Chennai Court November 1891 Judgments
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Shangara Vs. Krishnan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-11-1891
Reported in: (1892)ILR15Mad267
1. Original Suit No. 610 of 1887 was instituted by the defendant No. 1, the plaintiff's brother, who is alleged by the plaintiff to have been his agent, the property which defendant No. 1 sought to recover in the above suit having been purchased in his name benami for the plaintiff. The question is whether the plaintiff is bound by the decision in that ease. The presumption is that the benamidar instituted the suit with the authority and consent of the true owner Gopi Nath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad I.L.R. 10 Cal. 697 and the lower Courts have found upon the evidence that the suit was instituted with the knowledge of the plaintiff. He is therefore as much bound by the decree as if he had himself instituted the suit, and the present suit is barred as being res judicata. The plaintiff stood by and permitted his undivided brother to sue for possession. There was nothing to put the person in possession upon inquiry as to who was the real owner, and it is too late now for plaintiff to be all...
Hayagreeva Vs. Sami and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-11-1891
Reported in: (1892)ILR15Mad286
1. We think that the lower Courts were right in holding that the plaintiff's right to go into defendants' land for the purpose of repairing his wall and roof was a right accessory to the easement which was established in the former suit of having the roof of his house projecting on defendants' land and discharging the water on defendants' land; and the lower Appellate Court was quite right in holding that there must be some limit of time to the exercise of such accessory right; but we think it was in error in only allowing the right to be exercised on one occasion and thus rendering further litigation necessary when other repairs become necessary in future. We shall modify the decree of the lower Appellate Court by providing that plaintiff's right of entering upon defendants' land to repair his roof and wall shall only be exercised once a year after one month's notice to defendants and between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p. m. Each party will bear his own costs of this second appeal.2. T...
Gomaji Vs. Subbarayappa and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-03-1891
Reported in: (1892)ILR15Mad253
1. In our opinion, the judgment of the District Judge is clearly wrong- By the terms of the instrument sued on, the defendants covenanted to pay the money, and, at the same time, the plaintiff was empowered to sell the property and realize the amount. Had the document been registered, it would have been competent to the plaintiff either to proceed on the covenant or to sue for sale of the mortgaged property. The decision in Mattongeney Dossee v. Ramnarain Sadkhan I.L.R. 4 Cal. 83 is distinguishable.2. We must reverse the decree of the District Judge and remand the appeal for disposal on the merits. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal. Other costs to be provided for in the revised decree....
Sadagopa Ramanjiah and ors. Vs. Mackenzie and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Nov-02-1891
Reported in: (1892)ILR15Mad79
1. Several points were raised by Mr. Rama Rau in this appeal, but the only one purporting to be a complete answer to the plaintiffs' claim and requiring any special notice is that the contract for breach of which damages have been decreed was invalid as being made in restraint of trade. The contract is expressed in two documents, dated the 13th May 1885, one of which was signed by the plaintiffs, and the other by the defendant. Shortly stated, the effect of it was on the one hand to oblige the defendant who had obtained a license under the Salt Commissioner to manufacture salt for a period of five years, and on the other hand to oblige the plaintiffs to take delivery of such salt at a certain price. Another material provision in the contract was that the defendant should not manufacture any salt in excess of the quantity which the plaintiffs might, at the commencement of any season, require to be manufactured. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that, as the contract had by implic...
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