Chennai Court July 1895 Judgments
Devalji Rau Vs. President, Municipal Commission
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-31-1895
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad503
1. We are of opinion that the letter of the plaintiff is not a sufficient notice within the meaning of the 433rd Section of the City of Madras Municipal Act of 1884. It is insufficient because it omits to state the place or street in which the house alleged to be demolished stood, as also the time of the alleged demolition. Further, the letter does not positively state that an action will be brought. See Breese v. Jerdein 4 Q.B. 585; 12 L.J. Q.B. 234 and Mason v. Birkenhead Improvement Commissioners 6 H. & N. 72.2. It is unnecessary to answer the second question.3. Barclay, Morgan & Orr: Attorneys for Defendant....
Tag this Judgment!Eacharan Patter and anr. Vs. Appu Patter and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-31-1895
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad16
Shephard, J.1. As I understand the reference, the suit is an ordinary suit for redemption in which, owing to the fact that the mortgagee in possession has not paid the stipulated rent, the plaintiff asks for an account, in taking which the arrears of rent will be deducted from the mortgage amount.2. In my opinion the Court fee ought in such a case to be computed according to the principal money expressed to be secured by the mortgage. In Konna Panikar v. Karunakara I.L.R. 16 Mad. 328 it is distinctly said that the suit was to redeem the land and to recover arrears of rent. On that basis the judgment proceeds. Subramanya Bharatengal v. Kunnan Civil Revision Petition No. 387 of 1889 (unreported) seems exactly in point.3. I would answer the reference by holding that the fee must be computed on the amount of the mortgage.Best, J.4. The suit is not for redemption and rent, but for redemption on payment of the kanom amount, the arrears of rent due from the kanomdar being deducted.5. I am of ...
Tag this Judgment!Rangasami Naidu Vs. Virasami Chetti
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-26-1895
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad477
1. In our opinion there is in this case no question of a retrospective effect being given to a new provision of law. When the Act V of 1894 came into effect there was no purchaser in existence. The new law was passed before the purchase was made and the purchaser must take subject to its provisions.2. We agree with the opinion expressed by Petheeam, C.J., at the end of his judgment in Girish Chundra Basu v. Apurba Krishna Dass I.L.R. 21 Cal. 940.3. We must reverse the order of the Judge and remand the matter for disposal.4. The respondent must pay the appellant's costs....
Tag this Judgment!Chakrapani Asari Vs. Narasinga Rau and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-26-1895
Reported in: (1896)ILR19Mad56
1. In our opinion the Subordinate Judge is right in his conclusion see also Krishnasami v. Kanakasabai I.L.R. 14 Mad. 183. Furthermore under the 8th Section of the Suits Valuation Act of 1887 it is clear that the suit is within the jurisdiction of the District Munsif. Costs to be costs in the suit....
Tag this Judgment!Queen-empress Vs. Muppan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-23-1895
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad401
1. We think the accused was rightly convicted. The custody of a prisoner does not necessarily come to an end because the custodian absents himself for a few minutes. A man legally arrested for an offence must submit to be tried and dealt with according to law. If he gains his liberty before he is delivered by due course of law, he commits the offence of 'escape.' It has been long established that even when the escape is effected by the consent or the neglect of the person that kept the prisoner in custody, the latter is no less guilty, as neither such illegal consent nor neglect absolves the prisoner from the duty of submitting to the judgment of the law (I Russ., 5th edition, p. 567, Roscoe, 11th edition, p. 453, and Bishop's Criminal Law, 7th edition, Section 1104). Consequently in the present case the neglect of the police officer in absenting himself from the place where the accused was detained when he escaped does not affect the accused's guilt.2. We decline to interfere....
Tag this Judgment!Seeni Chettiar Vs. Santhanathan Chettiar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-17-1895
Reported in: (1895)5MLJ253
Shephard, J.1. The firstquestion is whether the Yadast tendered in evidence by the defendant is a lease and, as such, requires registration. The interest acquired by the defendant under the instrument consiated in the right to enjoy the produce of all the trees in the tank-bed as also the grass and the reeds and further to cut and remove the trees for a period exceeding four years. It was not merely the trees and grass then growing and ready to be cut that the defendant was to acquire. He was further to be at liberty to take all the trees which might grow on the ground within the period named. The intention was, in my opinion, to create an interest in immoveable property, and certainly it was intended that the defendant should have exclusive enjoyment of the produce named in the yadast.2. There was, therefore, a lease of immoveable property and not a mere license, Sultry Kurdeppa v. Goondakull Nagireddi (1870) 6 M.H.C.R. 73 and as the enjoyment was given for a term exceeding one year, ...
Tag this Judgment!Narasimha Naidu Vs. Ramasami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-12-1895
Reported in: (1895)ILR18Mad478
1. We think it must be taken to be found that the property originally belonged to the plaintiffs' family and that it remained in their possession till 1884. It is true that there is no explicit finding on this latter point by the lower Appellate Court, but this objection is not taken in the memorandum of appeal to this Court, and even in the lower Appellate Court the contention raised in the fourth ground of appeal is consistent with the facts above stated. In 1881, in execution of a decree against some members of the plaintiffs' family, the property was sold and purchased by the defendant who now appeals, and it is contended that the suit falls under the 12th[1] Article of the Limitation Act, and is therefore barred by limitation. We are referred to Suryanna v. Durgi I.L.R. 7. Mad. 258 in which it seems to have been held that a stranger to the decree whose property is sold in execution of it must bring his suit within the year. If it were necessary to decide the question, we should re...
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