Chennai Court November 1900 Judgments
Browse smarter
Open an 18-section brief on any judgment
Structured AI Brief in seconds on any result - plus Semantic Search when you need meaning, not just keywords.
- AI Brief & Ask
- Semantic AI Search
- Devil's Bench
Credentials emailed - log in to pick up where you left off.
Queen-empress Vs. Abdulla Sahib and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-02-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad262
1. Two points have been raised on behalf of the petitioners,--first, that the conviction of the petitioners by the Magistrate is invalid upon the ground that the Magistrate, who convicted the petitioners of an offence under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code--the offence being a breach of an order made under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code--is the same Magistrate who made the order under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code; secondly, that the order which purports to have been made under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was beyond the powers conferred by the section, and was therefore made without jurisdiction. Section 487 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides as follows: (1) Except as provided in Sections 477, 480 and 485, no Judge of a Criminal Court or Magistrate other than a Judge of a High Court and the Recorder of Rangoon shall try any person for any offence referred to in Section 195 when such offence is committed before himself or in contempt of h...
Surij Mull Vs. Hudson
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-01-1900
Reported in: (1901)ILR24Mad259
1. We are unable to agree with the learned Judge that no part of the cause of action arose in Madras. Not only was the note payable in Madras, but payments of interest had actually been made here. The fact that the note was also payable at Secunderabad does not affect the matter. The obligation to pay in either place gave a cause of action in both.2. We must also disagree with the Judge's decision that the promissory note sued upon was inadmissible in evidence on the ground that the stamp was affixed and cancelled after the signature to the note was made. The uncontradicted evidence of the plaintiff shows that the acts were practically simultaneous and the stamping therefore was done 'at the time of execution' within the meaning of Section 16 of the Stamp Act (I of 1879), which is the Act governing the present case. Even under the present Act (II of 1899), where 'execution' is defined as meaning 'signature,' we do not think it would make any difference if the stamp is affixed and cance...
- ‹ Prev
- 1
- 2
- Next ›