Chennai Court August 1890 Judgments
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Queen-empress Vs. Suka Singh and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-08-1890
Reported in: (1891)ILR14Mad223
1. The petitioners, who are members of a body known as the Salvation Army, have been convicted under Section 71, clauses xi and xv of the Madras City Police Act, and have been sentenced to pay fines. The case was tried summarily by the Magistrate, and there has been, so far as we can see, no evidence recorded in the case.2. The Magistrate was not bound, under Sections 263 and 362 [In cases where no appeal lies, the Magistrate orRecord in eases where Bench of Magistrates need not record the evidence of the witnessesthere is no appeal. or frame a formal charge; but he or they shall enter in such formas the Local Government may direct the following particulars:(a) the serial number;(b) the date of the commission of the offence;(c)the date of the report or complaint;(d)the name of the complainant (if any);(e)the name, parentage and residence of the accused;(f)the offence complained of and the offence (if any) proved, and in cases coming underclause (d), clause (e) or clause (f) of Section ...
Thandavan Vs. Perianna
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-07-1890
Reported in: (1891)ILR14Mad363
1. This is a petition to revise the judgment of the Sessions Court of Coimbatore acquitting a person accused of an offence under Section 471 of the Penal Code. In cases of acquittal by a Sessions Court, the law allows an appeal on behalf of the Government and the reason for such a provision is obvious. The present is, however, the case of a private prosecutor seeking to put the Court in motion to revise an acquittal deliberately arrived at by the Sessions Judge concurring with the assessors. An appeal against an acquittal by way of revision is, in our opinion, not contemplated by the Code, and it should, we think, on public grounds, be discouraged.2. Acting, therefore, under the discretionary power given in Section 440, Criminal Procedure Code, we decline to hear the learned Counsel who appears to support the petition, and we dismiss the application....
Chomu Vs. Umma and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-05-1890
Reported in: (1891)ILR14Mad46
1. On behalf of the respondents, it is objected that, as the plaintiff might have sued for further relief, she is not entitled, with reference to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, to maintain the present suit for a mere declaration.2. Assuming, for the moment, that the plaintiff was able and called upon in this case to ask for further relief, we are of opinion, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Limba Bin Krishna v, Rama Bin Pimplu I.L.R. 13 Bom. 548, that the suit should not at the present stage be dismissed on this ground, the objeotion not having been raised in either of the Lower Courts.3. We are of opinion, however, having regard to the circumstances of this case that the relief sought for by way of declaration was sufficient, and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to ask for any further relief in the suit.3. The objections on this ground accordingly fail.4. The suit for a declaration being, for the reasons stated, maintainable, we are of opinion 'tha...
P. Ratnasabapathi Pillai, Chairman, Municipal Council Vs. Vaithilinga ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-04-1890
Reported in: (1896)6MLJ317
1. The act done was the erection of a toll gate on a vacant site. 2. The erection of toll gates or of bars for the collection of tolls is one of the duties imposed on Municipalities by the District Municipalities Act (Section 92), and the plaintiff's own case is that the act complained of was done by the Municipality through their Chairman. The 'finding of the Subordinate Judge that the act on which the plaintiff grounds his cause of action was not an act done under the District Municipalities Act is therefore in our opinion clearly erroneous in law, and this being so, the suit was clearly barred under Section 261 of Madras Act IV of 1884, it not having been brought until nearly 16 months had elapsed from the date on which the defendants had taken possession.3. We must allow the Appeal, and reversing the Subordinate Judge's decree, we restore the decree of the District Munsiff dismissing the suit. Appellant (defendant) will receive his costs....
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