Chennai Court January 1898 Judgments
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Ramakisoor Doss Vs. Sreerangacharlu and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-17-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ74
1. The order of the District Judge as to costs is not a 'decree' within the definition of that word in Section 2, Civil Procedure Code, nor is the order one of those enumerated in Section 588, Civil Procedure Code, as subject to appeal. No appeal, therefore, lies (Jogodindro Nath v. Sarut Sunduri Debi, I.L.R. 18 C. 322). We dismiss the petition with costs....
Ramachari Vs. Duraisami Pillai
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-17-1898
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad167
1. This case is unlike the Allahabad case quoted by the Judge as his authority for exonerating the first plaintiff from the decree, inasmuch as the first plaintiff was, as a fact, made a party to the suit. Although it has now turned out that he was a major at the time of suit, whereas he was treated in the suit as a minor, he must be held to be bound by the decree if he was aware prior to the sale, of the suit or the subsequent proceedings, and still allowed the manager of the family to conduct the defence and proceedings on his behalf which the manager in truth did. The plaintiff has not averred in his plaint or elsewhere that he was ignorant of the suit and proceedings, and there are circumstances indicating that he must have been aware of them, but as the point was not put distinctly in issue, the question has not been tried. We think it ought to be tried now, and we remit the following issue for trial:Whether the first plaintiff was aware, prior to the date of the sale, of the Suit...
Ramakissoor Dossji Vs. Sriranga Charlu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-17-1898
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad421
1. The order of the District Judge as to costs is not a 'decree' within the definition of that word in Section 2, Civil Procedure Code, nor is the order one of those enumerated in Section 588, Civil Procedure Code, as subject to appeal. No appeal therefore lies Jogodindro Nath v. Sarut Sunduri Debi I.L.R. 18 Cal. 322.2. We dismiss the petition with costs....
Manickam Vs. Tatayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-13-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ48
Subrahmania Aiyar, J.1. One Lakimsetti Subrayudu obtained a decree for money in original suit, No. 242 of 1892. Shortly after, one Potti Subrayudu (deceased), alleging himself to be the transferee of the decree, applied to be permitted to execute the decree, and he was allowed by the Court to do so. The appellant, Manda Manickam, alleging that he and his brother, the 5th respondent, are the real transferees and that Potti Subrayudu was but a benamidar for them, has now applied to execute the decree. As I understand the order of the District Judge, he holds that even if the appellant is one of the real transferees, Section 232, Civil Procedure Code, does not admit of such transferee applying under the Section, and further, supposing that an application for the execution of the decree by such transferee is entertainable under the Section, the Courts should, in the exercise of their discretion, decline to grant the application. But it is impossible to doubt that, notwithstanding the form ...
Karuppana Nadan Vs. Chairman, Madura Municipality
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-13-1898
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad246
1. It is not quite necessary to consider whether in the absence of a resolution passed by the Municipal Council the accused could have been proceeded against under Section 264 of the District Municipalities Act, 1884. The accused was clearly punishable under Section 263 if, as alleged, he erected the fence in the lane without the license required by the law. The circumstance that two out of the seven Magistrates (who constituted the bench that sat during part of the trial) did not attend on the day when the accused was convicted by the five Magistrates who were present then does not affect the legality of the conviction. The cases of Hardwar Sing v. Khega Ojha I.L.R. 20 Cal. 870 and Damri Thakur v. Bhowani Sahoo I.L.R. 23 Cal. 194 are clearly distinguishable, inasmuch as in the present case the Magistrates who decided it had attended throughout the trial. We must, therefore, set aside the order of the Deputy Magistrate acquitting the accused and direct the Magistrate to rehear the appe...
In Re: Goods, Chattels of Sladen
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-10-1898
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad492
1. A question has been raised as to the proof of the execution of the power of attorney under which the petitioner in this matter seeks to act. The power of attorney does not purport to have been executed in the presence of a notary public or any other of the persons designated in Section 85 of the Evidence Act; but with regard to the execution by each of the three executors, one of the attesting witnesses has made a declaration before a notary public to the effect that he witnessed the execution of the power of attorney by one of the executors, and that the signature of the other attesting witness is the proper signature of the person bearing that name. To each declaration is appended a certificate signed and sealed by the notary public. In similar circumstances it has been held in Calcutta that, inasmuch as the execution is not proved in the manner indicated in Section 85 of the Evidence Act, the application for letters of administration ought to be refused (In the Goods of A. J. Pri...
Satagopa Ramanuja Vs. Mahabir Doss Ji
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-06-1898
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ180
1. The question for decision in these cases is whether the plaintiff's cause of action against the 1st defendant survived upon 1st defendant's death against the 2nd defendant, who succeeded him in the office of pedda jaiyyangar. The action was one to recover compensation for loss of income, and for expenses caused to the temple by the 1st defendant's alleged refusal to give up the keys of the temple and have worship duly performed therein. Whether this misconduct on the part of the 1st defendant be regarded as a tort or as a breach of contract of personal service, in neither case do we think that the cause of action survives against his representative, for the reason that the misconduct was one purely personal to the 1st defendant and did not in any way benefit his estate. (Haridas Ramdas v. Belindas Mathuradas, I. L. R., 13 B., 677 and Kirk v. Todd, 21 Ch. D. 484 ) It has not boon found that the 1st defendant left any personal assets, and it is clear from the evidence of the plaintiff...
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