Chennai Court February 1900 Judgments
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Gulam Mahade Vs. Ramakrishna Mudali and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-26-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ134
Subrahmania Aiyar, J.1. I am unable to agree with the contention urged on behalf of the respondents that the order passed by Moore, J., and myself granting the-review was ultra vires. In the first place, I am by no means satisfied that it is not open to this Court to entertain an application for reivew in a second appeal on the ground of discovery of documentry evidence. Even if it were otherwise, the circumstance that the order granting the review in the present case was granted on a ground which would not support it, does not render the order ultra vires (compare L.R. 3 Indian App 221. The respondent had notice of the-application, and, not having appeared to oppose the application, must be held to be bound by the order.2. As to the question on the merits, we must accept the finding of the District judge. Even if Exhibit F were issued with reference to the mosque in question it would be impossible to hold that the institution is governed by the clause therein as to appointment of a su...
Chemminian Pockan and anr. Vs. Udayavarma Valia Rajah
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-23-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ201
1. The Lower Appellate Court having upon the evidence found that the title to the land in dispute was vested in the plaintiff, the decree in his favour must be upheld unless, as contended for the defendants, the plaintiff was bound to make out that he had before the suit made a demand for possession. It is true that under Exhibit I, the last lease granted by the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, the tenancy did not absolutely determine on the expiry of the term of three years fixed as according to the further provisions contained in the instrument the tenant's possession amounted to that of a tenant at will. It would seem that according to the English Law (seeWoodfall's Landlord and Tenant, 12th Edn., p. 240, foot-note K.) a plaintiff suing to eject a person who held under a tenancy-at-will has to show that before the issue of the writ there had been a demand for possession or something equivalent thereto, though according to Bam Lal Patak v. Deoia Nath Patak and the cases therein...
Sornavalli Ammal and ors. Vs. Muthiah Sastrial
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-22-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ208
1. The award in this case adjudged to the plaintiffs certain immoveable property to recover which the present suit is brought. The date of the award is 7th July 1893, and this suit was instituted on the 15th of November-1897. The District judge held the suit was barred by limitation, as the article-applicable was 113 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. That article provides for suits for specific performance of a contract and allows only 3 years from the date fixed for the performance and in case no date is fixed when the plaintiffhas notice that performance is refused. We may note in passing that, if the article is applicable, the Judge's decision is defective, as he does not state from which period limitation began to run in this case. We are, however, unable to agree with the Judge that the said article 113 is applicable to the present case. This is a suit for the recovery of land, the title to which was declared in plaintiffs' favor by the award. The award does not provid...
Arumugam Pillai Vs. Valura Koundan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-22-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad22
1. We agree with the District Judge that the payment relied on by the fifth defendant to the fourth defendant is not binding on the plaintiff, inasmuch as the assignment to the fourth defendant by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was also not binding on plaintiff. The contention now for the first time made that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 acted as guardians on behalf of the minor plaintiff is opposed to the whole facts of the case.2. The only other question is whether the plaintiff is not entitled to the decree he obtained in the Court of First Instance by reason of his not having produced a certificate of heirship. That decree is not for money due under a contract, but is in reality the assessment in money by the District Munsif of the value of the plaintiff's mortgage interest. In strictness the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for the land itself, and it was only by his consent that money was awarded in lieu of the land. The amount cannot, therefore, rightly be treated as a debt within the...
Ramasawmi Sastrulu Vs. Kameswaramma
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-19-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ126
1. We are. of opinion that when a party defendant in a suit is exonerated from such suit--the suit being dismissed against him and a decree passed agaiast a co-defendant in the suit--and in execution of thai decree property belonging to, and in the possession of, the defendant who was so exonerated from the suit is attached and sold, the latter is not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the, property and that the question of his claim to, and to recover possession of, the property is a question foiling within Section 244. Civil procedure Code of 1882, so as to debar him from maintaining such suit.2. It was contended before us that a defendant in whose favour the suit is dismissed is not a party to the suit within the meaning of the section, because there is no decree which can be executed against him and that the words ' parties to the suit ' in the section must be limited to the judgment-creditors and judgment-debtors, because they are the only persons between wh...
R.G. Orr and anr. Vs. the Secretary of State for India
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-18-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ261
1. The following facts are either undisputed or are proved by the evidence:The plaintiffs are the lessees of the Sivaganga Zemindari. Prior to fasli 1300 it was the custom for the tenants to bring their paddy, when harvested, to the threshing floor, when it was divided among those entitled to it in the following manner:first, the ' common charges ' were deducted; that is, the actual cultivator took his expenses of cultivation (Kudi Swatantram) and the village servants, such as the Kamam, Ambalagaran, totti, etc,, took the shares due to them (Pala Swatantram). Then the balance was equally divided between the Zemindar (or his lessees)(Melvaram) and the tenant (Kudivaram),2. . This was done in the presence of the Zemindari officials, the tenants and the village servants, and neither the Melvaram nor the Kudivaram could be taken until the 'common charges ' had first been appropriated. From and after fasli 1300 the lessees altered this old system which had obtained from time immemorial. The...
W.M. Thorburn Vs. K. Venkata Rao
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-16-1900
Reported in: (1900)10MLJ316
1. There is no doubt the language used in the petition was highly improper, and in returning the petition for amendment, the judge adopted the proper course. As no further immediate action was taken and the petition was not represented, the matter should have been allowed to drop and not resuscitated after the lapse of several mouths.2. Further, we are of opinion that steps should not have been taken against the petitioner under the Legal Practitioners' Act, so long as it was possible to take notice of the act in any other way as one committed by a suitor. See the case In re Wallace I.L.R. 20 A 412. It may be added that the act of the petitioner was not per se sufficient to disqualify him from continuing to be a pleader. We therefore dismiss the charge....
In Re: a First-grade Pleader
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-16-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad17
1. There is no doubt the language used in the petition was highly improper, and in returning the petition for amendment, the Judge adopted the proper course. As no further immediate action was taken and the petition was not represented, the matter should have been allowed to drop and not resuscitated after the lapse of several months.2. Further, we are of opinion that steps should not have been taken against the petitioner under the Legal Practitioners Act go long as it was possible to take notice of the act in any other way, as one committed by a suitor. [See the case of In re Wallace L.R. 1 P.C. 283. It may be added that the act of the petitioner was not per se sufficient to disqualify him from continuing to be a pleader.3. We therefore dismiss the charge....
Basavayya Vs. Syed Abbas Saheb and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-16-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad20
1. It is clear from exhibit XXXIX (the attachment order) that what was attached was a debt in respect to which prohibitory orders were issued under Section 268, Code of Civil Procedure. The attachment of a right to receive a debt is not, in our opinion, property capable of possession within the meaning of Sections 280 and 281 of the Code. A similar view was taken under the Code of 1859 by the Calcutta High Court Mussamut Rambutty Kooer v. Kamessur Pershad 22 W.R. 36. The observation of Phear, J., that Section 246 of that Code clearly contemplates property of which the judgment-debtor is entitled to the possession in specie, is applicable to the corresponding provision of the present Code. This suit was. therefore, not one instituted under Section 283 of the Code. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs....
Queen-empress Vs. Rama
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-13-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad13
Shephard, J.1. The question is whether a direction that a youthful offender shall be 'detained in a Reformatory school for a 'period of five years, unless he shall attain the age of eighteen 'years at an earlier date' is a direction which should properly be made under the provisions of Act VIII of 1897. In respect to time the Act lays down three rules: First, the youthful offender must be a boy under the age of fifteen years at the date of his conviction. In the present case the Magistrate finds that the boy is thirteen years old, Then the Act says the period of detention in the school must not be less than three years and, lastly that the period must not exceed seven years. In order to give effect to these rules the Magistrate is directed by Section 11 of the Act to enquire into the question of age and after taking such evidence as may be deemed necessary, to record a finding thereon stating the boy's age as nearly as may be, and, as it appears from Section 13, the Magistrate is to st...
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