Chennai Court November 1892 Judgments
Vatta thevan Vs. Vandal Alagappudayan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-30-1892
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ44
ORDER1. Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, does not empower a Magistrate to fix a time during which a sanction may be in force. The legislature has expressly provided that the sanction shall not remain in force for more than six months, but has conferred no power on the authority granting the sanction to limit it to a shorter period. The orders must be set aside and the Deputy Magistrate must receive the complaints and dispose of them according to law....
Tag this Judgment!Queen-empress Vs. Ramasami Reddi
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-30-1892
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ178
1. In this case, certain standing crop was distrained for arrears of revenue. The accused are the real owners of the land on which the crop had stood and the parties in possession. But the pattas stood in the names of others and the demand in writing and the list of distrained property prescribed by Act II of 1864 were given to them alone. The accused carried away the crop and were charged with theft. Their defence was that they knew nothing of the distraint, that they cut and carried away their own crop, and that no one objected to their doing so. The Deputy Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that no demand was served upon them and that no list of distrained property was furnished to them. The, District Magistrate considers that as S. 8 of Act II of 1864 requires the service of a demand in writing only on the defaulter and the delivery of the list of distrained property only to him, the acquittal is wrong and refers the case for the orders of this court.2. The Deputy Magis...
Tag this Judgment!Queen-empress Vs. Ramasami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-30-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad364
1. In this case certain standing crop was distrained for arrears of revenue. The accused are the real owners of the land on which the crop had stood and the parties in possession. But the pattas stood in the names of others and the demand in writing and the list of distrained property prescribed by Act II of 1864 were given to them alone. The accused carried away the crop and were charged with theft. Their defence was that they knew nothing of the distraint, that they cut and carried away their own crop, and that no one objected to their doing so. The Deputy Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that no demand was served upon them and that no list of distrained property was furnished to them. The District Magistrate considers that as Section 8 of Act II of 1864 requires the service of a demand in writing only on the defaulter and the delivery of the list of distrained property only to him the acquittal is wrong and refers the case for the orders of this Court.2. The Deputy Mag...
Tag this Judgment!Venkatarayer Vs. Jambu Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-25-1892
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ97
1. The question before us is whether the appeal lies to the District Court or to the High Court. The suit in which the order was passed was one in which the subject-matter was over Rs. 5,000 in value and the appeal in the suit therefore lay to the High Court.2. As Section 589, Civil Procedure Code, was first enacted appeals from orders specified under Section 588, Clause 17, lay in all cases to the High Court. This was medified by Act VII of 1888 in which the court to hear the appeal in the suit was made to hear the appeal against the orders in insolvency matters. The section thus modified failed however to provide for cases in which orders in insolvency matters were passed by courts of small causes, and by Section 3, Act X of 1888, it was provided that an appeal from an order specified in Section 588, Clause 17, should lie (a) to the District Court when the order was passed by a court; subordinate to that court, and (b) to the High Court in any other case.3. The question therefore is ...
Tag this Judgment!Venkatrayar Vs. Jamboo Ayyan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-25-1892
Reported in: (1894)ILR17Mad377
1. The question before us is whether the appeal lies to the District Court or to the High Court. The suit in which the order was passed was one in which the subject-matter was over Rs. 5,000 in value and the appeal in the suit therefore lay to the High Court.2. As Section 589 of the Code of Civil Procedure was first enacted, appeals from orders specified under Section 588, Clause 17, lay in all cases to the High Court. This was modified by Act VII of 1888, in which the Court to hear the appeal in the suit was made the Court to hear the appeal against the orders in insolvency matters. The section thus modified failed, however, to provide for cases in which orders in insolvency matters were passed by Courts of Small Causes, and by Section 3, Act X of 1888, it was provided that an appeal from an order specified in Section 588, Clause 17, should lie (a) to the District Court when the order was passed by a Court subordinate to that Court; and (b) to the High Court in any other case.3. The q...
Tag this Judgment!Ramaswami Aiyar Vs. Rama Aiyar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-18-1892
Reported in: (1892)2MLJ288
1. It is first argued that the decree for mesne profits reserved to be ascertained in execution is not a decree for money and that therefore respondent was not entitled to apply under Section 273 for the attachment of the decree in satisfaction of his decree in O. S. No. 388 of 1885.2. We are of opinion the courts below were right in disallowing this contention. As observed by Hobhouse J. in Sharoda Moyee Burmonee v. Wooma Moyee Burmonee 8 W. R 11 with reference to Section 232, Act VIII of 1859, the decree was a decree for money in the sense that it represented a sum of money to be ascertained hereafter. It was also held, in Viraragava v. Varada I. L. R. 5 M 128, that the holder of a decree for unascertained mesne profits is of a money decree for the purpose of claiming rateable distribution under Section 295. The first contention therefore must be disallowed.3. It is then argued that as the heir of Ramasami the deceased plaintiff in the suit has not been made a party, the application ...
Tag this Judgment!M. Sangili Pandaram and ors. Vs. Mookan Alias Muthirala Pandaram
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-18-1892
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ137
1. [After holding that the plaintiff had not been adopted into a different family, the court proceeded:]The next point urged is that the District Judge was in error in deputing to the commissioner the enquiry as to what items of property were in possession of the defendants and their title thereto. It is pointed out that the judge virtually transferred the trial of every issue except the first issue to a commissioner thus investing him with much larger powers than can be legally delegated under Section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On this point we are constrained to hold that the objection must prevail. We are of opinion that 'a local investigation requisite for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute' presupposes the existence of some independent evidence on record which requires to be elucidated and that a court is not at liberty under Section 392 to delegate to a commissioner the trial of any material issue which it is bound to try. This was the view taken by another...
Tag this Judgment!Sangili and ors. Vs. Mookan
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-18-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad350
1. The first point taken in appeal is as to the alleged adoption of the plaintiff by his aunt Tayumuthu. As to this we agree with the District Judge that the evidence adduced to prove the adoption is altogether unreliable. Tayumuthu was not called as a witness. According to first defendant's own evidence, she had been a widow five or six years at the date of the alleged adoption. It is not explained why she should have delayed so long if she really wished to adopt a son to her late husband, and not a single question was put to show that the lady had any authority to make an adoption either from her late husband or from his sapindas. The only witness for defendants not of the Kallar caste, the kurnam, fifth witness, deposed that the plaintiff had lived with his father till he was turned out of the house on account of his marriage, and we agree with the District Judge that this was the true cause of the quarrel between father and son.2. The next point urged is that the District Judge was...
Tag this Judgment!Nilakanta Shanbhog Vs. Imam Sahib and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-11-1892
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ134
1. The first point taken in this second appeal is that the suit is barred by limitation. The argument for appellant (defendant) is that the cause of action arose at the time of the purchase by plaintiff in 1882 and therefore that the suit brought more than 6 years after that date is barred, whether the case is governed by Article 62 or Article 120 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. In our opinion the lower courts were right in holding that the cause of action arose at the date of the decree in Original Suit No. 65 of 1887 declaring that Subbamma the judgment-debtor whose hypothecation right plaintiff purchased, had no saleable interest in the property. Plaintiff could not have brought the present suit prior to that decree, for until then he maintained that Subbamma had a saleable interest. The present suit is really brought under Section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure which had been held to apply to suits, Pachayappan v. Narayana I. L. R. 11 M 269. No special period of l...
Tag this Judgment!Nilakanta Vs. Imamsahib and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-11-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad361
1. The first point taken in this second appeal is that the suit is barred by limitation. The argument for appellant (defendant) is that the cause of action arose at the time of the purchase by plaintiff in 1882, and therefore that the suit brought more than six years after that date is barred, whether the case is governed by article 62 or Article 120 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. In our opinion the lower Courts were right in holding that the cause of action arose at the date of the decree in Original Suit No. 65 of 1887, declaring that Subbamma, the judgment-debtor, whose hypothecation right plaintiff purchased, had no saleable interest in the property. Plaintiff could not have brought the present suit prior to that decree, for until then he maintained that Subbamma had a saleable interest. The present suit is really brought under Section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has been held to apply to suits--Pachayappan v. Narayana I.L.R. 11 Mad. 269 No special peri...
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