Chennai Court August 1898 Judgments
Paramasiva Goundan Vs. Kandappa Goundan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-30-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ201
1. The real question for decision is whether the suit for recovery of rent for fasli 1301 is barred. It is not correct to say that the landlord's right to the rent accrues only after exchange of puttah and muchilika or tender of putta. The right of the landlord to the rent is a right existing prior to, and independent of, the written engagements prescribed by the Rent Recovery Act. The exchange of puttah and muchilika or tender of puttah is a condition imposed by law as a necessary preliminary to the filing of a suit but does not affect the accrual of the cause of action, for purposes of limitation in a suit like the present for arrears of rent. (See Coburn v. Colledge, 1897, I.Q.B., 702 ). Such cause of action accrues when the rent becomes payable according to contract or usage. It was for the plaintiff to show that the rent became due within three years prior to the bringing of his suit. He has not attempted to do so. As the defendants pleaded limitation in their written statement, t...
Tag this Judgment!Tirupatiraju Vs. Rajagopala Kristnama Razu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-30-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ271
1. We agree with the Judge that the Article of the Limitation Act applicable is 61, but we find that under that Article the suit is not barred by limitation as the money, in respect of which contribution is sought, was not paid till 31st January, 1894, and this suit was brought on the 5th January 1897.2. We, therefore, reverse the decree appealed against and remand the suit for fresh disposal. Costs to abide and follow the result....
Tag this Judgment!Seshayya Vs. Subbamma
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-26-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ269
1. We cannot agree with the District Judge in holding that Section 58 of the Indian Stamp Act precludes any evidence except a receipt being adduced to prove payment. It only provides that a party making a payment may demand a receipt Even when a receipt is given and is not produced in evidence, evidence aliunde is admissible as the Illustration to Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act to which the Judge refers clearly shows. There is no conflict between that Illustration and Section 92 of the Act. The Judge was also in error in holding that the endorsement on Exhibit I, was inadmissible for want of registration for the endorsement does not purport to extinguish the mortgage. (Section 17 Clause n of the Indian Registration Act.)2. As the District Judge, in consequence of his erroneous views on these matters, has decided the case without reference to the .evidence bearing on the question of payment, we must set aside his decree and remand the appeal for disposal in accordance with law. C...
Tag this Judgment!Narayanamma and ors. Vs. Ramayya Chetti
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-23-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ199
1. The wording of the bond does not in terms make the surety liable for the performance of the decree so as to bring the case clearly within the provision of Section 253, C.P.C. It is, however, contended for the appellant that Section 253 is applicable to all cases in which it may reasonably be inferred that the real intention was that the surety should satisfy the decree, notwithstanding that the bond does not expressly bind the surety to do so. As illustrations of such a liability cases of security taken under Sections 479 and 485, C. P. C., but in which the bonds failed to charge expressly the liability of the surety in the terms of the Code were referred to. In such cases, no doubt, the circumstances under which the security was given and the manifest object of taking the security might be properly considered, But the security in the present case was not taken under any of these provisions of the Code and we are not in a position to say that the direct object of the Court was to pr...
Tag this Judgment!Venkata Chinnaya Rau Vs. Krishna Charyalu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-23-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ228
H.H. Shephard, C.J.1. It is objected that there is no appeal because the claim is of a Small Cause nature,--but I am not satisfied that it is so. It was an action for fees, the liability for which, was fixed by an agreement. It was not an action on a bond as is suggested by the respondent's vakil. The main question is one of limitation. The suit was brought against two defendants, mother and daughter, and a decree was given against both. The mother died before an appeal was filed. The daughter appealed and her appeal was dismissed by the Subordinate Court. In second appeal to the High Court, the decree was reversed in her favour. It is now sought to execute the decree against the daughter as representative of her mother, the application having been made more than three years after date of the original decree. The District Judge has held that the application is within time because it was made within three years of the date of the Subordinate Judge's decree.2. Although the result in this...
Tag this Judgment!Mrs. J. Foulkes Vs. Muthusami Goundan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-23-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ207
Subrahmania Aiyar, J.1. The first question for determination is whether under Exhibit A, the pattah, dated the 16th November 1841, granted by the appellant's father, the late Mr. George Frederick Fischer, the then owner of the Salem Mittah, to the late Narahari Iyen, a raiyat that held certain lands in the mittah, which are now in the possession of the respondent claiming through Narahari Iyen's son, Ramakrishnaien, the annual assessment in respect of those lands, fixed at Rs. 40, instead of Rs. 103-0-5 payable till that time, was fixed in perpetuity. After setting forth certain details, immaterial for our present purpose, the pattah concludes thus: 'The remainder is Rs. 103-0-5. Cowle therefor is Rs. 40; this sum of forty rupees you shall pay perpetually (saswathamai is the vernacular word) every year as per kist in the Mittah cutchery and obtain receipt.' The learned Vakil for the appellant, in support of his argument that the pattah should not be construed as fixing the assessment a...
Tag this Judgment!Seshachalam Chetti Vs. Rajam Chetty
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-23-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ203
H.H. Shephard, C.J.1. This is an appeal against an order made in execution of a decree, dated the 6th of January 1885. The petition, in pursuance of which the order is made, dated the 21st January 1897, alleges that a prior application for a warrant of arrest is still in force and asks for the attachment of certain immovable property; I am clearly of opinion that such a petition oh the face of it was defective and ought not to have been entertained. Assuming that an application made before the expiration of the 12 years period may, notwithstanding the provision contained in Section 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, be granted after the lapse of 12 years from the date of the decree, I see no reason for holding that a decree-holder can, on account of the pending of a prior application, be allowed, after the lapse of the 12 years, to make another application of a totally different sort. This is what the decree-holder by his petition seeks to do, and accordingly I think his petition should ...
Tag this Judgment!Changa Ram Vs. Narayani Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-18-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ194
1. The point which I took time to consider was, whether an auction-purchaser having ineffectually made an application under Section 315 of the Civil Procedure Code, may afterwards bring a suit to recover the purchase-money. It appears that the application for repayment of the purchase-money made after the sale of the property was set aside was dismissed on the ground of limitation. It is said that it was wrongly dismissed, but the point is not material, because it is not suggested that the present suit is barred by the law of limitation.2. I was inclined to think that the plaintiff having elected to proceed by application could not subsequently have recourse to a regular suit, and Stuart, C.J., in the case cited (Munna Singh v. Gajadhar Singh, I.L.R., 5 A. 582) seemed to have entertained that opinion. It certainly is not convenient that a purchaser should be at liberty to vex the judgment-creditor by adopting, first, one of the remedies, and then, the other. In a case, however, like th...
Tag this Judgment!Sri Rajah Bounnadovara Vs. Putman and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-17-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ185
1. Both the lower Courts find (if we may say so, in our opinion, correctly) upon the correspondence referring to the arrangement entered into between the plaintiff (appellant) and Mr. Morrison, the Sub-Divisional Officer, on whoso orders with regard to quarrying the defendants (respondents) rely, that the plaintiff had agreed to the collection and removal of loose stones only, but that he had not consented to any quarrying work being carried on his land or to any quarried stones being taken away therefrom. It is admitted that the defendants nevertheless did quarry stone from the plaintiff's land and use the stones so quarried for their own purposes. In upholding the decree of the District Munsif dismissing the suit, the Sessions Judge gives two reasons: The first is ' the general rule is that the principal and not the contractors or agents is liable civilly for tortious misfeasance. Let the superior answer for the wrong is the general principle.' This is clearly an error; for it is ele...
Tag this Judgment!Vellanki Venkatarama Rao Vs. Venkatasubbamma Rao and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-17-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ276
1. It is objected that no appeal lies because orders under Section 583 of the Civil Procedure Code are not mentioned in Section 588 of the Code. But Section 583 gives no right which a successful party did not otherwise possess. It only regulates the exercise of his right of having the state of things, as it stood before the erroneous decree was passed, restored. 2. I think an appeal lies against the order as against any order passed in execution. The order of the Subordinate Judge is quite unworkable and cannot stand. In order to replace the present appellant the Judge must determine what the nature and extent of that appellant's prior possession was, and, in that sense, he must decide the question between the two defendants. 3. I must reverse the order and direct the Subordinate Judge to find whether the appellant was in possession of any, or what part of, the two-third's share and, if so, whether solely or jointly with the other defendant and to pass orders accordingly. 4. The costs ...
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