Chennai Court October 1897 Judgments
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Sivarama Tevar Vs. Kovil Arulanantham Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-15-1897
Reported in: (1898)8MLJ18
1. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated by the District Judge, but we cannot agree with him in his conclusion that the District Munsif did in fact dispose of the application for execution, dated the 14th April 1893. The District Munsif's order on the petition is ' Execution stayed by the Sub. Court; petition struck off the file consequently,' Thus the District Munsif struck the petition off his file simply because execution had been temporarily stayed by the Subordiuate Court. The District Munsif had no ligal authority to dismiss the petition simply because the execution had been stayed, nor did he in fact dismiss it. He struck it off his file, by which, we apprehend, he merely ceased to show it as pending in his statistical returns, but the petition not having been dismissed or otherwise legally disposed of must be regarded as still pending. This was the view taken by Muihusamy Iyer, J., in an exactly similar case in A. A. O. No. 34 of 1892, in which he followed the rulings o...
Rayiran Chathan and anr. Vs. Thottinkara Moopil
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-15-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ317
1. This is an appeal by the stani and his lessee against a decree obtained by the plaintiff as successor to the stanom. The effect of the decree is to restrain both the defendants absolutely from cutting the timber in certain forests and to make the defendants liable in damages to the extent of Rs. 400, a peculiar direction being made as to the manner in which the money shall be treated. In the District Munsif's Court the plaintiff's suit had been dismissed on the ground that the lease was one which the stani was competent to give. This decree is reversed by the District Judge and the decree as above mentioned is framed on the strength of certain English cases cited by the Judge in which the position of a tenant for life impeachable for waste was in question. There is, as has often been observed, great danger in applying English decisions on the law of Real Property to cases which arise in this country. To make the decision cited applicable, it must be assumed that the English law of w...
Gadicherla China Seetayya Vs. Gadicherla Seetayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-15-1897
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad45
1. We think the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the defendant who had been exonerated from the suit was a party within the meaning of Section 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code, and, therefore, that the plaintiff could not bring a separate suit against him, but was bound to proceed in execution [see Mukarrab Husain v. Hurmatunnissa I.L.R. 18 All. 52.2. The fact that the plaintiff's claim arises out of expenses incurred in the course of executing the decree makes no difference. We express no opinion as to the merits of the plaintiff's claim. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the Subordinate Judge and direct him to restore the suit to his file and dispose of it according to law.3. The respondent must pay the appellant's costs....
ittirarichan Unni and anr. Vs. Kunjunni
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-15-1897
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad144
1. This is an appeal by the stani and his lessee against a decree obtained by the plaintiff as successor to the stanom. The effect of the decree is to restrain both the defendants absolutely from cutting the timber in certain forests, and to make the defendants liable in damages to the extent of Rs. 400, a peculiar direction being made as to the manner in which the money shall be treated. In the District Munsif's Court the plaintiff's suit had been dismissed on the ground that the lease was one which the stani was competent to give. This decree is reversed by the District Judge and the decree as above-mentioned is framed on the strength of certain English cases cited by the Judge, in which the position of a tenant for life impeachable for waste was in question. There is, as has often been observed, great danger in applying English decisions on the law of real property to cases which arise in this country. To make the decision cited applicable, it must be assumed that the English law of...
Sasivarna Tevar Vs. Arulanandam Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-15-1897
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad262
1. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated by the District Judge, but we cannot agree with him in his conclusion that the District Munsif did, in fact, dispose of the application for execution, dated the 14th April 1893. The District Munsif's order on the petition is 'Execution stayed by the Subordinate Court; petition struck off the file consequently.'Thus the District Munsif struck the petition off his file, simply because execution had been temporarily stayed by the Subordinate Court. The District Munsif had no legal authority to dismiss the petition, simply because the execution had been stayed, nor did he, in fact, dismiss it. He struck it off his file, by which we apprehend he merely ceased to show it as pending in his statistical returns, but the petition not having been dismissed or otherwise legally disposed of must be regarded as still pending. This was the view taken by MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J., in an exactly similar ease Sri Rajah Papamma Rau v. Venkatappayya, appeal again...
Venkatagiri Rajah Vs. Ramasami
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-15-1897
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad413
1. According to the contract evidenced by the muchalka in the case before us the rent was payable in three instalments, and each instalment which remained unpaid on the date it ought to have been paid became at once an arrear (see Section 14 of the Rent Recovery Act). Time began therefore to ran from the dates specified in the kistbandi, that is, the dates on which the instalments fell due and not from either of the other dates mentioned in the reference....
Gantapalli Appalamma Vs. Gantapalli Yellayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-14-1897
Reported in: (1897)ILR20Mad470
Collins, C.J.1. I think it would be wrong to limit the meaning of the word 'adultery' in Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, to the very limited definition of the word in Section 497 of the Penal Code. Adultery is a crime under that Section that can only be committed by a man having sexual intercourse with the wife of another without the consent or connivance of the husband of that wife.2. Section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the maintenance of the wife and enacts that a Magistrate may make an order for maintenance in favour of the wife, even though the husband offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband is living in adultery. The term 'adultery' is used in that Section in the ordinary sense, that is, a married man having sexual connection with a woman who is not his wife. It appears to me that this construction is not affected by the last words of Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but is c...
Suryanarayana Sastri Vs. Ramamurti Pantulu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-12-1897
Reported in: (1898)ILR21Mad253
1. The first question for consideration is what was the price for the assignment. The Judge has found that only Rs. 1,450 was actually paid and that there was no satisfactory evidence of the payment by plaintiff either of the litigation expenses Rs. 290 or of the sum of Rs. 1,900 under the receipt Exhibit B. Notwithstanding the execution of this receipt Exhibit B by Ramamma we agree with the Judge in believing her evidence that no money was paid her on that receipt. The evidence in proof of payment is not of a credible character, and the omission of the plaintiff to state whence he procured this large sum of money indicates that he never had it. It would have been easy for him to show how he happened to get the money if he really did get it. The payment of the Rs. 1,900 is therefore not proved. As regards the Rs. 290 for legal expenses, there can be no doubt that plaintiff must have spent a considerable amount of money in litigation on behalf of Ramamma. There is to begin with the stam...
Barber Maran and anr. Vs. Ramana Goundan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-10-1897
Reported in: (1897)ILR20Mad461
1. The question raised by this appeal is whether a payment made to one of two persons jointly entitled under a mortgage bond can be pleaded as a valid discharge of the debt in an action brought by the other person interested in the bond. It is found that the party who received payment was not the agent in that behalf of the plaintiff. On the other hand, it is not suggested that there was any fraud on the part of the defendants who made the payment. The appellants' vakil in support of his contention, that the payment to one joint creditor was a valid discharge of the debt as against the other, referred to Section 38 of the Contract Act and to the English ease of Wallace v. Kelsall 7 M. & W. 264. 'An offer to one of several joint promisees has the same legal consequences as an offer to all of them.' That is the language of the last paragraph of the Section. In the first part of the Section it is provided that, where an offer of performance has been made and not accepted, the promisor is ...
Subrahmaniam Chetti Vs. Authinarayanan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-05-1897
Reported in: (1897)7MLJ288
1. We think Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Buttun Koer L.R. 19 I.A. 234 is clearly distinguishable from the present. There the Judicial Committee held that the agreement on which the second suit was founded ought to have been put forward in the first suit.2. Here the two suits present two perfectly distinct grounds of claim. In the first suit, the plaintiff claims by virtue of an alleged adoption. In the second suit, it is a will which Is put forward as giving title to the property. A. person who takes by adoption is obviously in a totally different position from one who takes under a will. We have no copy of the will before us, and it may well be that the one claim is even inconsistent with the other.3. We must dismiss the appeal with costs....
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