jurisdiction, and this Court, if Act II of 1894 had not been passed, would have appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 540 of the Civil Procedure Code in suits brought under t...
Chinnappa Mudaliar Vs. Sikka Naikan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-29-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad36
1. It is found that the plaintiff, a Government raiyat, has suffered damage by reason of the negligence of the defendant, a. revenue officer of Government, in causing the Government channel from which the plaintiff's land derives its supply of water to be closed: before the date on which it ought to be closed.2. These are the facts found by the District Munsif and the District Judge does not express any dissent. It must be taken that there was no malice on the defendant's part and no intention to harm the plaintiff. It was part of the defendant's duty as Tahsildar to see that the channel was closed at a certain date, but he made the mistake of closing it fifteen days too soon.3. On these facts the question is whether the plaintiff can maintain an action for damages against the defendant. In support of the judgment Mr. Desikachariar contends that the plaintiff's right to the water is in the nature of an easement, and that the plaintiff has a right of action against any person who distur...
Ramanna and anr. Vs. Sitamma and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-27-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ238
1. The District Judge received a mass of evidence, oral and documentary, and dismissed the case as barred by limitation. On first appeal to the High Court this finding was set aside, and the case was sent back for trial by the District Judge. The District Judge referred certain matters to a Commissioner who sent a report. After the receipt of this report, the District Judge transferred the case to the Subordinate Judge for disposal. The Subordinate Judge tried the case and a first appeal having been preferred to the District Judge, the suit now comes before the High Court on second appeal. We must hold that these proceedings have been throughout most irregular. Under Section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code, the District Judge was not entitled to transfer the suit to the Subordinate Judge even before the trial had commenced (Sakharam v. Gangaram,) I.L.R. (1889) B 654 and it was of course a most objectionable course to pursue to decide one issue as a court of first instance, and when the ...
Jugrath Singh Vs. Mir Gulam HussaIn and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-27-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ251
1. If it had been necessary for us to consider the question as to whether the suit was barred by the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, we should have been prepared to hold that the suit was barred not on the ground taken by the learned Judge that consequential relief by way of injunction ought to have been asked fore but on the ground that the plaintiff ought to have claimed, in addition to the declaration which he asked for, payment to him by the 2nd defendant, of moneys in the hands of the 2nd defendant which but for the power of attorney would have been payable by the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant. See Kombi v. Aundi I.L.R. 1892 M. 333.2. It seems, however, that after his suit was disposed of by the District Judge, the plaintiff elected to abandon his rights under the power of attorney and took out execution proceedings (see Exhibit 1) under his decree, In that state of things he is clearly disentitled for any relief on appeal in a suit based upon the power of ...
Guruvajamma Vs. Venkatakrishnama Chetti and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad34
1. We are clearly of opinion that the learned Judge is wrong in holding that; the valuation given in the plaint for an injunction can be questioned.2. Section 7, Clause IV(d), of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, requires that in a suit for an injunction the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. The plaintiff in this case values the relief, at Rs. 50, and therefore the City Civil Court had jurisdiction.3. There is no authority for holding that the Court has power to increase the value.4. The appeal is allowed. The defendant must pay the costs of the appeal....
Raghava Charry Vs. Oriental Life Assurance Company
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-21-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ236
1. The allegation on behalf of the plaintiff is that he was engaged as agent by the defendant company on the terms of receiving for every policy taken out through his instrumentality 10 per cent. on the first premium paid and 5 per cent on every subsequent premium.2. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant contracted to pay the latter percentage as long as the premiums continued to be paid, irrespective of the continuance between the parties of the relation of employer and agent.' Under the alleged contract the plaintiff seeks to recover a small sum, which, as he says, has accrued due to him since the determination of the agency and with regard to the future he prays for a declaration. Assuming that the contract was, as he alleges, I think the plaintiff has altogether mistaken his remedy. If he is entitled to anything it is damages which he ought to claim, ft is not as if he were the assignee of the premiums payable by policy-holders. There is no reason why his claim for remuneratio...
Lingam Krishna Bhupati Devu Vs. Vikrama Devu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-19-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ256
1. The law is now well settled in the absence of any contractor usage to the contrary, Kattubadi is not chargeable on the and. See Gajapati Bajah v. Surya.2. We disagree with the view taken by the Sub-Judge, and we think the District Munsif was right in holding that in the present case, the Kattubadi is not chargeable on the land.3. It has been pointed out that the plaintiff in the prayer of his plaint asks that the arrears of Kattubadi claimed may be satisfied on the liability of the defendants and of the lands and that the 3rd defendant in his written statement does not in terms deny that the Kattubadi is chargeable on the land. As a matter of technical pleading there is no ground alleged that the Kattubadi is chargeable on the land. But we should certainly not decide this case on any technicality of pleading.4. The 4th issue involved the question as to whether the Kattubadi was chargeable on the land, and the District Munsif held that it was not so chargeable.5. Agreeing with this v...
Seshayya Chettiar Vs. Chengayya Chettiar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-19-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad31
1. The only question seriously argued is whether there was jurisdiction to try the suit, or in other words whether the matter to which the award relates was matter over which this Court had jurisdiction.2. There is no doubt that the matter to which the award relates was the partition of property including immoveable property, part of which is outside the jurisdiction of this Court on its original side. Without leave first obtained a suit for the partition of such property could not have been entertained. And it is consequently contended that, there being no leave granted in the present case, there was no jurisdiction having regard to Sections 12 of the Letters Patent. A similar contention was raised and overruled in Kellie v. Fraser I.L.R. 2 Calc. 555 and we see no reason for not following that case.3. It cannot be said that because the Court was not bound to grant leave it had no jurisdiction over the matter in respect of which it had liberty to grant leave.4. In the case cited leave ...
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