Chennai Court August 1893 Judgments
Pemma Raju Ganga Raju and ors. Vs. Kondreddi Swami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-30-1893
Reported in: (1894)4MLJ24
1. Assuming that the suit was maintainable there can be no doubt that the decision is correct on the facts found.2. It is contended however that the suit is not sustainable by reason of the decree in summary suit No. 72 of 1890 on the file of the Head Assistant Collector and of the order for ejectment under Section 10 of Act VIII of 1865 (Madras).3. The 1st plaintiff did not appear to defend that suit and a subsequent application of his to have the ex parte decree set aside was dismissed. Hence the present suit on title.4. As was held in Rama v. Tirtasamit I. L. R. 7 M 61 the decision of a question of title by a Revenue Court is merely incidental and no bar to a fresh suit on title in a Civil Court. Our attention has been called to the decision reported in I. L. R. 9 M 39 Ragava v. Rajagopal.5. The learned judges who decided that case held that the decision and order of a Revenue Court under Section 10 of Act VIII of 1865 would bar a subsequent suit on title in the Civil Courts. But it...
Tag this Judgment!Gangaraju and ors. Vs. Kondireddiswami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-30-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad106
1. Assuming that the suit was maintainable, there can be no doubt that the decision is correct on the facts found.2. It is contended, however, that the suit is not sustainable by reason of the decree in Summary Suit No. 72 of 1890 on the file of the Head Assistant Collector and of the order for ejectment under Section 10 of Act VIII of 1865 (Madras).3. The first plaintiff did not appear to defend that suit and a subsequent application of his to have the ex parte decree set aside was dismissed. Hence the present suit on title.4. As was held in Rama v. Tirtasami I.L.R. 7 Mad. 61 the decision of a question of title by a Revenue Court is merely incidental, and no bar to a fresh suit on title in a Civil Court. Our attention has been called to the decision in Ragava v. Rajaqopal I.L.R. 9 Mad. 39 The learned Judges who decided that case held that the decision and order of a Revenue Court under Section 10 of Act VIII of 1865 would bar a subsequent suit on title in the Civil Courts. But it does...
Tag this Judgment!Ramasami thevan Vs. Sami Aiyan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-29-1893
Reported in: (1894)4MLJ28
1. We consider that the decree in suit No. 241 of 1886 on the Mannargudi Munsif's file was a final decree in as much as it decreed according to the last clause of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act that in case of default in payment within the stipulated time, the plaintiff was to be debarred of his right of redemption. Orders passed under Section 93 are in our opinion merely supplementary to the decree under Section 92, showing whether the terms of the decree have or have not been fulfilled. It is clear that in this case when the three months' time allowed in the decree had elapsed without payment having been made, the decree became a final decree without any farther orders being required. That decree then being a final one after confirmation in appeal, the present suit being based on precisely the same cause of action as in that suit, is of course barred as res judicata.2. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Ramasami Vs. Sami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-29-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad96
1. We consider that the decree in Suit No. 241 of 1886 on the Mannargudi Munsif's file was a final decree inasmuch as it decreed according to the last clause of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, that in case of default in payment within the stipulated time, the plaintiff was to be debarred of his right of redemption. Orders passed under Section 93 are, in our opinion, merely supplementary to the decree under Section 92, showing whether the terms of the decree have or have not been fulfilled. It is clear that in this case when the three months' time allowed in the decree had elapsed without payment being made, no extension of time for payment having been granted, the decree became a final decree without any further orders being required. That decree then being a final one after confirmation in appeal; the present suit being based on precisely the same cause of action as that suit is, of course, barred as res judicata.2. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Ramachandra Aiyar Vs. Sundaramurthi Mudali and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1893
Reported in: (1894)4MLJ9
1. It being found as a fact that a contract to sell was made by the defendant Ekambara, now dead, and the appellant, the only question is whether there is anything in the circumstances of the case rendering it inequitable that specific performance of that contract should be decreed. It is not easy to understand from the judgment of the District Judge on what precise ground he has thought fit to refuse the prayer of the plaint. His judgment does not proceed on the ground of law declared in Section 28 (a) of the Specific Belief Act, because though he observes that the property is worth considerably more than Rs. 2,000 he does not find that the price was so grossly inadequate as to justify an 'inference of fraud having been practised.2. Again ho refers to the case in Gurusami v. Ganapathia I. L. R. 5 M 337 as an authority, but he does not follow it, for apparently his decree is intended to dismiss the suit altogether and not even to give effect to the contract so far as regards the share ...
Tag this Judgment!P.T. Krishnaswami Chetti Vs. the Natal Emigration Board Carrying on Bu ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1893
Reported in: (1893)4MLJ70
1. It appears that on the 13th May 1892 there was a valid tender of rent, interest and costs and that on 3rd November there was a payment into court of the full amount due up to the 15th November. This being so, the defendants have brought themselves within the terms of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. After the tender on the loth May the plaintiff proceeded with the suit at his risk. The only other question is as to costs between attorney and client given by the learned judge. In our opinion this suit was not cognizable by the Small Cause Court and therefore Section 22 of the Act does not apply, An application under Chapter VII is not a suit within the meaning of Section 22.2. We must vary the decree accordingly. Each party will bear his own costs of this appeal....
Tag this Judgment!Krishnasami Chetti Vs. the Natal Emigration Board
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-22-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad216
1. It appears that on 13th May 1892 there was a valid tender of rent, interest and costs, and that on 3rd November there was a payment into Court of the full amount due up to the 15th November. This being so, the defendants have brought themselves within the terms of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. After the tender on the 13th May the plaintiff proceeded with the suit at his risk. The only other question is as to costs between Attorney and client given by the learned Judge. In our opinion this suit was not cognizable by the Small Cause Court and therefore Section 22 of the Act does not apply. An application under chapter VII is not a suit within the meaning of Section 22.2. We must vary the decree accordingly. Each party will bear his own costs of this appeal.3. Wilson and King, Attorneys for Respondents....
Tag this Judgment!Venkata Reddi Vs. W. Taylor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-21-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad100
1. The preliminary objection is taken that the petitioner's remedy is exhausted by the order passed by Mr. Justice Parker under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, from which it is contended no appeal is allowable by reason of Section 27, which declares the decrees or orders of the Small Cause Court to be final, subject to the provisions of that Act. We observe that the revision contemplated in Section 25 is by the ' High Court'. Mr. Justice Parker exercised such revisional jurisdiction under the rules of this Court framed under Section 13 of the Charter Act. The judgment is, therefore, subject to the appeal provided by Section 15 of the Letters Patent.2. The preliminary objection must consequently be disallowed.3. Passing on to the merits, have see no reason to differ from the learned Judge in holding that any person who makes it his business to sell for profit is a 'trader' within the meaning of the Municipal Act IV of 1884. We do not think the fact of what he sells being the p...
Tag this Judgment!Queen Empress Vs. Ramaya Nadan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-18-1893
Reported in: (1894)4MLJ189
1. The case in Atchayya v. Gangayya I. L. R 15 M 138 referred to by the Judge dealt only with the case of a Registrar acting under Sections 72 to 75 of the Indian Registration Act. A Sub-Registrar acting under Section 41 of that act has also been held to be a court (In re Venkatachala I. L. R 10 M 154 but it has been held in Queen Empress v. Subba I. L. R 11 M 3 and Queen Empress v. Sobhanadri I. L. R 12 M 201 that a Sub-Registrar acting under Sections 34 and 35 of the Indian Registration act is not a court and those decisions have not been overruled.2. There is therefore no reason for quashing the commitments....
Tag this Judgment!Secretary of State for India Vs. Vydia Pillai and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-16-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad193
1. This is a claim made to a percentage of the net revenue of the reserved forest at Sriharicotta under Madras Forest Act V of 1882. The appellant before us is the Secretary of State for India in Council represented by the District Forest Officer, and respondents are two mirasi karnams who had served as such in connection with the forest till 1884, when the Forest Officer dispensed with their services. The claimants stated that from time immemorial their family had been enjoying the rusum and rendering services as karnams in relation to the forest, and that in return a commission of Rs. 5-7-6 on every 100 rupees of the net income of the forest had been paid to them. The appellant repudiated the claim, but did not object to the jurisdiction of the Forest Settlement Officer. On the 31st May 1888, the Forest Settlement Officer held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim, the right asserted by respondents being neither a right in and over the forest nor a right to forest produc...
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