Chennai Court September 1898 Judgments
Ramachandra Rao and ors. Vs. Kuppusami Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-27-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ262
1. In Pattat Ambadi Marar v. Krishnan I. L. R., 11 M. 290 it was held that without indorsement there could not be negotiation of a promissory note payable to order. Here the point taken is that there was a valid transfer or assignment of the chose in action, and it is not contended that there was any negotiation of the note. According to English law it is clear that a promissory note may be assigned by the holder just like any other chose in action, the assignee taking the rights which his assignor has to convey and no more. Whistler v. Forster, 32 L. J., C. B., 163. He does not obtain the title according to Law Merchant which an endorsement would give him, nor could he before the Jurisdiction Act sue in his own name, but the transfer is nevertheless valid as an equitable assignment. There is no reason why in this country an assignee of this particular sort of chose in action should not enjoy the rights which attach to the assignee of debt and be allowed to sue in his own name.2. It is...
Tag this Judgment!Nagoji Ramachandra and ors. Vs. Queen Empress
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-16-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ253
ORDER1. We do not consider that the conviction under Section 188, Indian Penal Code can be upheld. The order passed by the Magistrate under Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code was an order to a Police-officer to take possession of the land and not an order to any one of the accused persons. It is urged that the order of the 29th July 1896 is one the disobedience of which would constitute an offence under Section 188, Indian Penal Code, but we cannot accept that view. This is merely an administrative order by the Deputy Collector to the Tahsildar to the effect that the lands are not to be leased out for the future. We set aside the conviction of the 3rd accused under Section 188, Indian Penal Code. It is, however, shown that the 1st and 2nd accused deliberately entered on the land while it was still under attachment by order of the Magistrate. In doing so they, we consider, committed an offence under Section 447, and we uphold the findings and sentences of the Magistrate under th...
Tag this Judgment!Queen Empress Vs. Makam Abayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-13-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ259
Benson, J.1. The Deputy Magistrate was, in my opinion, right in holding that the alleged act of the accused in cutting and removing the standing crops which had been attached by the Civil Court did not amount to theft. In order to constitute theft there must be moving of moveable property with the intention of taking it dishonestly out of the possession of another person. Standing crops are, for the purposes of the Indian Penal Code, immoveable property, and when such crops are attached under Section 274 of the Civil Procedure Code, possession of them is not transferred to the Court. Possession remains with the owner, but he is forbidden to alienate and charge the crops.2. When the crops are cut they become moveable property, but it would, I think, be difficult to conclude that possession of them is transferred to the Court or its officer by the act of cutting. the cutting, however, cannot put an end to the attachment once properly effected. The crops must be regarded as moveable prope...
Tag this Judgment!Thottathil Ahmmad and anr. Vs. Muthedath Avuthraman and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-13-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ273
Subrahmania Aiyar, J1. The question in this case is whether the: suit is wholly or to any extent barred, because the respondent (plaintiff) did not include the items of damages, claimed here, in O. S. 507 of 1893 instituted by him against the appellant (defendant). In that suit the respondent asked for and obtained a decree for the possession of a hill from which he had been evicted and for the damages caused by the appellants' having cut and removed certain trees from the said hill. The damages now claimed are in respect of trees alleged to have been cut and removed subsequent to the institution of the previous suit and in respect of a quantity of timber which, it is said, had been stored on the hill by the respondent and which also the appellant took away after the institution of that suit. First, as to the item of the present claim relating to the trees cut and removed--Now it is scarcely necessary to say that in the case of property, such as the hill which was in question in the ea...
Tag this Judgment!Nagammal and ors. Vs. Venkatagiri Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-13-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ298
1. The respondent, plaintiff in the suit, is the holder of a simple mortgage, dated the 4th June 1888. The appellants have become possessed of the property comprised in this mortgage by purchase from the vendee who bought at the auction-sale in execution of the mortgage-decree made in O. S. No. 236 of 1890. This latter mortgage was executed in 1887.2. The price settled at the auction-sale in 1892, viz., Rs. 600, was not sufficient to pay off the amount due under the mortgage-decree. The valuation of the property by the District Munsif made since certain improvements had been effected by the appellants leaves a margin beyond the amount required to satisfy the mortgage-decree. The appellants claim that in the decision of any question between themselves and the respondent credit should be given them for the amount spent on these improvements, and it is convenient to dispose of this question first, for if it were decided in the appellant's favour, the suit ought to be dismissed as it pract...
Tag this Judgment!Venkaiya Vs. Ramaswamy and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-08-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ278
Moore, J. 1. The plaintiff (appellant) sued to eject the defendants (respondents) on the ground that they had converted a piece of wet land held by them on patta under him intended for cultivation with paddy, ragi, &c.;, into a cocoanut garden. He also prayed that he should be awarded Rs. 2 as the cost of removing the cocoanut plants on the holding. Both the lower Courts have dismissed his case with costs. In the pattas filed (Exhibit A series) the land under cultivation is classed as wet, but nothing is said as to the nature of the crops that should be grown on it. As the District Judge remarks, the plaintiff tried to import into the terms of the tenancy a clause to the effect that the tenant should not use the land for any purpose inconsistent with its general character as paddy land, and finds that the burden of proving that such a condition was one of the terms of the tenancy was on the plaintiff and that he has not discharged it.2. It is now urged in appeal that the tenants have, ...
Tag this Judgment!The Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. Rajah Goundar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ224
1. The facts which it is necessary to notice in this case are as follow: The revenue due on the plaintiff's mitta for fasli 1302 fell into arrear, and a portion of it was attached and advertised for sale, with the usual formalities. Some days before the date fixed for the sale the full amount (Rs. 2,766-4-0) of the arrear for fasli 1302, with interest and other charges was paid by the defaulter to the Tahsildar. Meantime, however, the revenue payable for fasli 1303 had become due, but had not been fully paid by the defaulter. The Collector, therefore, refused to stay the sale already advertised and sold the land in order to recover the arrears due for falsi 1303. The District Judge found that the sale was invalid and void, and against this decree the Secretary of State for India in Council appeals mainly, as we are informed by the learned Government Pleader, for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of Section 37 of the Revenue Recovery Act (No II of 1864 Madras). The Section runs as...
Tag this Judgment!Rajagopala Pillai Vs. Krishnasami Chetti
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ261
1. The District Judge's finding is sufficiently clear. The only question raised was whether or not there was a partnership at the time of the acknowledgment. This the Judge negatives.2. A surviving partner cannot bind the representatives of a deceased partner unless he is authorised to do so. It is not suggested in this case that the surviving partner was so authorized except in so far as that is implied by the continuance of the partnership and this is negatived by the Judge.3. We are unable to see that the law is in any way affected by the Sections of the Contract Act referred to. The fact that the partnership is being wound-up is not of itself sufficient to authorise a surviving partner to bind the representatives of a deceased partner by acknowledging a debt.4. The second appeal is dismissed with costs...
Tag this Judgment!Nilakanta Rotho and anr. Vs. Gongapani Panda and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-06-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ217
1. It is argued that the suit was barred by limitation in accordance with the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in Ramachandra Bayaguru v. Modhu Padhi, I.L.R., 21 M., 326 . The respondent's vakil argues that the plea of limitation was given up. It is, however, clear from the facts as they appear on the record and from the affidavit of the pleader engaged that the point of law was given up simply because the pleader thought that he could not argue it in the face of the decision in Rangasami v. Muthukumarappa I.L.R. 10 M. 509. We do not think this case precludes the point being argued in this Court, and we have no doubt that the case is governed by the recent ruling of the Full Bench above referred to, namely, that Article 147 of the 2nd Schedule of the Limitation Act is not applicable to a case like the present in which no prayer for fore - closure or sale, in the alternative is or could be made. The Article applicable must, therefore, be 132 and under that, the suit is ...
Tag this Judgment!Savithri Animal Vs. Ramasami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Sep-05-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ266
1. Asuming the facts to be as stated by the plaintiff and the money to have been advanced on the instrument of August 1891, before the attachment in September, we are of opinion that the attachment cannot override the right already acquired by the plaintiff. At the date of the attachment he was in a position to insist on the instrument being registered. He cannot be in a worse position, because in December he took another instrument for the same sum and had that registered. Section 276 of the Civil Procedure Code does not; profess to override the general principle that a creditor cannot assert higher rights over the debtor's property than a debtor himself possessed. The decree of the Court below must be reversed. There must be a decree as prayed for the amount claimed with costs and interest....
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