Chennai Court October 1892 Judgments
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Queen-empress Vs. Alagu Kone
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-05-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad421
1. We have no doubt that the statement A was really taken under the provisions of Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the only question is whether the Magistrate acting under that Section had power to administer an oath.2. The Additional Sessions Judge has distinguished this case from that of Empress v. Malka I.L.R. 2 Bom. 643 on the ground that, under Act X of 1872, the Magistrate was empowered by law (Section 331) to administer an oath. That Section was not re-enacted in the present Code, since under the Indian Oaths Act X of 1873, all Courts are authorized to administer oaths (Section 4), while Section 14 of the same Act imposes the obligation to state the truth. The term 'Court' includes all Magistrates (Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act).3. The direction in Section 164 that the statement shall be recorded in one of the manners prescribed for recording evidence is merely a direction as to procedure. The statement itself was one which the law (Section 164, Criminal ...
Sundaramaiyan Vs. Seethammal and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-04-1892
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ144
Muthusami Aiyar, J.1. The second respondent is a person of weak mind and the 1st respondent is his adoptive mother. The land in dispute originally belonged to the former and on the 22nd December 1883 he executed a sale-deed (Exh. IX) regarding it in appellant's favor for Rs. 50. On the 9th February 1884, he conveyed all his properties including the land in question under document B to his adoptive mother. In 1889 respondents brought this suit to recover the land with mesne profits on the ground that appellant took wrongful possession of it in 1885 and since continued to hold possession adversely to them. The plaint did not refer to the sale-deed Exh. IX nor did it pray that it should be cancelled or set aside, and the suit as based on the averments in the plaint, was one brought to recover possession of immovable property from appellant who held it adversely to respondents, and, as such, it would be governed by Article 144 of the second schedule of the Act of Limitations. For appellant...
Balakrishna Aiyar Vs. the Secretary of State for India in Council
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-04-1892
Reported in: (1893)3MLJ98
1. This was a suit brought by the appellant to establish his right to certain yearly remissions and to have it declared that the Government is not entitled to levy full assessment without granting those remissions. They are called Tiyaja-kori remission and Varam remission under the orders of the Board, of Revenue. The appellant rested his claim on a permanent cowle alleged to have been granted by the Goverment to his ancestors on the 29th April 1785. He stated further that so long as the amani system prevailed, the Government paid to appellant's family the excess kudivaram at the rates mentioned in the cowle and that when the system, of fixed money assessment was substituted for the amani system, the Government remitted a portion of the money assessment at certain rates till 1878. It was contended for respondent that the civil courts had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit relating to the rate and amount of assessment payable to the Government and that the claim was barred by limitatio...
Balakrishna Vs. the Secretary of State for India
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-04-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad294
1. This was a suit brought by the appellant to establish his right to certain yearly remissions and to have it declared that the Government is not entitled to levy full assessment without granting those remissions. They are called tiyagakari remission and varam remission under the orders of the Board of Revenue. The appellant rested his claim on a permanent cowle alleged to have been granted by the Government to his ancestors on the 29th April 1785. He stated further that so long as the amani system prevailed, the Government paid to appellant's family the excess kudivaram at the rates mentioned in the cowle and that, when the system of fixed money assessment was substituted for the amani system, the Government remitted a portion of the money assessment at certain rates till 1878. It was contended for respondent that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit relating to the rate and amount of assessment payable to the Government, and that the claim was barred by limitatio...
Ammunni Vs. Krishna
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-04-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad405
1. The second defendant has not been made a party to this appeal, nor was he a party to the appeal to the District Court, and the question which we have to decide is one arising between the plaintiff and the first defendant. The suit is virtually one to obtain a declaration as against the respondent that plaintiff is the legal representative of the deceased Raman Menon, and, as such, entitled, in preference to the respondent, to the certificate issued by the British Resident under Act XXVII of 1860 and to receive the interest due on the Government securities. It is conceded that both parties are domiciled in Native Cochin. There can be no doubt that, if the respondent had collected any money due as interest on the Government securities, a suit for money had and received would lie only in the Courts of Native Cochin, though the money had been received in British territory. The question as to who is the legal representative of the deceased Raman Menon is a question which, as between appe...
Sundaram Vs. Sithammal and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-04-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad311
Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. The second respondent is a person of weak mind, and the first respondent is his adoptive mother. The land in dispute originally belonged to the former, and on the 22nd December 1883, he executed a sale-deed (Exhibit IX) regarding it in appellant's favour for Rs. 50. On the 9th February 1884, he conveyed all his properties, including the land in question, under document B to his adoptive mother. In 1889 respondents brought this suit to recover the land with mesne profits on the ground that appellant took wrongful possession of it in 1885 and since continued to hold possession adversely to them. The plaint did not refer to the sale-deed (IX), nor did it pray that it should be cancelled or set aside, and the suit, as based on the averments in the plaint, was one brought to recover possession of immoveable property from appellant, who held it adversely to respondents, and, as such, it would be governed by Article 144 of the second schedule of the Act of Limitations. F...
Lakshmipathi Vs. Kandasami
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-03-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad54
1. The property in litigation is the poliapat or zamindari of Edayakottai in the Madura district. The zamindar Muthu Venkatadari Naik, who died in 1873, left sons by his two wives, of whom the defendant, the eldest son, succeeded to the zamindari. The plaintiff, who is the step-brother of the defendant, sues for partition of the zamindari, claiming a half share in the zamindari, the pannai lands and the moveables in defendant's possession. In the alternative he asks that he may be awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per annum. He also claims to recover from defendant Rs. 4,000, the sum borrowed by him and expended on his marriage.2. The Subordinate Judge of Madura (West) found that the estate was impartible and descended to a single heir by the rule and custom of primogeniture. With reference to the pannai lands he held that they had not been incorporated with the zamindari, but had all along been distinguished as the private property of the zamindar, and therefore decreed to ...
Channamma and anr. Vs. Ayyanna and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-03-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad283
1. It is argued that the letter, Exhibit A, contains merely a proposal to borrow and does not amount to an unconditional undertaking to pay and we have been referred to a case, Dhondbhat Narharbhat v. Atmaram Moreshvar I.L.R. 13 Bom. 669. That case is not in point, because the document did not contain, as Exhibit A does, any words indicative of the writer's intention, that if the addressee consented to make the loan the letter itself should operate as a security for repayment. The use of the words 'I will obtain back this letter' and ' you will lend on the strength of this letter,' indicate the intention of Ayyanna that the document should be retained by plaintiff's husband, if he sent the money as an unconditional undertaking to pay back the money on a certain date. The case is similar to one, in which a promissory note is sent along with a letter applying for a loan with the intention that the promissory note should be retained if the loan is made. The mere fact that the intention th...
Rajaram Vs. Krishnasami and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Oct-03-1892
Reported in: (1893)ILR16Mad301
1. The only question for determination is whether the defendant No. 3 took with notice of the plaintiff's right of pre-emption and of the necessity of his consent. The partition-deed was the first defendant's deed of title. By the partition he obtained a right to the specific portion of the house which he conveyed to the defendant No. 3. As remarked by jessel, Master of the Rolls, in Patman v. Harland L.R. 17 Ch. D. 353 constructive notice of a deed is constructive notice of its contents, provided that the deed is a deed relating to the title and forming part of the chain of title. Jones v. Smith I Hare, 43, which is relied on by the respondent, was referred to and it was held that that class of cases has no bearing at all on a case where the vendee knows that the deed of which he has notice is a deed affecting the land, and the question as to the extent to which it does affect the land can be ascertained only by looking at the deed itself. The third defendant's attention was drawn by ...
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