Chennai Court August 1897 Judgments
Thovanna Chetti Vs. Ramachandra Rao and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-30-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ250
1. Section 135 of the Transfer of Property Act was never intended to apply to cases like this; and the appellant cannot in any case ask for the benefit of the section unless he can show that in its terms he ' paid the buyer the price' paid by him. This he has not done.2. We dismiss the second appeal with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Mirasa Ravuthan Vs. Abdul Kani Ravuthan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-26-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ234
1. We think that the Lower Courts were both wrong in refusing the plaintiff's claim to a lien on the property agreed to be sold by the 1st defendant to the extent of the moneys paid by the plaintiff in anticipation of the contract being carried out. We must, therefore, vary the decrees by declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien for Rs. 32 upon the plaint lands as against the 2nd defendant.2. Proportionate costs as against 2nd defendant throughout....
Tag this Judgment!Venkatramayya and ors. Vs. Kristnayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-25-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ257
1. The question is whether the plaint having been presented with an insufficient court stamp on the last day allowed by the law of limitation, viz., 29th March 1893 and subsequently within the time fixed by the Court presented again with a proper stamp, can be said to have been duly presented within the time limited by the Act of limitation. According to the 4th section of that Act a suit is instituted when the plaint is presented to the proper officer, and, unless the suit is so instituted within the period prescribed by the schedule, it must be dismissed. This suit, therefore, ought to have been dismissed, if, in point of law, there was no plaint presented on the 29th March 1893. The document presented as a plaint satisfied the requirements of the Civil Procedure Code, but it did not satisfy the requirements of the Court Fees Act, inasmuch as the stamp affixed was 12 annas, when it ought to have been Sections 15-12-0. This being the case, it was a document which, in view of the provi...
Tag this Judgment!Rangayya Appa Rau Vs. Ratnam and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-25-1897
Reported in: (1897)ILR20Mad392
1. In Second Appeal No. 906.--The facts of the case, so far as the question raised with reference to the claim for the rent for falsi 1299 is concerned, appear to be these: Before the present suit was instituted the appellant (plaintiff) had distrained for that rent under the Eent Recovery Act VIII of 1865. Thereupon the respondents (defendants) filed a summary suit before the Collector under the provisions of that Act to set aside the distraint. The distraint was set aside on the ground, it would seem, that the appellant had not tendered a proper patta as required by Section 7 of the Act. This finding of the Collector has now been held, by the District Munsif as well as by the District Judge, to conclude the appellant from showing, in the present suit, that there was such a tender. The question is whether this decision is right.2. We think it is not. Ragava v. Rajagopal I.L.R. 9 Mad. 39 relied upon on behalf of the respondents, no doubt supports the view taken by the lower Courts. But...
Tag this Judgment!Sethurayer Vs. Shunmugam Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-24-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ279
1. Upon the allegations of the plaintiff, his case may be considered on the footing either that the 1st defendant was his agent, or that he was his benamidar. If 1st defendant was an agent, the plaintiff is entitled to obtain the advantage gained by the 1st defendant in securing a decree upon the bond. Whether 1st defendant's action in obtaining the decree was rightful or wrongful is immaterial. This has long been established law (Taylor v. Plumer 3. M. and Section 562).2. If 1st defendant was a benamidar, the result would be the same, for he would be in the petition of a trustee (Sections 91 and 95 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882).3. The only remaining question is as to the relief to be given. The injunction prayed for cannot be granted under Section 56 clause (b), of the Specific Relief Act, but if the plaintiff's case be true he is entitled to the declaration granted by the Munsif subject to the plaintiff reimbursing the 1st defendant the costs incurred by him in obtaining the decree...
Tag this Judgment!Sethurayar Vs. Shanmugam Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-24-1897
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad353
1. Upon the allegations of the plaintiff, his case may be considered on the footing either that the first defendant was his agent, or that he was his benamidar. If first defendant was an agent, the plaintiff is entitled to obtain the advantage gained by the first defendant in securing a decree upon the bond. Whether first defendant's action in obtaining the decree was rightful or wrongful is immaterial. This has long been established law Taylor v. Plumer 3 M. & S. 562.2. If first defendant was a benamidar, the result would be the same, for he would be in the position of a trustee Sections 91 and 95 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.3. The only remaining question is as to the relief to be given. The injunction prayed for cannot be granted under Section 56, Clause (b) of the Specific Relief Act; but, if the plaintiff's case be true, he is entitled to the declaration granted by the Munsif subject to the plaintiff reimbursing the first defendant the costs incurred by him in obtaining the decr...
Tag this Judgment!Ramaswami Pillai Vs. Audinarayana Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-23-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ246
1. On the facts found by the District Judge we do not think he was justified in the conclusion that the transaction was in fraud of creditors. The Judge finds there was good cause for the mortgage, but considers that the want of good faith brought the case within the purview of Section 53 of the Act. The reference to good faith occurs only in the proviso to the section. It has first to be seen whether there was intent to defraud creditors within the meaning of the former part of the section. When it is said that deed is not executed in good faith, what is meant is that it was executed as a mere cloak, the real intention of the parties being that the plaintiff's grantor should retain the benefit to himself. (Exparte Games; in re Bamford1)2. There is nothing to show that there was want of good faith in that sense in the present case. Section 53 cannot be understood and correctly applied without reference to the English cases on which the section is really founded.3. We must reverse the d...
Tag this Judgment!Perianna Goundan Vs. Muthu Veera Goundan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-23-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ315
1. There can be no doubt but that under the general law money payable on demand is due from the date of the loan; in other words there is a cause of action on the date of the loan.2. This being so, we must hold that in a suit brought to enforce payment of money so lent, the money must be taken to have become due, within the meaning of Col. 3 of Article 132 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, on the date of the loan. To hold otherwise would lead to an anomaly for which there is no justification. If it was intended that money lent on the security of immovable property though payable on demand should not be subject to the general rule as to money lent and payable on demand (Article 59), the language of the 3rd Col. of Article 132 would have been so framed as to make this clear.3. We cannot, therefore, accept the appellant's contention that in a case like the present an actual demand is necessary in order to establish a starting point for limitation under Article 132.4. According to the ...
Tag this Judgment!Vasudeva Upadyaya Vs. Visvaraja Thirthasami and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-23-1897
Reported in: (1897)ILR20Mad407
Benson, J.1. This is an appeal under Section 15 of the Letters Patent against an order of Mr. Justice Shephard, dismissing an appeal against an order of the District Judge of South Canara, in Appeal Suit No. 279 of 1893, remanding a suit to the Court of First Instance under Section 562, Code of Civil Procedure, for disposal on the merits.2. A preliminary objection is raised that no appeal lies inasmuch as the order of Mr. Justice Shephard was passed in an appeal under Section 588, Code of Civil Procedure, and the last paragraph of that Section provides that 'orders passed in appeals under this Section shall be final' In reply it is contended that the Section does not apply to a case like the present where a Judge of the High Court sitting alone makes the order, and that, by virtue of Section 15 of the Letters Patent, an appeal does lie notwithstanding the provisions in Section 588. In a word, the question is whether the right of appeal given by Section 15 of the Letters Patent against ...
Tag this Judgment!Venkatanarasimha Naidu Vs. Dandamudi Kotayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1897
Reported in: (1897)ILR20Mad299
1. In this case the plaintiff, the holder of a permanently-settled estate, seeks, among other things, to eject the defendant from certain lands. Admittedly, the lands are situated within the plaintiff's estate and are subject to an annual assessment payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.2. The decision of the case depends solely upon these facts, no other facts having been satisfactorily established by the evidence.3. In this state of the case the lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit in so far as the prayer for possession was concerned. On behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that the dismissal was erroneous, and that the error was caused by the lower Appellate Court having wrongly thrown the on us of proof on the plaintiff. The argument in support of the contention was that upon the admitted facts, the finding must be that the defendant was a tenant from year to year and as due notice to quit had been given, the tenancy had been determined before the date of the action and...
Tag this Judgment!- ‹ Prev
- 2
- Next ›
- Last »