Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad445
1. The Sessions Judge having examined five witnesses for the prosecution, and there being no further direct evidence of the offence, asked the jury whether they wished to hear any more evidence, and on their stating that they did not believe the evidence and wished to stop the case, the Judge recorded a verdict of acquittal, We are unable to approve of the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge. It is not warranted by any provision of law, and it might, under certain circumstances, lead to a failure of justice.2. It appears that there were, in this case, two other witnesses examined before the Magistrate, and bound over to give evidence at the trial, whose evidence, if believed, would have corroborated the case for the prosecution, and might possibly have led the jury to form a different opinion of its credibility. No final opinion as to the falsehood or insufficiency of the prosecution evidence ought to be arrived at by the Judge or jury until the whole of that evidence is before the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad79
1. The appellant was convicted of having made to the police a false charge of dacoity against certain persons and was sentenced under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, to suffer four years' rigorous imprisonment.2. In appeal it is urged that though the charge to the police may have been false, yet, as they referred the charge to the Magistrate as false, and as the Magistrate ordered the charge to be dismissed as false without taking any action against the accused, there was no ' institution of criminal proceedings within the meaning of Section 211, and the offence was therefore only punishable with a maximum of two years' imprisonment under the first part of the Section, instead of with seven years' imprisonment under the second part of the Section. 3. In support of this view the rulings of the Allahabad High Court in Empress of India v. Pitam Rai I.L.R. 5 All. 215 and Queen-Empress v. Bisheshar I.L.R. 16 All. 124 and Queen-Empress v. Karim Buksh I.L.R. 14 Cal. 633 L.R were relied upon. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad383
1. The order of the High Court, dated 28th January 1896, on which the appellant relies, was passed mainly on the ground that there had been undue delay in making the application for transfer. Section 487, Criminal Procedure Code, was not referred to in the petition then before the High Court, nor in the order of the High Court, and was apparently rot considered.2. On the merits we think that it is impossible to say that an order whether original or appellate granting or refusing or revoking sanction under Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, is not a 'Judicial proceeding' as defined in Section 4 of the Act, and looking to the wide terms 'brought under his notice' used in Section 487, we are of opinion that the Magistrate who declined to revoke the sanction was precluded from himself trying the case.3. The Sessions Judge was, therefore, right in ordering a new trial. We dismiss this appeal...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1898)ILR21Mad78
Shephard, J.1. The question is whether a person charged under Section 183 of the Indian Penal Code was rightly acquitted, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the goods seized by the Amin and rescued by the accused were, as being part of the assets of the deceased debtor, liable to be taken in execution of the decree against his representatives. The question is whether the seizure of the goods was an act done by the lawful authority of a public servant within the meaning of Section 183. It was argued on behalf of the accused that no offence had been committed in resisting the Amin, because he was acting unlawfully in seizing goods, which could not properly be taken in execution. The Amin, being commissioned to take the goods of the deceased debtor, forfeited the protection of the law, when he proceeded to take the goods of the defendant himself, although he might have acted in good faith.2. It appears to me that, in construing Section 183, the language of Section 99,...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ49
1. The appellant built upon the land found to be the respondents' property in spite of a notice from the latter objecting to the erection of the building. Under these circumstances the appellant cannot be allowed to rely upon the lapse of time before the institution of the suit in which possession founded upon his title was sought.2. As to the objection that the Munsif had no jurisdiction, it is to be observed that the buildings did not form part of the subject-matter of the suit. The Munsif had therefore jurisdiction to try the ease.3. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ16
1. The appellant was convicted of having made to the police a false charge of dacoity against certain persons and was sentenced under Section 211, Indian Penal Code, to suffer four years' rigorous imprisonment.2. In appeal it is urged that, though the charge to the police may have been false, yet as they referred the charge to the Magistrate as false, and as the Magistrate ordered the charge to be dismissed as false without taking any action against the accused, there was no 'institution of criminal proceedings' within the meaning of Section 211, and the offence was therefore only punishable with a maximum of two years' imprisonment under the first part of the section, instead of with seven years' imprisonment under the second part of the section.3. In support of this view, the rulings of the Allahabad High Court reported in Empress of India v. Pitam Rai I.L.R., 5 A., 215 and Empress v. Parahu I.L.R. 5 A. 598, and Queen-Empress v. Karim Buksh I.L.R. (1887) C. 633 were relied upon. Thes...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ140
1. The plaintiff sued in the Presidency Small Cause Court, and her claim was decreed by the Chief Judge. Under Section 37 of the Act the defendant made an application for a new trial, and the Small Cause Court, consisting of the Chief Judge and two other Judges, heard the application; and in doing so went into the merits of the case. The Chief Judge differed from his colleagues on a point of law, and still maintained that the claim should be decreed, but his colleagues taking a different view on the point of law, the Court reversed the decree passed by the Chief Judge and gave judgment for defendant with costs.2. Plaintiff' now puts in this revision petition under Section 622, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that as the judges differed on a point of law, they were bound, under Section 69 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, to refer the case for the opinion of the High Court, and either to reserve judgment or deliver judgment contingent upon such opinion.3. We think the petiti...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ211
1. The case relied on by the Subordinate Judge has been overruled by the Privy Council in Dakhina Mohan Boy v. Saroda Mohan Boy I.L.R., 21 C., 142 and the principles applicable to cases like that now beforeus are laid down. It appears to us that it is common justice that if the plaintiff in good faith made payments to rent and revenue due by the tarwad of the 2nd defendant and thereby saved the land for the benefit of the tarwad on its ultimately establishing its rights thereto, the plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed that sum by the tarwad. If the plaintiff received raesne profits, they should, of course, be taken into account, and equally, if he made payments not due or in excess of what were dug by the tarwad, he would not be entitled to charge them against the tarwad.2. We must set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge as against defendants 2 to 11 and order him to restore the suit to his tile, and to proceed to dispose of it in accordance with law, taking an account of sums...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad21
1. The house-rent in question was not alleged to be due upon a written contract signed by the defendant'. The case therefore, falls under proviso 3 to Section 13 of Act I of 1889, which lays down that a village Munsif cannot entertain a suit for' rent of land, unless such rent is due upon a written contract signed by the defendant. In Civil Revision Petition No. 48 of 1894, BEST, J., held the proviso to be inapplicable to a claim for house-rent. But we are unable to agree with the learned Judge, as we see nothing in the language of the proviso or in the reason for the enactment thereof to make us suppose that the term ' land ' is used in a restricted sense excluding land built upon from the operation of the proviso. In the absence of any ground for putting such a limited construction on the term in question, it should, we think, be understood in its ordinary sense which of course includes land not covered by buildings as well as that so covered. It follows that the village Munsif had n...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)ILR20Mad48
Collins, Shephard, Subramania and Davies, JJ.1. In the case which gave rise to this reference, it appears that the former suit was dismissed, because without leave of the Court, claims in respect of moveable and immoveable property had been united in one plaint in violation of the provisions of Section 44 of the Civil Procedure Code. The real question to be decided is whether the reason for the failure of that suit was of such a character as to entitle the plaintiff in the present suit to take advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that any misjoinder of causes of action rendering the Court unable to entertain the suit, should be deemed to be ' a cause of a like nature' with defect of jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 14. The argument, indeed, was pushed to this length, that any plaintiff, whose plaint had been rejected under Section 53 or 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, might, provided that other conditions were fulfilled, clai...
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